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ABSTRACT

This collection of papers begins with a position paper by L.F. Helbig describing the German studies movement and its implementation to date. V. Lange contributes a survey of German studies in America. Two papers by E. Herlitzius and H.D. Schaefer discuss the role of national economic planning and of higher education in the German Democratic Republic. The other papers demonstrate the interdisciplinary focus of German studies: (1) "Convergence, Ostpolitik and the Berlin Accords" by J.E. Smith, (2) "Social Change in the FRG and the GDR" by P.C. Ludz, (3) "German Government and Politics from the Textbook Author's Viewpoint" by J.H. Herz, (4) "Competition in Miracles?--How to Study the Postwar Development of the German Economies" by H.D. Renning, (5) "The Bundeswehr: A New Phase in Civil-Military Relations in the Federal Republic of Germany" by H.P. Secher, (6) "Education as Change Agent and Change Object in the Two Germanies" by R.F. Lawson, (7) "Teaching Postwar German Culture--An Undisciplined Discipline" by G.H. Weiss, (8) "A Reader on Postwar Germany for American Students--Some Preliminary Thoughts" by W. Koepke, and (9) "GDR Literature--A Literature of Conflict and Dissent" by M. Eifler. The volume concludes with the texts of conference discussions and remarks by G. Stern. (Author/PMP)

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Teaching Postwar Germany in America

Papers and Discussions

German Studies Conference
Indiana University
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Edited by
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PREFACE

Three questions dominated the papers and the discussions at this first interdisciplinary *German Studies Conference*: 1. How should Postwar Germany be taught in America if "Germany" has indeed become an out-of-date political term on the cultural map of Central Europe? 2. Should the scope of American Germanistic studies be adjusted by observing the ideological distinctions between West Germany and East Germany, and if so, how? 3. Finally, if "Germany" today is to mean the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, where does this leave Austria and Switzerland, the other two German culture areas?

It ought to be stated at the outset, and in order to avoid misunderstandings, that this meeting did not produce any concrete answers to these questions. Some of the papers presented and the discussions seemed to indicate that a new "cultural approach" might become the necessary methodological tool in this new teaching task. At any rate, it became clear that the Germanistic profession will not be able to solve it alone, but that the American teacher and scholar is ready to help solve the conceptual as well as the methodological problems realized by German Studies. This is the reason why representatives from all disciplines dealing with Postwar Germany and teachers from all levels were invited. For the same reason the papers as well as the discussions are presented here—the latter cautiously edited from tapes recorded at the meeting.

Resubmitting all issues in the form of the present volume for further critical and practical evaluation will, hopefully, facilitate the current reappraisal in many disciplines focusing on "German" subject matters from a North American vantage point. Whether interdisciplinary culture studies and a greater emphasis on the contemporary "German" scenes will in fact achieve this, will depend on the individual teacher's effort and imagination as well as on the viability of the German Studies concept itself.

Our thanks go to all participants, discussants, and panel chairmen, especially to the contributors: Professor Ludz (West Germany), Professors Herlitzius and Schaefer (East Germany), Professors Lawson and Smith (Canada), Professors Eifler, Herz, Koepke, Lange, Renning, Secher, and Weiss (United States). We also thank Professor Stern (University of Cincinnati), rapporteur of the conference, and his assistant, Mr. George Schwyzer.

We gratefully acknowledge the support from the *Stiftung Volkswagenwerk* for both the conference and this publication.

Indiana University
Bloomington, Indiana
October 1972

The Editors

Papers

THE CONCEPT OF A GERMAN STUDIES PROGRAM

Louis F. Helbig

The German Studies Conference: Teaching Postwar Germany in America has been organized by the Institute of German Studies at Indiana University with the following objectives in mind:

1 *The German Studies Conference*, as the first national forum in this field, will focus on problems of teaching and research as related to the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

2 As an interdisciplinary conference it will try to define a suitable approach to the problem of teaching the German-speaking culture areas of contemporary central Europe at American universities, colleges, and high schools.

3 Equal attention will be given to the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic.

4 Special emphasis will be placed on all pedagogical issues.

In order to achieve these goals, the Institute of German Studies has invited you, a group of more than 200 teachers and scholars from all parts of the country, West Germany, East Germany, and Canada.[1] We are a truly interdisciplinary group. We have representatives from the traditional German Language and Literature departments, Political Science, Economics, History, Sociology, Philosophy, Law, and Pedagogy. There will be contributions from all countries mentioned. Let me add at this point: Since the concept of German Studies includes culture in four central European countries—West Germany, East Germany, Austria, and Switzerland—the absence of speakers from the last two countries must be noted with regret. Problems relating to Austria and Switzerland are part of German Studies; they may be dealt with on a future occasion.

No interdisciplinary conference has ever been completely satisfactory for all participating disciplines. In our case, an additional dissatisfaction will remain in that no accord will be reached between the views represented by the two states under discussion: the FRG and the GDR. Some of our West German guests may leave dissatisfied because too much may be said about East Germany. Our East German guests have shown some concern over the announcement that the GDR will be treated here as one of the four German cultural areas and not exclusively as a separate political entity, which it also is. Political scientists may find it difficult to accept that political considerations will not be the only focal point in the discussions. Germanists may regret that such an important issue as teaching culture through language had to be excluded. The language teacher may have to leave without having discovered how German culture and German language will fit into the latest trend toward individualized instruction. Finally, sociologists, economists, and historians may be disturbed by the apparent de-emphasis of statistically proven data and the dangers of a minimal historical distance from the period treated.

I would like to submit that all of us, no matter which discipline we represent, stand to gain from this meeting in so far as we are first and foremost teachers. Therefore the differences between our disciplines and our approaches will tend to disappear in view of the task before us: teaching postwar Germany in America. The following remarks, then, are intended to describe briefly the concept of German Studies and the new teaching approach which it seems to demand.

I

The concept of German Studies implies that German culture in central Europe today is composed of four German culture areas. Culture, being a human phenomenon in space and time, is subject to the process of history. German culture, the four culture areas, and German history have found as many interpretations as there are world views, German and non-German. Not all of them can be defined here. Similarly, defining in detail the West German and East German views of German culture and history can only be named as a necessary task for German Studies. Also, how West and East Germans see themselves and each other are important aspects of teaching postwar Germany in America. *The most important criterion in this meeting is how we, as teachers in America, are to present German culture and the two main German culture areas to our students.* Ultimately, it is the way in which we understand our own American culture—the Germans speak of *Selbstverständnis—which* might be improved through teaching foreign cultures; the West and East German *Selbstverständnis* is a problem the Germans have to solve for themselves. A German Studies program can only record it, not solve it.

Historically speaking, there has never been one monolithic tradition of German culture. More often there have been times in German history when one historical tradition, especially in the political field, has suppressed rivaling traditions. Both West and East Germany have one and the same historical and political tradition in the sense that they are the successor states to the three German nation states after 1871: Imperial

Germany, the Weimar Republic, and the Third Reich. As far as literature, philosophy, the arts, even politics are concerned, West Germany and East Germany appear to have one common tradition from the American point of view. Obviously, this view does not take into account what has happened since 1945 in West and East Germany. At least we are not sufficiently aware that the two German states are in effect laying claim to different mainstreams in what appears to us as one and the same tradition. Both German states are making use of their interpretation of what the German tradition is for them. In this way both are trying to justify their self-claimed right to represent that which, in their views, is the 'true' German tradition. This is why today there are two different German culture areas in addition to the Austrian and Swiss culture areas. Neither West Germany nor East Germany can be "blamed" for this situation because those two sides of the same tradition were always there, at least since 1871. It cannot be the task of a German Studies program in America to settle this German conflict or to take sides in it. One thing seems certain, however, and this is that the idea of a German Studies program and the concept of German culture areas is the best possible way in which 'postwar Germany' can be dealt with objectively and profitably in America.

There are four reasons which confirm this assertion. Each pertains to specific aspects of our subject matter and to our own vantage-point: the German political tradition; some practical considerations in the field of teaching methodology; the American concept of culture and the culture area; and the American tradition of area studies. Let me deal with all four in this order.

1 *The German political tradition.* The question has been asked what 'Germany' really is, and when and where it existed. Ralf Dahrendorf, a West German sociologist and political scientist, has posed and answered it in this way: "When is Germany? Roughly speaking, in the last hundred years. Where is Germany? In all territories that belonged to Germany during this span of time."[2]

These answers are of limited usefulness in the sense that they comment implicitly on the political and historical dimensions of the German culture area. Obviously, they can also lead to misunderstandings when one thinks of the German nation state. But even more obvious is the fact that they do not help us in trying to cope with the present situation or with these larger, more difficult questions: What is 'Germany?' What is the German nation? Nobody seems able or willing to answer these questions.

Even Karl Jaspers, the eminent German philosopher, could not answer it. He said: "The Germans have created states. But no state is the German state."[3]

It becomes clear that political distinctions alone do not seem to help solve the task before us: teaching postwar Germany in America. However, if we choose the concept of German culture and its culture areas as the basis for our undertaking, then we stand a much better chance of being able to accomplish this objective. At least we would avoid these unanswerable questions: What is 'Germany?' What is the German nation? This is the first proof for the viability of German Studies in America.

2 *Methodological considerations.* We have seen that it may be advisable to stay on the relatively safe ground which the concept of German culture areas represents. If we were to follow a different approach, the matter would become much more complicated. For example, we might ask this question: Is it legitimate to subsume the existence of two German states under the concept of German Studies or, as the East Germans see it, of two German nations? The answer, to the American observer, is simple. Whether the two Germanies are states or nations is a German problem. For us, they are two German culture areas with one cultural tradition until 1945. Seen in the historical perspective, there is but one German culture which the German-speaking countries in central Europe have in common as a result of their commonly experienced historical tradition on the basis of language and geography. The American social scientist will add in the same breath that West Germany and East Germany represent only the two most important German culture areas. From our vantage point, this is a very practical distinction because it allows for the Austrian and Swiss culture areas. Furthermore, it avoids the danger of seeing all four German culture areas under a one language/one culture/one nation concept.

The concept of German Studies is bound to aggravate both the West German side, which may prefer 'West German Studies,' and the East German side, which appears to insist on 'East German Studies' on the basis of separate nationhood. But these are German viewpoints, German demands. It seems clear, therefore, that the American teacher and scholar finds himself in a more advantageous position than both his West German colleague who may tend to dispute the existence of these *two* cultures, *two* societies, *two* states, and possibly *two* nations, and his East German colleague for whom this view is the indisputable premise. This is the second proof for the viability of the German Studies concept.

3. The third proof consists of yet another advantage which the American teacher and scholar enjoys in comparison with his West and East German colleagues: *the American concepts of culture and the culture area*. It is a well-known fact that German scholars have traditionally maintained a sharp distinction between culture (*Kultur*) and civilization (*Zivilisation*), drawing a somewhat problematic line between an 'inner,' 'individualistic' realm of ethics, esthetics, and philosophy in contrast to an 'outer,' 'social' realm of technology, government, and all manifestations of daily life. This notion is still prevalent in West Germany.

In socialist East Germany culture (*Kultur*) is seen as "the totality of all material, intellectual, artistic, and moral values created by mankind and serving its development into higher stages."[4] 'Development' here means progress in terms of the Marxist, change-oriented view of society. Therefore the West German concept of culture can be called idealistic in the sense that it excludes a substantial portion of reality—production, technology, custom, behavior, etc.—which is part of culture. At first sight, the East German concept of culture seems more useful in that it is holistic. However, we cannot use it in German Studies because of its dogmatism in view of social change.

The American concept of culture, which is synonymous with civilization for most scholars, is descriptive in nature. Culture, according to the American cultural anthropologist, is seen as "the totality of material and non-material traits, together with their associated behavior patterns, plus the language uses which a society possesses."[5] This concept, together with the concept of the culture area as "a contiguous geographic area comprising a number of societies that possess the same or similar traits or that share a dominant cultural orientation,"[6] is more appropriate for German Studies in America than any of the German concepts. The American concept of culture is free from the idealistic notion that culture is superior to civilization; it is also free from the dogmatic notion that culture must serve political and ideological aims. The American concept of culture simply records what is, not what might be or what must be. German Studies describes the German culture areas. This is the third proof for the viability of the idea of German Studies.

4. The fourth proof follows from the American tradition of area studies. In the 1930's a new interdisciplinary branch of cultural anthropology emerged in the U.S. under the name of American Studies. It was conceived as a discipline which was to focus on the American society in a way comparable to the German Studies approach to postwar Germany.

This discipline of American Studies focuses on the many historical and cultural traditions in this country, the main manisfestations of American culture as well as our country's sub-cultures. Without going into details at this point, I would like to suggest that German Studies can learn a lot from the way in which that discipline has tried to come to terms with its subject matter and teaching problems. By simply substituting 'German Studies' for 'American Studies' in the following quotation, the problems of American Studies can be compared directly with our problems in German Studies. Richard E. Sykes writes:

> "American Studies (German Studies) is young, and thus, inevitably, has been unsure of its goals and methods. Part of its uncertainty is due to the skeptical attitudes of some scholars who identify themselves with the older, more respectable and secure disciplines. But despite the matter of prestige, the problem of theory and method is very real. As yet there is no generally recognized theory of American Studies (German Studies), and thus we do not really know who we are, and what we are doing. There is even disagreement as to whether or not such a theory is desirable at this time. While a number of scholars have suggested theories and methods, others feel that the best procedure is to avoid dogmatic definition of content or method, and to wait for the discipline to define itself through practice."[7]

In this quotation the following issues are of relevance to German Studies: the task of defining German Studies *vis-à-vis* the older disciplines, notably *Germanistik, Kulturgeschichte, Volkskunde, Geistesgeschichte,* and *Geschichte* (which refer to the study and the teaching of German language and literature, cultural history, folklore, intellectual history, and history proper); the problem of theory and method; the problem of identity; the question whether German Studies is, or needs to be, a discipline of its own. Hopefully, we will know more about those issues at the end of this meeting.

II

As has been suggested, the concept of a German Studies program centers on the task of teaching contemporary German culture and the German culture areas. Therefore, some comments seem necessary on the pedagogical issues and the methodology of German Studies.[8] Since German Studies focuses on all material and non-material traits in contemporary German culture, the term 'cultural approach' seems to be most appropriate for our purposes. How could one define this cultural approach? First, it means that all features of the German culture areas are to be dealt with side by side, without any single aspect being elevated into a dominant position. Politics, for example, is of course included in the cultural approach. But politics will not be its determining criterion. Similarly, in the case of the other disciplines dealing with aspects of German culture, none of them ought to be considered the master discipline if the cultural approach is followed. Here the advantage of the American concept of culture becomes fully apparent. This is clearly in line with our attempt to take into account all aspects of culture in the German-speaking countries. The cultural approach does not imply that all aspects of German culture, West and East, are of equal importance. It seems natural that some are more important to us than for West Germans or East Germans, not to mention such preeminent aspects as the political and economic conditions. A German Studies program, then, ought to avoid getting involved too closely with any one discipline. The essence of the cultural approach is that it is interdisciplinary.

There is at least one difficulty which follows from this. Interdisciplinary, comparative, or cross-cultural programs are sometimes seen as havens of dilettantism. It is argued that no single scholar can be a jack-of-all-disciplines. Although this critique is not without foundation, it must be said in defence of German Studies that research and teaching are two different aspects of our work. In doing research the German Studies scholar is as much a specialist as his colleague in a monodisciplinary program. In the area of teaching, however, where a multitude of aspects is dealt with —culture, politics, society, economics, the churches, the military, etc.— what looks like madcap dilettantism is actually a quite sober pedagogical intention. Offering survey courses with an interdisciplinary content seems pedagogically honest for two reasons: First, they give the student the necessary overview, which is a worthwhile educational objective in itself; furthermore, they allow him to move into the discipline of his choice without forcing him too early into a rigid monodisciplinary course of studies. This is a special problem at the university level, someone may rightfully say. Therefore the cultural approach would have to be modified at the high school level.

The cultural approach is, of course, nothing new. The Germans have had a science of culture or *Kulturwissenschaft* for some time, although it does not seem to have survived postwar university reforms. But there never was a course called 'culture studies' or *Kulturkunde* in the German high school curriculum. Some recent meetings of scholars in West Germany, such as the national forums of the *Germanists* (*Germanistentage*) and a series of meetings with international participation organized by the *Goethe-Institut* in 1970, have discussed in some detail the well-known and sometimes misused concept of *Deutschlandkunde*. It seems obvious that the translation of this word, which is 'German Studies,' is much more appropriate, simply because the German word 'Deutschland' is in the singular, whereas 'German Studies' implies that there is no 'study of Germany' (*Deutschlandkunde*), only a course of studies directed towards the German culture areas.

Leaving aside the problem of disciplinary nomenclature, it is very interesting to note that, from the West German point of view, *Kulturwissenschaft* and *Kulturkunde* still lack a systematic methodology. Other European countries, like France, have revolutionized German Studies in recent years, apparently without having suffered from the same kind of scruples as the Germans. Professor Pierre Bertaux' French concept of German Studies, which became operational in 1966-67, has included very successfully a great number of social, political, economic, and other aspects of German culture. The new French concept of "études allemandes"—which used to be "études germaniques"—can be also compared with our concept of German Studies presented here. The only difference consists of the fact that the German Studies program at the *Institut d' allemande* in Asnières is not only dealing with postwar Germany, it is reinterpreting and systematizing the totality of German history with an emphasis on German literature. There can be no doubt, however, that this French undertaking deserves our close attention.

It does not take too much imagination to foresee considerable changes in the near future in all disciplines dealing with aspects of German culture, not only in the field of German language and literature. The winds of change are blowing in West Germany; they have been blowing for some time in East Germany; and they are beginning to blow here. It is not difficult to see that there will be a shift towards social, sociological, and political considerations in many fields dealing with aspects of German culture. As always in such cases, the newly discovered subject matter will require new methods. All contributions to this conference are meant to provoke comments on this new cultural approach and its interdisciplinary method.

III

There are very few German Studies programs in our country at this time. For this reason it may be of interest to look at some of the courses taught by the Institute of German Studies at Indiana University.

The Institute offers a survey course as well as topical courses. The survey course has been taught five times over the past six semesters, sometimes as a team teaching course, or by visiting professors. There is strong evidence that the team-teaching approach is particularly successful in the field of German Studies. It exposes the student to the various aspects of the German culture areas, especially West and East Germany, which are ideally presented by experts in the field. Visiting scholars as well as regular staff usually stress the discipline they are most familiar with. This survey course deals with selected political, social, economic, and cultural aspects of the FRG and the GDR.

Four topical courses are being taught at the Institute of German Studies. The first one deals with literature and society in West Germany and East Germany, stressing the differences in the roles of literature, the author, and the reader in the two German states. A second course, taught by political scientists, focuses on the FRG, dealing in some detail with voter behavior, political learning, and political beliefs. The third topical course is devoted to the GDR. The fourth course focuses on German Culture since 1945. In it we try to analyze cultural, artistic, and intellectual developments in West and East Germany since the end of World War II as well as differences and similarities in 'western' and 'socialist' culture. We also evaluate critically such German concepts as *Kultur*, *Zivilisation*, *Kulturgeschichte*, *Kulturindustrie*, *Kulturpolitik*, *etc.*, and we discuss typical manifestations and recent trends in the arts, music, architecture, literature, theatre, film, and television.

The Institute of German Studies at Indiana University is fully aware of the fact that those course offerings can only be considered a modest beginning.

IV

German Studies is a new field. As with any emerging discipline, what we are doing today will be different tomorrow. This should not keep us from formulating our concerns, goals, and methods now. Indeed, it is our duty to do so. Only then will we be able to overcome any possible shortcomings in the present stage of our development. With this in mind let me suggest ten points which are intended to define German Studies in America.

1 German Studies is an area program dealing with the German-speaking countries in the geographical area of central Europe. The term 'area program' indicates that the concept of German Studies is not based on political distinctions alone but on the geographical regions occupied by the four German culture areas.

2 The subject matter of German Studies is German culture as manifested in its four main culture areas. 'Culture' is not identical with '*Kultur*.' It is based on the American concept of culture which comprises all material and non-material traits of a given culture. Politically speaking, the four German culture areas are more or less congruent with the political entities of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, the Republic of Austria, and the Swiss Confederation.

3 German Studies is a branch of culture studies. German culture cannot be defined in terms of any single German culture area. The unifying concept of German Studies is culture, not the concepts 'Germany' or 'the German nation(s).'

4 As an interdisciplinary area program German Studies deals with all aspects of German culture. 'Interdisciplinary' means that no discipline ought to be master over any other discipline. German Studies cannot take sides in any controversy between the two German states which are under discussion here. Such issues are to be discussed and analyzed as dispassionately and impartially as possible.

5 German Studies focuses on the contemporary situation in the German-speaking culture areas. 'Contemporary' means that the emphasis is on the period after 1945. It is obvious, however, that our work should not neglect entirely historical developments before 1945.

6 German Studies is comparative in the sense that two, or all four, German culture areas are being compared. Describing differences and similarities in the German culture areas is the main task for most of our teaching and research undertakings.

7 German Studies can be cross cultural. This means that differences and similarities of the German cultures can be related back to the student's environment: his native American culture. This is how German Studies as a foreign culture program may achieve better recognition and more support from school boards and boards of trustees.

8 Proponents of German Studies are not seeking departmental status for their discipline; they consider German Studies as a pioneering endeavor within existing German language and literature departments. Where established as an area program, German Studies tries to contribute teaching experiences, research findings, and teaching personnel to existing departments dealing with postwar Germany.

9 The method of research in German Studies is the same as in culture studies in this country. In other words, it tends to treat equally all material and non-material aspects of a culture.

10 In regard to teaching, the pluralistic subject matter somehow defies a narrow methodological concept. Nevertheless, we may assert the adequacy of a "cultural approach" as the most viable one to date. Since we subscribe to the idea of an interdisciplinary academic subject that appeals to students of all disciplines, the language of instruction at the university will normally be English. While the knowledge of German is, of course, desirable, it must not be considered a prerequisite for German Studies.

● **Indiana University**

1 There were 226 registered participants at the German Studies Conference. This figure does not include on-campus visitors.

2 Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany*, Doubleday (New York, 1969), p. 16.

3 Karl Jaspers, "Was ist deutsch?" In: *Hoffnung und Sorge: Schriften zur deutschen Politik 1945-1965*, R. Piper & Co. Verlag (Munich, 1965), p. 353.

4 *Der grosse Duden*, 16. Aufl., VEB Bibliographisches Institut Leipzig (Leipzig, 1969), S. 260.

5 S. Winston, *Culture and Human Behavior* (New York, 1933), cit. A. L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard U., Vol. XLVII, No. 1 (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), p. 43.

6 *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, G. C. Merriam Co. (Springfield, Mass., 1968), p. 552.

7 Richard E. Sykes, "American Studies and the Concept of Culture: A Theory and a Method," in: Robert Merideth (ed.), *American Studies. Essays on Theory and Method*, Charles E. Merrill Publ. Co. (Columbus, Ohio, 1968), p. 71.

8 Problems of culture in language teaching and in civilization courses are discussed in considerable detail in: Eberhard Reichmann (ed.), *The Teaching of German: Problems and Methods* (Philadelphia, 1970), esp. pp. 268-280.

GERMAN STUDIES IN AMERICA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Victor Lange

Let me, I am sure on behalf of all of us, say at once how grateful we are for the splendid opportunity which Indiana University and the Institute have provided for a discussion of issues that move and trouble us as teachers and scholars concerned with contemporary German affairs. The large number of those who have come to attend this gathering and who thereby offer evidence of an interest in intercultural studies is, I feel, a measure of our gratitude.

This symposium is especially welcome at a time when teachers and administrators of German and of foreign language studies in general, tend to display a mood that is more sober and perhaps more self-critical than at any time during the past thirty years. Enrollments in most of the languages, certainly on the college level, have declined: between 1968 and 1970, when general enrollments increased by 13%, French and German declined by 7%; requirements—those happy guarantees of a more or less captive audience—have, in nearly 50% of all colleges and universities been abolished; graduate enrollments have declined, and reflect the bearish prospects of the job market. No wonder if a melancholy and a troubled mood has fallen over many departments whose faculty may have been reduced, whose support for graduate study has been diminished and who are not quite certain what to do next.

Even if this is not a universal experience it has, happily, led to a serious reassessment of what we are about. It is not likely that we can reinstate the language requirement and reverse the dislike among students and faculty for a device that is widely regarded as protectionist and that has for too long been maintained in favor of a special subject, the learning of a foreign language (which may or may not be used later), and an incidental understanding of the foreign culture. (The distinction between language and culture is deliberately made; but it must not be misunderstood to suggest that students are altogether uninterested in the languages. Their rebellion seems to me directed more at the element of coercion than at language learning as such. Those who have had an opportunity to experience the battle for and against the language requirement seem to be in agreement that, if the language requirement alone is abolished, the enrollment may well suffer; however, where *all* requirements are abolished, an attractive program of language and culture studies can successfully compete with offerings in other fields, and the enrollment in the language departments is likely to rise. I shall later elaborate on the obvious conclusions which we must draw.)

We are, at any rate, deluded if we pity ourselves as the victims of unhappy circumstances, of academic plotting or even of a supposedly congenital American indifference or hostility towards foreign languages. The reasons for the present plight may lie in the quality of our teaching; they are at the same time more complex, more interesting and, I am inclined to think, more challenging than the sweeping excuses with which we are tempted to cover the shock of having our effectiveness questioned and reduced.

What has for some time been questioned is our often asserted and indeed historically sanctioned assumption that the teaching of languages, ancient and modern, as a means of accesss to another culture, is a central ingredient in the pursuit of education. This assumption has increasingly lost its cogency not because we appear to have surrendered that peculiarly American faith in a liberal education, not because the social scientist seems to have usurped the major share in the curriculum, but because the central tenet of our faith, the civilizing character of language itself, has been effectively challenged. It has been challenged by the two authorities on whose views and actions our welfare is bound to depend, those concerned with reflecting on the function of language and those concerned in a much larger sense with an interpretation of the functioning of society. The work of the linguist and the new methodology of the social sciences, let me not hesitate to say what is bound to be obvious, have for us been of incalculable consequence! Whether we like it or not, the character and scope of our efforts to interpret a culture through the medium of its langage have been profoundly affected. They have been affected by one summary contention: that it is dangerous to assume that language is the central, the most telling vehicle of the values by which a society defines and projects itself. Other forms of definition, some supplied by members of that culture itself, others indeed by those not belonging to it, seem to offer a vocabulary and a syntax of cultural understanding at least as reliable and perhaps as fascinating as language.

That a literary man like myself for whom language is an instrument of vital significance, should become somewhat melancholy at this sort of reflection goes without saying. At the same time I must confess that I have never thought that it was sensible to consider my talking and writing about German literature as a superior means of access to German culture. I have read German books much as I have read Balzac or Henry James, as works of literature for which, of course, the particular language provides the nearly indispensable material for critical judgment but which are related to one another more within a canon of absolute excellence than within any national context.

To say, when we read *Faust* or *Siebenkäs* or *Stopfkuchen* or the *Duino Elegies* or even *Katz und Maus*, "this is excellent because it tells me what Germans are like," would seem to me absurd and certainly misleading. That these books have—or may have—contributed to the sum total of the German experience which may as such, as a system of culture, be worth interpreting is a different sort of assertion, and a thoroughly legitimate one.

It is too soon in my argument to speak of the role of literature in a constellation in which language seems in some serious sense no longer the self-evident or cardinal means of access to cultural studies or, putting it differently, in a situation in which we may well have to ask what we are teaching languages for, if it is not to tell our students that the Germans are the way they speak. We shall, of course, continue to have language students if we teach the language well and if we keep the uses of such teaching clearly in mind. Its use may be purely practical, in which case we must teach it efficiently and without lofty pretensions. The number of students is increasing who are well aware that many Germans speak excellent English and that Karl Marx or Hermann Hesse may quite satisfactorily be read in English, but who realize that without knowing German they cannot find their way into the great poets who now fascinate students here and in England or France: Hölderlin, Novalis, Kleist, Büchner, Benn, Kafka. There are, it seems to me, many and excellent customers who will, if we meet them on intelligent and mature ground, come to us without the persuasion of a language requirement; and these are the ones whose perception of language and of its untranslatable devices we can most richly enlarge.

I hope you do not misunderstand me to say that only poetry should justify our work. But our justification for a traditional form of language and culture study can only be that what we offer leads to a kind of perception that nothing else will produce. A thorough competence in the German language may not be indispensable for a broad view of contemporary German society. But no thorough analysis of a culture is, of course, imaginable without familiarity with the language. There can be no disputing this truism. But we must be concerned with feasibility: we should provide intelligent access to a wide range of cultural features. But to make an adequate mastery of the foreign language the prerequisite for an understanding of the economic, the political and the social scene leads to superficiality in both areas and to amiable dilettantism.

Language, yes, as much of it as is sensibly achievable, (effectively taught by teachers who, beyond their native equipment or their enthusiasm, have been taught how to teach), and well-focused as to its purpose; but at the same time an ample, well-informed and intelligent view of the life of the people who speak that language today. The two are related but not, I feel, interdependent, and the formula I have just used suggests a program of cultural studies that may well differ in essential respects, in its rationale, its subject matter and its methods, from the sort of "language-literature-and-culture" pattern that has for long been sacrosanct.

It will be different, in the first place, because within our system of education we have ceased to defend what I would call the Emersonian concept of the study of a foreign culture: that is, the notion that we should approach particularly the European civilizations with deference and in a spirit of emulating an exemplary form of life.

We no longer confidently maintain, as did the Transcendentalists, or the generation of William James, that to know the German world, its traditions, its ideals, its achievements, especially in education, is to be in the presence of a venerable body of experience which we should live up to. Neither the classical nor the modern cultures can, in our pluralistic system of values, in that sense be regarded as uniquely compelling models—each, whether Greek or French or German or Chinese, functions within our educational philosophy as one in a competitive variety of alternatives.

Whatever features or accomplishments in a foreign culture we find stirring or admirable, we have learned to place (or must learn to place) in a comparative context without the kind of respect that is static, sentimental and merely affirmative. Our approach, all this is to say, to an understanding of a different culture, is no longer normative but pragmatic, experimental, critical.

I think I am not blind to the excellence immanent in a society if I now ask, concretely, whether much that we regard with keen interest and respect in the contemporary German scene is not, when all is said and done, common to all modern industrial societies, and admirable in terms far larger than any national context: the striking technological superiority that produced, only a decade ago, incomparable cameras and electronic equipment and that seemed to us the result of impressive German postwar characteristics, has now passed to the Japanese. The Leica has been superseded by the Nikon, Grundig radios have ceased competing with Sony—their parts are in any case produced in Japan. If you resent the technological focus, are the Karajans, the Fischer-Dieskaus or the Stockhausens admirable because they reflect a peculiarly German (or Austrian) musical genius? They are, in fact, figures and phenomena in a totally international market of music making and far less German than Muck or Weingartner were felt to be when they conducted Wagner in New York. Is contemporary German music "German" or is it part of that fundamental revolution in music to which any musician, wherever he composes, is bound to contribute? There is only good modern music and bad, but no music is good, no film, no painting, no theory of behavior or of knowledge is to-day fascinating, simply because it is German or Italian or Greek.

Indeed, I am inclined to argue that even the most interesting figures in contemporary German literature, Grass, Enzensberger, Jürgen Becker, Thomas Bernhard, Handke, derive their appeal not so much from any uniquely regional cultural or social premises as from an awareness of contemporary issues and of a contemporary sensibility that is common to all western societies. To speak of any of these in an essentially German or Austrian context is to indulge in cultural patriotism of the sort that we should at all cost avoid and discourage.

In their justification, then, as well as in their subject matter, German cultural studies need to-day to be rethought and retooled. I have questioned the first; let me touch on the second, the substance, the subject matter of any concern with contemporary German society. I think that it is true to say that we have in the past, because of our faith in the inherently central and revealing character of language, operated largely in the aesthetic realm; we have maintained the pre-eminence, as pedagogical material, of literary texts which we hoped would illuminate and enliven our students' interest in the German achievement past or present. I have already confessed to my own predilection, by training and disposition, for literature as the vehicle of my teaching. But the overwhelming evidence relegates my role to that of a partial contributor to the total enterprise, we should at the most satisfying level presuppose a knowledge of the language, but I have long enough taught increasingly large groups of indubitably superior students much about the masters of German literature through translated texts of inevitably limited adequacy but nevertheless of rich and fascinating substance. To question whether the study of German literature in translation is a legitimate exercise seems to me a waste of time, and a sign of literary and pedagogical obtuseness. We shall totaly abdicate our responsibility as interpreters of culture, if we fail to recognize that neither the Bible nor Homer nor Dostoevsky would have had a wide circulation if their reading in translation had been regarded with the horror of many of our present-day defenders of modern languages.

Two things seem to me of utmost importance for an effective conduct of these ever more plausible courses in foreign literature in translation: they should not be merely a translated course in the history—or in fragments of the history—of German literature, but a discussion of those modern texts which have contributed significantly to the articulation of interests and issues that motivate the feelings and thoughts of our students. Here too, we can no longer assume the normative function of our material or indeed our very activity as teachers. Goethe, I am afraid, may at present suffer, and so will many of our most revered and beloved German writers,—Stifter, Keller, Storm, Hauptmann—but no one who has interpreted *Woyzeck* or Heine's *Reisebilder*, Nietzsche, Wedekind, *Malte Laurids Brigge* or *Törless*, Kafka or Th. Mann can have failed to arouse a sense of excited involvement and discovery in our students. And none will fail, if he has learned to use not merely the literary categories borrowed from our venerable German elders, Strich, Gundolf or Korff, but the critical directions provided by those who occupy much of the thinking of our best students, whether Marx, Lukács or Levi-Strauss, Leavis or Northrop Frye, and even, to descend to the lesser prophets, Marcuse or Norman O. Brown. Here, as in so many other contexts of our work as interpreters of a foreign culture, we need a kind of teaching that is far more aware than has been the case in the past, of the impact of our own American concerns, preoccupations and methods upon the business of articulating the characteristic contributions of German life.

You may feel disturbed by my speaking insistently of the contemporary scene as though I had forgotten the pervasive element of history or the overriding role of the historical experience in the German or any other of the traditional cultures. I am, on the contrary, again by profound predisposition, committed to an historical faith. But I am far from assuming that history offers the primary and the most effective model by which to elucidate the structure or the particular features of a culture. "For the younger generation . . . understanding of the past is no longer felt to be . . . as necessary for an understanding of the present as it was to earlier generations." To argue that we can best understand the Germans, now or at any earlier time, by reference to their history, by understanding Luther or Frederick the Great or the inflation after the first World War, or indeed, that as yet nearly inscrutable experience of the Hitler years, is to proceed in such a summary and abstract fashion that little is gained for a comprehension of the concrete behavior of the Germans of today. I would at any rate venture to say that by an overemphasis of the historical premises of the contemporary situation little or nothing is gained for the kind of critical view that we should develop. What we may attempt to establish is the difference in the sense of historicity that motivates German behavior in contrast to our own. In the American tradition, history has meant the elimination of obsolete or irrelevant ideas, in the European, an accretion of experiences that demands a continuing awareness of its nearly inescapable presence. In American life the present tends to supersede the past, in the European, the past—consciously or unconsciously—commits the present.

It is this difference in the functioning of historicity that we should make one of the topics of our teaching. History can only be a theme and need not be the preferred instrument or the central justification of an approach by which, as we have been persuaded to do in the past, we attempt to gain access to the various facets of a foreign culture. It is only one of the several methods that we must learn to employ.

If, as I have argued, our views of the relationship between language, literature and culture and of the role of the historical perspective appear to have changed, it is equally compelling to recognize that in the total system of culture, indicators other than the time-honored literary field, deserve our attention. German studies, a German sociologist has argued, have for too long been enclosed in an "ideology of culture" or, as Lionel Trilling formulates it, "an examination of life by the aesthetic mode." The focal point of German studies must be the totality of the modern technological, industrial society, and its evidence must be described and analyzed in all spheres of public life. To convey this totality to our students is not easy. It is, certainly not properly mobilized by the all-too-common tourist-motivated look at miscellaneous, more or less charming and intriguing, features of German life, the sort of topical miscellany that we usually find in our cultural readers. I do not, as a matter of fact, urge merely an extension of the information that we must provide. It would be difficult to envisage a more ample supply of German cultural material than is at our disposal at the present time. But this unparalleled flow of information will make sense only if we recognize that to make it effective for our teaching we need a systematic approach to the characteristic and intelligible forms of the social and political institutions. To develop the preliminary categories of such a systematic approach seems to me the very precondition of any attempt to introduce the student to contemporary German culture. By "institutions" I mean, of course, the whole gamut of behavior insofar as it has assumed compelling authority or public shape in such contexts as the law, the family, education, politics, the media, sports, or the like. Our determination to understand contemporary German life in terms of its institutions should provide the rationale of any enlarged definition of what we are about.

Understanding requires more than familiarity or affection or faith; it requires detachment and method. And it is, surely, in order to develop methods of institutional analysis that we must turn to the experience of those of our colleagues in the social sciences who have accumulated a body of useful criteria and of judgment. This alliance we have in the past all too often thought either unnecessary or, at least, unattractive and uncongenial. At a time when the traditional distinctions between the humanities and the social sciences have become largely irrelevant, this pointed aloofness becomes meaningless and provincial.

Admittedly these new perspectives put an extraordinary burden upon us. Some may prefer to withdraw into language teaching proper, or into literary studies, pursued perhaps in the company of other literary professionals. But if we wish to maintain and increase the effectiveness of our profession as a whole, if we wish to give relevance to the work of a Department or a Program of German Studies, we must attack as responsibly as possible the broader and, above all, the more intelligently defined job of interpreting the contemporary German society to students who are more than ever preoccupied with interpreting and changing their own.

It is at this point that it seems to me important to recognize the ever more obvious need for specific attention to the two contexts in which German life has recently developed distinct institutional forms of social life, the West and the East, or the German Federal Republic and the German Democratic Republic. I need not spend time asserting that these are two distinct societies that have developed radically different institutions, and that as such, they must both be, as well, of course, as Austria or Switzerland, the objects of our attention, of our analysis and our judgment. The two are in all practical respects, and certainly for our academic purposes, equivalent systems of social organization; each has institutionalized its avowed aspirations in a manner that offers remarkable materials for our work as interpreters. Happily we shall in the course of this symposium have occasion to speak in detail of the manner in which in each society political and cultural issues have become viable and intelligible and clearly articulated in different institutions. I hope we can in our teaching move beyond mere discrete description to an awareness of the premises necessary for an understanding of the motivating social convictions.

Let me return to the difficulties which a new view of our job as interpreters and analysts of the contemporary German societies may present. We are, clearly, as conventional Germanists, not competent to deal sufficiently with many of the more important ingredients of any modern technological society, with economics, the industrial power structure, political theory, perhaps not even with educational policy or the intricacies of international relations. Germanists might feel eager to talk about the present state of German universities (I doubt, in fact, that we, or the Germans themselves can do so *sine ira et studio*); but can we sensibly interpret the impact of the value-added tax on the German economy or the structure of the German trade unions? And if we could, would our account meet the expectations of students who may be, as majors in economics or political science, better informed than we are? If we succeed in enlisting the help of competent specialists, what sort of integration and focus can we hope to achieve? Must we return to the discredited concept of area studies which was abandoned a generation ago because it offered a superficial patchwork instead of a serious educational experience? How should a program of contemporary German studies be designed that might offer a satisfactory educational experience? Satisfactory from everybody's point of view—the experts, the deans, the departments, the students. Can we, in workshops and various crash programs retool our faculties to greater mobility in fields in which they might otherwise have less methodological competence than even their students. Can we persuade our literary colleagues that if they wish to share in such a program of cultural studies they must learn to talk about literature not as a miscellany of remarkable aesthetic achievements, but as itself an institution, one institution among many? Shall we be able to produce teaching teams in which a productive relationship among disciplines of inherently different principles and educational purposes can be established? (Will the present (or past) schizophrenic sense of having been born to deal with the nobler matter of *Faust* but being condemned to waste time teaching the subjunctive—will this continue in a new constellation of indispensable and objective social scientists and the costly subjectivity of literary scholars?)

None of these questions is insoluble, but each, I believe, must be faced. I raise them not in diffidence but with a sense of urgency. We shall undoubtedly attract a sizable undergraduate public if, quite apart from introducing more political and cultural subject matter, we can offer the right sort of integrated teaching. What we must do at all cost is to train suitable teachers; and this is a formidable job. Where and how can this be done? Can we persuade graduate departments and graduate schools that are now on the whole historically and aesthetically oriented, to include the appropriate training in the MA or PhD program? I would hope that programs in contemporary German culture should become the responsibility of a German Department, of a department I hasten to add, that will in many cases need to be restructured with serious consequences for the definition of its purpose and the character of its staff. There is something to be said for placing the primary concern for foreign studies programs in the hands either of special committees or of existing social science departments. But I would argue that German Departments will welcome an opportunity of looking at their own strengths and weaknesses. Unless their function is basically reconsidered, they are in danger of withering away and of having, apart from courses in literature in translation, little more to offer than language and literature instruction for a severely limited group of students.

The sort of program of studies which we need to develop should from the very beginning be clearly defined and specifically focused upon an active understanding of culture; it cannot merely be a device for making language learning more attractive by using cultural materials. Cultural subject matter may at the moment be more appealing than literature but it is intrinsically far less indispensable for an intelligent use of language than literature. I am, therefore, not much moved by the widely proposed extension of cultural materials within a two or three year course for students who want to learn German. The debate in the professional journals as to what cultural materials should be offered to language students I find only moderately interesting. Indeed, I am a little skeptical of the notion that, while the track "language to literature" has lost its popularity, the track "language to culture" or "culture through language" should galvanize our students' eagerness to learn German. What is more urgently needed is to develop programs which are directed systematically towards an exercise in learning and understanding that will amount to a confrontation of two cultures and their institutions, the German with all its elements (West, South and East) and the American.

To discuss the study of contemporary German culture compels us, therefore, to reflect on methods that will achieve a critical relationship to the structure of another society. If our teaching remains on the show-and-tell level, it cannot compete with the tourist information offices and with other providers of exotic entertainment: tourism seldom leads to an understanding of another culture, it leads only to culinary or aesthetic pleasures which are all the more satisfying as they remain untouched by the troublesome business of analysis and judgment.

The teaching of contemporary Germany, I repeat, does not, at present, require a lengthy discussion of its content: *what* we should know, *what* we should stress, *what* we might persuade students to find appealing seems to me far less in dispute than the methods we should employ. In the development of a useful and practical methodology lies a task which one or two comprehensive, authoritative, non-obsolescent textbooks (or better, manuals) might well make plausible; these should supply, beyond well-chosen information, the categories by which teachers and students may integrate what is before them, integrate not only hermetically within itself, but within that larger purpose of creating critical awareness to which German studies must essentially contribute.

I have no doubt, though I realize that this may be a debatable position, that the key to any such textbook must be its comparative or contrastive approach, the principle, that is to say, of selecting institutions and patterns or fields of behavior that can be regarded as central to the German as well as to the familiar American experience, and that can be demonstrated and analytically interpreted in both social contexts. Such model fields can be—and have been—identified: they range from forms of everyday behavior and social organization, to the institution of the family, the notion of "the public," the relationship to bureaucratic presence, educational assumptions, the organization of leisure, space or time concepts, legal philosophies, etc. Indeed, as I have suggested earlier, even the literary life treated as an institution.

I am aware of the difficulties inherent in such a comparative or contrastive method; they spring essentially from the question of purpose and of intellectual feasibility. By intellectual feasibility I mean, to use an obvious example, the difficulties that are inherent in contrasting with our own presumed values the values of societies, whether East or West, which may be not only objectively different but in serious conflict with our own. There are and there should be limits to objectivity. To what extent can any teaching about contemporary German life fail to register and to judge the ideological premises which are obvious in the two German societies, to what extent, I am reckless enough to ask, should these premises, well understood, be explicitly *made* to affect our own ideologically conditioned thinking? A large group of our best students will be eager to move us towards an activist answer. It seems to me foolish to think that the teaching of culture can be effective in an a-septic, totally formal space. We must, here as elsewhere, choose between educating toward a critical (and therefore perhaps in fact "uncritical") neutrality, or toward creative partisanship.

I must, finally, say a few words on the issue which, I think, determines the effectiveness of any study of a contemporary society: the issue of motivation and of purpose. Any general study of the attitude of students towards language and/or culture study is bound to be inconclusive; but it is safe to say that where that interest is brought into play, it is today livelier, more specific and more critical than ever before. Technical facilities (cheap travel, television, films, etc.) have opened an enormous horizon of curiosity; but they have not necessarily succeeded in destroying the stereotypes and mythologies by which other cultures are too frequently approached and judged. The extraordinary enthusiasm which so many of our students bring back from a summer or a semester abroad springs in many cases from the satisfaction of having discovered the relativity of previous prejudices. Whether stereotypes are altogether useless, or whether they should be exposed as paralyzing our judgment is a question I would leave to the cultural anthropologists. It is certainly our job to identify them as obtuse and deceptive. Their dismantling is a tremendously difficult job: it requires a degree of detachment that must be directed, not only at the malicious stereotype, or at the glossy window dressing of tourism and its advertising machinery, but, far more challenging, at the clichés, the assumptions, the ideological convictions which the Germans hold of themselves. This self-portrait of a society must, as such, become a central topic of our interpretation.

Let me conclude by saying that the study of contemporary Germany or of any other culture can be made truly useful only if it pursues two goals, if it is directed at once towards a command of information which in an increasingly manipulated society becomes a vital prerequisite of the responsible life, and towards the articulating and mobilizing of self-critical judgments. A clear view of this double purpose will give direction to our work. What we do as interpreters of the contemporary German societies should ultimately lead to a better, a more critical understanding of ourselves and of our own institutions.

● **Princeton University**

NATIONAL ECONOMIC PLANNING IN THE GDR

Erwin Herlitzius

With gratitude I accepted Mr. Helbig's kind invitation to participate in this Conference. The purpose of my paper is to provide a brief survey of national economic planning in the first German socialist state, the German Democratic Republic.

When I visited Indiana University in 1970, on the occasion of an informal talk, Professor Noretta Koertgen from the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at this university gave rise to a spirited discussion about socialist management science, valuation and decision-making. Repeatedly and with emphasis she asked me the question: "What in your planning is the criterion to decide whether to make capital investments in order to establish a steel mill or to build a hospital?" Probably she was expecting a purely theoretical and by no means a political answer. And in no case would she have made the concession that her question, which was asked with great charm, would imply ideology.

On the spur of the moment I then had to explain that, in principle, there is (or should be) no dichotomy in a highly developed socialist planning system with respect to investments, either being spent on industrial objects or to be expended directly upon satisfying urgent necessities of human life. Therefore, the Eighth Congress of the leading Marxist-Leninist party, the SED (Socialist Unity Party), held in the GDR capital of Berlin in June 1971, was able to state that in the past few years great progress has been made in constructing the socialist society in all fields: "We are guided by only one objective which permeates the entire policy of our party"—the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED said—"to do everything possible for the well-being of man, for the happiness of the people, for the interests of the working class and all working people. That is the meaning of Socialism."[1]

As I am learning from American literature dealing with the science of management, some of the local government officials in your country have become active in the development of social indicators for the purpose of measuring different social conditions, such as crime or poverty.[2] In a highly sophisticated style, the *Journal of the Operations Research Society of America* (ORSA) claims that ways should be found "to reduce and then perhaps resolve the complex web of problems that encumber modern industrial society."[3] In either way, systems analysis is supposed to render its service. But it seems to me a kind of planning *post festum*. Indeed, all measures of economic effectiveness are more or less equivalent to social indicators, and social development of any kind causes a feed-back into the productivity of industry and agriculture. No doubt, even a partial decision is strongly dependent upon a great number of factual studies. The skill in assembling and analyzing facts is a precondition for any scientific approach, in order to provide an accurate evaluation of alternatives and adequate answers. In this respect it may remain undecided whether a data bank, filled with large amounts of information about many individuals, would be valuable for statistical studies. Or information could be gathered more efficiently and less expensively by sampling techniques. That which is found in American literature about management science and decision-making with respect to operations research ought to be considered with some respect—down to the smallest details. However, in order to conduct our discussion most profitably here and now, the statement is unavoidable that, obviously, there is not a single approach to decision-making in a capitalist country that could be compared with our solution of problems in a socialist society. We had better state and acknowledge this divergence in theory as well as in practice. Addressing an American audience, I will try to work from my methodological understanding of the objective situation prevailing here. Our differences of opinion and views, after all, are so wide and vast that we should try to avoid pure misunderstandings about facts and conceptions. One essential factor related to the appreciation of social planning in this country is probably the fruitless quest of American management science for a universal theory including the laws of social development as a whole. As you know, we are proclaiming the existence of such a theory, founded by Marx and Engels and further developed and practiced by Lenin and the socialist states. Meanwhile, in the U.S. Institute of Management Sciences, the "increasing strength of conflicting groups" is also under discussion.[4] In a paper on "The ABC's of OR" by Harvey M. Wagner, Yale University, I recently found the alarming question: "What, then, gives rise to the common perception that the theoretical advances are getting further and further removed from practical reality?"[5] His answer is that only a few contributions to theory in Operations Research (OR) will ever have much practical significance.

I am giving this summary without any polemic intention. This is simply done in order to prove that nothing in the way of true progress in the social sciences dare escape our attention. On the other hand, why do we stick to the theoretical foundation given by Marxism-Leninism? We have, above all, two main reasons for this: The first one was expressed in the most concise way by Friedrich Engels in his speech at the graveside of Karl Marx with these famous sentences:

> "Just as Darwin discovered the law of development of organic nature, so Marx discovered the law of development of human history: the simple fact, hitherto concealed by an overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion, etc.; that therefore the production of the immediate material means of subsistence and consequently the degree of economic development attained by a given people or during a given epoch form the foundation upon which the state institutions, the legal conceptions, art, and even the ideas on religion, of the people concerned have been evolved, and in the light of which they must, therefore, be explained . . ."

And Engels continues:

> "Marx also discovered the special law of motion governing the present-day capitalist mode of production and the bourgeois society that this mode of production has created."[6]

There is no better inaugural prescription concerning socialist planning—both in human and scientific terms—than formulated by Marx and Engels in the third volume of *Das Kapital*:

> "Freedom in this field can only consist in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with nature, bringing it under their common control, instead of being ruled by it as by the blind forces of nature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and under conditions most favorable to, and worthy of, their human nature. But it nonetheless still remains a realm of necessity. Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis. The shortening of the work day is its basic prerequisite."[7]

(If you would like to say that this is dogmatism, as Mr. Helbig has done in his paper with respect to social change, then this kind of "dogmatism," in my view, is postulating the right things).

These words by Karl Marx, primarily addressed to the working class and to all working people, lead us to the second reason why we are using Marxism most consistently for socialist planning: By spreading the Marxist-Leninist theory in a comprehensible way, we are endeavoring to achieve greater understanding of the laws governing social development among the entire working class, among the cooperative farmers, the intelligentsia, and especially among the young people, and to induce them to act accordingly. Indeed, our guidance is that socialist consciousness constitutes the basis of their creative work.[8] This creative work and the highly developed consciousness of the working people is the most important guarantee for all socialist programming. For planning is as good as the workers, farmers, scientists and technicians proceed with it.

Exactly here is the point where controversy arises about convergence or divergence between capitalist and socialist societies. To get to the heart of this matter, let me quote from the bulletin of the American Institute of Management Sciences, according to which all planning should be the responsibility of every individual manager:

> "Setting up a formal department makes it too easy for the line executives to abdicate their responsibility for determining their own futures. Forcing people to plan also means they must assess and reflect about accomplishments to date and, more importantly, work at developing realistic alternatives for their future operations."[9]

Well, that is precisely the question. But why speak about a "formal department" if there is no third type of state or society between the capitalist or a socialist one? And what is the meaning of "forcing people to plan?" The history of realized socialism indicates a learning process of the people, thanks to their own initiative.

Our 1968 Constitution spells out that the socialist principle—"From each according to his abilities, to each according to his work"—is being put into practice. The most important driving force in the socialist society is the identity between social requirements and the political, material and cultural interests of the working people. The mutual relationship of all citizens in the socialist society is implemented on the principle that each bears responsibility for the whole (Articles 2 and 3).

With due regard to the economic foundations, Article 9 of the Constitution of the GDR signifies:

> "The national economy of the German Democratic Republic is based upon the socialist ownership of the means of production. It develops in accordance with the economic laws of socialism on the foundation of socialist relations of production. The socialist relations of production came into being as the result of the struggle against the economic system of monopoly capitalism, the aggressive and adventurist policy of which has hitherto brought only disaster to the German nation. By breaking the power of the monopolies and big landowners, and by abolishing the capitalist profit economy, the source of war policy and the exploitation of man by man was swept away . . . .
>
> The national economy of the GDR serves the strengthening of the socialist order, the constantly improving satisfaction of the material and cultural needs of the citizens, the development of their personality and their socialist relations in society . . . .
>
> The GDR bases itself on the principle of the planning and management of the national economy and all other social spheres . . . ."[10]

Let me try to explain what the conception "Sozialistische Volkswirtschaftsplanung," i.e., national economic planning, means. It is a function of the socialist society which is based upon the socialist ownership of the means of production. In taking cognitive advantage of the objective economic laws, the respective necessities are to be determined in binding form, in order to *fix all those tasks that are implied from and connected with the entire social process of reproduction*. The economic system combines central state planning and management of the basic issues of social development with the individual responsibility of the socialist producer of commodities and the local organs of the state.

In Western literature our democratic centralized system is often blamed for the setting of goals by just one central authority. Let us discuss problems of this kind freely and open-mindedly. In a modern system of productive forces with the utmost complexity, there is no question whether a trend towards centralization exists or not. The question is: either centralizing on the basis of traditional private property (this is what Lenin called "state monopolistic capitalism"), or centralizing based upon socialist ownership. A misleading pattern in U.S. literature about the GDR makes me draw your attention to this problem. Robert G. Livingston, in his essay in *Foreign Affairs* (Jan. 1972), entitled "East Germany between Moscow and Bonn," stereotyped the citizens of the GDR as a kind of "Red Prussians"[1]—as Jean E. Smith[2] and others likewise had imposed upon us before. If you wish to make a scientific fight of it, then you do no good with subjective images. What does the concept "Preussentum" really mean? It implies: exploitation of big landowners of a special East Elbean type, aggressive and expanding against the Slavic people, conservative and militaristic, the backbone of a reactionary bureaucracy. The exceptional aggressiveness of German imperialism is not to be understood without going to the roots of "Preussentum." And those roots have been extirpated within 25 years in the GDR through two revolutions: the antifascist democratic revolution and the socialist revolution.

At this point, I should like to make some further remarks on the problem of centralizing. What Marx had written about it remains true: The growing accumulation of capital implies its growing concentration (this is the point where Lenin's research on imperialism is continuing the analysis of Marx). Thus grows the power of the capital, Marx says, and thus grows the alienation in the conditions of social production, as long as the capitalist is exploiting the actual producers.

> **" Capital comes more and more to the fore as a social power. This social power no longer stands in any possible relation to what a single individual can create. It becomes an alienated, independent, social power, which stands opposed to society as an object, and as an object that is the capitalist's source of power."**

A contradiction develops here between the private power of the individual capitalists and the general social power of the productive forces, which call for regulating rationally the interchange of man with nature by bringing it under general control. This increasing contradiction between the interest of common control and capitalist minority groups contains the only possible solution, as Marx has demonstrated:

> " it implies at the same time the transformation of the conditions of production into general, common, social conditions. This transformation stems from the development of the productive forces under capitalist production, and from the ways and means by which this development takes place."[13]

As far as our socialist democratic centralism in economic planning and politics is concerned, it is in absolute opposition to everything which the concept "Prussia" means. Take only the fact that the former representatives of the Prussian era, including the era of German fascist imperialism, were the most embittered enemies of the working people, especially of the working class and its leading organizing force: the Marxist-Leninist party. Marxism is anti-Prussian from its earliest days. It could be very helpful to take into account several other specialized inquiries into this matter.[14] The history of progressive Germany is the history of the struggle against Prussian policy that was practiced with "blood and iron." This progressive history reflects the struggle against a policy of splitting the nation. The successors of the Prussian landlords, militarists, teachers, and bureaucrats were doing their utmost after 1945 to disrupt the democratic and economic development of the GDR from inside as well as from outside. The victory of the socialist relationship to production and the consolidation of the socialist state power were possible only through the ever broader involvement of the citizens in the mastering of all spheres of social life. The safeguarding of the state frontiers was, and still is, an important prerequisite for ensuring the further construction of socialism. Today we can state the fact that the national income has increased by more than one fourth in the past five years, so that it totalled 108 thousand million marks in 1970. The growth in the national income[15] was attained entirely through an increase in labor productivity. The GDR has a population of over 17 million, of which more than 9 million are women. More than 8.2 million are employed, 84% of them in the socialist economy. To every 100 persons of working age there are 73 persons of non-working age, including 33.6 of retirement age. This unfavorable proportion is a result of the population losses suffered in two world wars.

Therefore, socialist rationalization is of decisive importance for the implementation of our economic targets. The Eighth Party Congress decided on the intensification of social production in the various spheres, above all in industry, as the main road to higher effectiveness. It is intended to increase production by better utilizing and modernizing production plants and buildings, by producing more with the same quantity of manpower. We shall have to spend our means above all on reconstruction. New factories will be built, too, in the future, but almost exclusively to promote better supply of raw materials and some other urgently needed goods. However, what the smaller socialist countries are going to prognosticate and plan, no longer can afford satisfaction in miniature. The scientific revolution in industry is just one reason why, in the course of the seventies, a new era of increased effectiveness in the international economic cooperation of the socialist states is beginning right now—not to mention environmental problems and the growing together of the great family of socialist scientists and technicians through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).

Our main task consists in further raising the material and cultural living standards of the people on the basis of a noticeable acceleration of development in social production. Our main problem is an increase in efficiency, in scientific and technological progress and in the growth of labor productivity. We don't strive for unknown goals; moreover, our main task is, of course, much more than a formulation of general direction and design. If ways of comparing different kinds of values in areas dealing with human necessities of life have not generally been agreed upon, then this would be a far cry from socialism. The fact remains that we cannot measure the value of human life and welfare in dollars or any other kind of hard currency—an idea which was put into words by the past president of ORSA, Joseph H. Engel.[16]

Indeed, planning techniques are based upon all relevant theories, skills, and experiences, and in a multidimensional value system as it is given with the economic system. Steel mills and hospitals will be scheduled differently: the one determinable on the CMEA level,[17] and the other dependent on the emerging need and careful planning in a given medical care district. The decisive factors are the requirements of the people under the conditions of socialist planned economy. The measures being instituted by the Eighth Party Congress apply to the energy, material and manpower balance and also to problems of supplies for the population. Decisions were made concerning the production and additional imports of certain products for the population, of which there was, and still is, a shortage at present. Today the given complexity of the economic structure, a somewhat over-accelerated development of preferred branches in the last few years, and the problems of balancing and of mastering such economic categories as gains, wages, cost, industrial prices, credits, motives, and interests, make us improve our results by better analyzing: What we have to realize is that neither this nor that particular measure will be decisive; what really matters is the systematic, well-balanced and efficient development of production as the basis of society as a whole. As you know, the figures of our regularly fulfilled plans represent a favorable balance sheet. But those average figures do not reflect the entire reality. At the Eighth Party Congress, Erich Honecker openly spoke about our difficulties. In short, the energy, material and manpower balance do not tally. Disproportions continue to exist in our economy. Definite national economic questions could not be solved overnight. Taking some quick steps means keeping all reciprocal actions under control. Management in the state and in economic organs is now intensively directed at making better use of the law of the *planned proportional development* of the national economy and at promoting the direct participation of the working class in its direction and planning, and in raising plan discipline. We are also using workers' and farmers' inspections for that reason.

The well-tried methods of making use of the individual material interests of the working people in the economic results are to be employed more and more. They are to be linked up better with moral stimuli.

The use of electronic data processing is of growing importance. Thanks to the successful cooperation with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries in the development and production of computers, we are in a position to employ electronic data processing for working out plans and balances and for the processing of information. For this purpose the preparation of well-trained personnel is one of our main tasks at the Dresden Technical University.

It is probably true what Robert G. Livingston wrote about the progressional political socialization in the GDR.[18] In some aspects I agree with the American political scientist Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., who defined political socialization as a maintenance process of the political system, functioning as a means for inculcating succeeding generations of citizens with political values, norms, and behavior patterns.[19] But the question is: For what kind of a political system? For which values and norms? I think it should be left to the individual American how he wishes to judge the situation in the GDR and what he might expect from my country. However, this statement seems to follow inevitably: One reason *why* models of authoritarianism, of a managerial-technical elite and of the

SED with "a highly sophisticated system of 'line' authority" (Livingston) have not lived up to expectations with respect to the analysis of socialist systems is that they are interpreted from the viewpoints of capitalist countries.[20]

I learned from Livingston's remarkable paper on my country that the GDR has become "unique among communistic societies in its capacity to diffuse modern technology, maintain close cooperation between industrial and political elites, and tolerate a limited pluralism in the economic sphere without noticeable effect on the political structure."[21] In this context we are supposed to be the "model of technocratic conservatism in the communist world."

Please, let me make three remarks on this quotation.

1. On what grounds do we deserve this honor of being unique? Decisive for the entire development of the GDR is the ever closer alliance with the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. We are collaborating fraternally in all fields. They are giving us important economic support. The consolidation of our alliance will always be a priority concern for us. The increasing cooperation is being demonstrated, for instance, by the opening of the borders from the GDR to Poland and Czechoslovakia. Further steps will follow.

2. What is the meaning of "tolerating a limited pluralism in the economic sphere?" In order to try a methodological approach to this somewhat curious conjecture, I am going to cite Joseph L. Bower from Harvard. He wrote about political prerequisites for systems analysis. In his paper on "Systems Analysis for Social Decisions,"[22] he stated the fact that, in the arena of social problems, a considerable amount of analytical innovation and what the technicians and scientists desire to change is part of the constitutionally given political structure. We have a socialist constitution as you have a capitalist one. The historical progress expressed in our constitution is irreversible. I likewise suppose that the humanistic achievements of the famous Jefferson Declaration should be irreversible, too. The power of the working people, the socialist ownership of the means of production are irreversible.

3. What a strange thing is this supposed to be: our socialist society—a "model of technocratic conservatism?" Take all what has been written about technocrats or technocracy (that means, following the *Concise Oxford Dictionary*: organization and management of a country's industrial resources by technical experts for the good of the whole community) and you will find that we are far from a technocracy. Let me make a quotation in regard to this point. Erich Honecker said:

> "It must, of course, be exactly calculated what benefits a measure, a technological improvement will produce. But still another calculation has to be taken into account: how many jobs, how much material and energy will be saved through it? There are still plenty of reserves. We are short of raw material deposits but our country has at its disposal an educated and experienced working class, intelligent cooperative farmers, capable scientists and technicians and working people. They are a valuable treasure. It is our concern to use this wealth for the welfare of the people. To economize on working time and places of work is a deserving and creative task for our Socialist economy, the results of which become effective in the economy as a whole, far beyond the enterprise concerned. On the other hand, it must be clear that the great readiness of the working people puts high demands on every manager, the obligation to trustfully consult the working people, to listen to their proposals and to observe them duly, to support their initiative and to see to it that, through good management, the best possible result is attained."[23]

After the Eighth Party Congress there is just one predominant topic in all discussions: the leading role of the working class in all spheres of our society. In Marxism-Leninism this is the heart of the socialist revolution. In his paper "On the History of the Communist League," Friedrich Engels wrote in 1885:

> ". . . the present-day oppressed class, the proletariat, cannot achieve its emancipation without at the same time emancipating society as a whole from division into classes and, therefore, from class struggles. And communism now no longer meant the concoction, by means of imagination, of an ideal society as perfect as possible, but insight into the nature, the conditions and the consequent general aims of the struggle waged by the proletariat."[24]

Well, if you like to call this conservatism—I will not dispute that. Conservative means "disposed to maintain existing institutions." But the question is: which institution, wherefore, in whose interest?

Let us take the fact that our currency, for instance, enjoys a good stability, that the increases in the minimum pensions and wages and the increases in income for certain groups correspond to fixed prices. Real income increased by a good fifth in five years. A further rise of pensions is programmed. Our people's level of education and culture has experienced further growth. Medical care for everybody is absolutely free of charge. The five-day work week gives everybody more leisure time and is thus particularly beneficial to family life. Thus the ever better satisfaction of the requirements of the working people will be implemented to the extent to which we earn the means for realizing our tasks.

Which other road should we take? Let us accept things as they are: The entire course of the development and consolidation of our socialist state leads objectively to a situation in which the antagonism between us and the capitalist society is intensifying, and the process of demarcation between the socialist state and the capitalist state will therefore become ever deeper and deeper in all spheres of social life. My government has unmistakably proclaimed that only relations of peaceful co-existence, corresponding to the rules of international law, are possible between the GDR and the FRG.

Being advised by Western authors to tolerate pluralism, we read something quite to the contrary in American management science literature: "Political responsibility needs to be focused—not diffused."[25]

Centralization, in the sense of Marxism-Leninism, always means the continued development of socialist democracy. The intention to strengthen socialist state power consists in guaranteeing a higher quality of state leadership and planning, and combining them more effectively with the increasing creativity of the workers in all spheres.[26] Thus democratic centralism unites central state leadership and planning with the initiative of all citizens. Therefore, better work by the people's representative bodies and more authority for their elected members is a concern of high importance in the near future. This requires close cooperation with the management and the social organizations in the enterprises, especially the trade unions, and with the committees of the National Front. These are the organized expression of the alliance of all forces of the people. The National Front unites the five political parties and mass organizations, such as the Confederation of German Trade Unions, the Democratic Women's Federation, and the Free German Youth, among others.

Economic plans cannot be fulfilled by means of administrative measures. They are put into practice by the working people. The complexity of the tasks in science and technology is increasing more and more. Division of labor and specializing in skilled work, in science and technology is unavoidable. True, the general managers bear, in accordance with the principle of individual directorates, sole responsibility for all decisions in their spheres. But the inclusion of all workers and office employees in the solution of the economic tasks is one of the most important objectives at present. Nearly 400,000 workers and technicians take part in the activities of the permanent production council. In the innovator's movement, inventors—usually workers in alliance with technicians—are suggesting and realizing improvements in machines, in the technological process, and they make proposals for a more effective use of materials. No small part in this is taken by youth—we could call it our socialist type of "youth unrest." Occurrences of our "campus unrest" following the third reform of universities and academies mean the same, namely to strengthen the connections between the students and the working class, between theory and practice. This creates many problems in our everyday life. For someone who lost the best part of his own young life through a terrible war, as I did, these are wonderful and inspiring problems.

In concluding, I will recapitulate the tasks that I have suggested in this paper.

1 In the GDR, a modern state with a developing socialist democracy, humanism and socialist planning means to do everything possible for the well being of man, for the interests of all working people.

2 The task of economic development is an extraordinarily important one, because the struggle on the world scale is conducted primarily in this field. If, on the part of the capitalist states, facts are not taken as facts, if misleading simplifications or untrue formulations following from convenient analogies remain predominant, the struggle for peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems will be hampered.

3 As Robert G. Livingston states, the West Berlin Agreement virtually ensures the emergence of the GDR as a full-fledged actor in the politics of European security. America, Britain and France, and with them the other NATO allies, he says, "have more or less willingly backed the West Germans in their campaign to keep the GDR from gaining political responsibility and international status."[27] Consequently, it is high time to abolish insulting stereotypes which were produced against us in line with psychologic warfare. Interested scholars, practicing serious research in the service of ever better mutual understanding, should avoid the hopelessly outdated stereotypes and turn from second-hand information to reliable and genuine sources. That means to take facts as facts.

4 The GDR is firmly determined to do everything in its power to bring about a solution, especially for those questions which today still disrupt the situation in Europe. There is a real possibility of a fundamental turn in the history of Europe. The growing strength of the socialist community of states is the decisive factor in maintaining European security. With its good intentions expressed in the Potsdam Agreement, the American people should help us forward on the way to gain full recognition by international law. The admission of the GDR to the UN would correspond to the principle of universality of the world organization and would be beneficial for the relaxation of tensions in Europe.

5. It seems to me that the tradition of the famous Jefferson Declaration, even in some of your management science publications, is still alive. I say this mainly for practical reasons. Joseph H. Engel, when retiring as president of the Operations Research Society at the National Meeting three years ago said:

> "The loss of man and the destruction of property through acts of war must be regarded as losses to all mankind . . . . I prefer to believe that war is a failure of national policy . . . . Other solutions must be sought, involving cooperation, altruism, constructive research, and attempts to maximize the positive values of all nations rather than to minimize those of the enemy."[28]

6. Allow me to include some remarks on the concept of the German nation, a concept that is also mentioned in the GDR Constitution, where the first sentence reads: "The German Democratic Republic is a socialist state of the German nation." The concept "nation" theoretically comprises different economic, political and cultural characteristics of a given society in a definite historical situation, mainly

- the development of a common economic system,
- the use of a common language,
- the accommodation to a given territory in a given state (wherein the development of the constituting elements of a nation corresponds to the more or less progressive role of the state, otherwise the development would be hampered),
- the entirety of psychological, intellectual and cultural behavior and traditions.

True, those factors, interconnected in many ways, exemplify a certain duration and continuity. But there is a deep gap within every nation which separates it from its capitalist origin, a gap that Lenin called the existence of two different cultures in one and the same nation.[29] This entails the existence of two antagonistic classes, distinguished from their position in the social structure of the capitalist society.

As a result of two world wars, German imperialism went down in defeat, and the German *Grossbourgeoisie* finally forfeited the right to lead the nation. The working class was called upon to renew the nation on a democratic foundation and guarantee its unity in an anti-fascist democratic German state. I think you know who feared such consequences, who formed a separate state first, and who caused the splitting of the nation.

From the base of its socialist economic system and through the cultural and political socialization by its own state, the working class then became the legitimate heir to all progressive national traditions. The socialist revolution renews the nation, and a new type of nation develops: the socialist nation. In the course of socialist development in the GDR, the new socialist culture is forwarding all humanistic traditions.

Sociological sampling in my country demonstrates how the cultural treasures of the humanistic heritage have become accessible to the people and nowadays are part of our socialist way of life.

If we go to the root of a nation, we will find its dynamics caused by the economic, political and cultural developments. You can imagine what is going to happen when, in the near future, the economic and cultural impact of the growing international cooperation and the emerging community of the socialist states will stimulate our national consciousness. We are increasing our cooperation with the other socialist nations; we are going to discover the cultural richness of the socialist continent.

Is the GDR thus a "nationless state"—as Robert G. Livingston postulated?[30] No, not at all.

In the GDR the cultural treasures of the humanistic heritage and of world culture are preserved in an exemplary manner. However, there is no reason to underrate our problems; a lot is to be done, and it will be done.

● **Technische Universität Dresden, GDR**

1 Erich Honecker, *Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth Congress of the SED*, 15-19 June, 1971, Berlin.
2 *Interfaces*, The Bulletin of the Institute of Management Sciences (TIMS), Vol. 2, No. 1 (Nov. 1971), p. 32.
3 *ORSA Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec. 1969), p. 939.
4 *Interfaces, op. cit.*, p. 3. The interview with George S. Dively: "I happen to feel that we're going through a period now that may have started two, three or four years ago, and that's going to last for a long, long time. It will be a very difficult period for leadership because of the increasing strength of conflicting groups which usually neutralize each other; but because of this, the opportunity for strong leadership is also greater than it ever was." —In my opinion, this kind of prefabrication of mind is ignoring the historical existence of "conflicting groups" (i.e., antagonistic classes as K. Marx and F. Engels have seen them) in "forms of the class struggle, but distinguished from all earlier class struggles by this one thing, that the present-day oppressed class, the proletariat, cannot achieve its emancipation without at the same time emancipating society as a whole from division into classes and, therefore, from class struggles . . . ." (*Selected Works*, in two volumes, Vol. LL, Moscow, 1958, p. 345).
5 *ORSA Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 6 (Oct. 1971), p. 1269.
6 K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works, op. cit.*, p. 167.

7 K. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Moscow, 1962, p. 800.

8 E. Honecker, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

9 *Interfaces*, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

10 *Constitution of the German Democratic Republic* (1968). Publ. in: Jean Edward Smith, *Germany Beyond the Wall*, Boston/Toronto, 1969. Appendix, p. 243-272.

11 Robert Gerald Livingston, "East Germany between Moscow and Bonn," *Foreign Affairs*, Jan. 1972, p. 302.

12 Jean Edward Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 74ff.

13 K. Marx, *Capital*, *op. cit.*, p. 259. In his paper on "Management Research in State and Local Governments," four years ago Freeman Holmer, in the *ORSA Journal* (Vol. 16, No. 6, p. 1066), claimed: "As citizens in a democracy it must be our objective to achieve for our government the application of the highest form of rationality of which we are capable." And he added: "The evidence is that we are failing to do so."

14 *Marx und Engels über das reaktionäre Pressentum*, Moskau, 1947; E. Warga, *Die historischen Wurzeln der Besonderheiten des deutschen Imperialismus*, SWA-Verlag, Berlin, 1946; W. I. Lenin, *Registerband I*, Berlin, 1964, p. 490: see under "Preussen" and the divergence of the Prussian and the American way in agriculture; A. S. Jerussalimski, *Die Aussenpolitik und die Diplomatie des deutschen Imperialismus Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts*, Berlin, 1954; Alexander Abusch, *Der Irrweg einer Nation*, Berlin, 1949; *Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung*, Vol. 1-8, Berlin, 1963-1966. — In its most anachronistic fusion with "Socialism," "Preussentum" lead to fascist "National Socialism." Oswald Spengler's inferior, pro-fascist essay on "Preussentum und Sozialismus" (Munich, 1920) is typical for this.

15 *Statistical Pocket Book 1971*, Staatsverlag der DDR, pp. 19-26.

16 *ORSA Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 5 (Sept. - Oct. 1969), p. 767.

17 "In accordance with our main orientation, 75% of our foreign trade is carried out with the Socialist countries. We owe an assured supply of a large part of the decisive plant, machinery, raw materials, matertals and fuel we need to the trade with the Soviet Union." (E. Honecker, *Report to the Eighth Party Congress*, p. 31).

18 R. G. Livingston, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

19 Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., "Political Socialization in the German Democratic Republic," *Societas — A Review of Social History*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 1971), pp. 101-121.

20 Compare with Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., "The Political System of the German Democratic Republic: Totalitarian, Authoritarian or what?" Paper at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Albuquerque, New Mexico, April 8-10, 1971.

21 R. G. Livingston, *op. cit.*, p. 303.

22 *ORSA Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec. 1969), p. 938.

23 Second Session of the Central Committee of the SED, Sept. 16-17, 1971. Verlag Zeit im Bild, Dresden, 1972, p. 42.

24 K. Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, in two volumes, Vol. II, Moscow, 1958, p. 345.

25 *ORSA Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1968), p. 1094.

26 E. Honecker, *Report to the Eighth Party Congress*, pp. 44-45.

27 R. G. Livingston, *op. cit.*, p. 298.

28 *ORSA Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct. 1969), pp. 768-769.

29 This phrase of the "two cultures" with regard to low and high level education, allegedly concerning blue and white collar workers, I found in American operations research literature.

30 R. G. Livingston, *op. cit.*

CONVERGENCE; *OSTPOLITIK* AND THE BERLIN ACCORDS

Jean Edward Smith

If I may put this talk about convergence into context, consider for a moment two modern countries living side-by-side, sharing a common language, in many respects a common heritage, a common high standard of technology, of industry and education, perhaps of life style (though this is less certain), and increasingly perhaps, of standards of living. Consider also the relative preponderance of one of these states as compared to the other; its dominance of markets, its ever ready supply of capital, a vast labor force at its beck and call—so much so that it towers over the second state, reducing it in world opinion to a mere appendage. The unique culture of the smaller state is constantly assaulted and undermined by an imposing array of television and radio beamed toward it. Its national identity is continually threatened, whether by discriminatory trade barriers or the penetration of foreign capital. Even the anticipated Spring invasion of thousands of tourists is frought with peril for a developing national consciousness. I am talking, of course, about Canada and its relation to the United States, but it could just as well be the GDR vis-à-vis the Federal Republic. The point I am making is that it is terribly difficult for citizens, even for scholars, in a nation as large and powerful as the United States to comprehend fully the anxieties and national cravings, the pride mingled with fear of less endowed states elsewhere. And to some extent, American consciousness of the German Democratic Republic has suffered from this failing. The American tendency to think in terms of continental hegemony is reflected in Central Europe in a tendency to think of Germany exclusively as the Federal Republic; a tendency raised to the status of a formal treaty obligation in the London and Paris accords of 1954.[1]

To the extent the GDR is considered, it remains a curious Marxist aberration—a relic of Soviet expansion which continues to be described by the U.S. Department of State in its official publications as "East Germany (Soviet Zone)."[2] Few believe this still, but still fewer are prepared to accept the GDR—even after 22 years—as a legitimate member of the international community, though scores of more ephemeral states have been beautified by Washington on grounds far less convincing. The recent article on the GDR by Jerry Livingston in *FOREIGN AFFAIRS*[3] and the grudging conversion of an occasional author on the "SURVEY—PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM—RADIO FREE EUROPE AXIS"[4] cannot obscure the fact that the political and economic study of the GDR lags badly in the U.S. Since World War II the wish has been father to the thought: ignor the GDR and perhaps it would fade away.

More recently, the open hostility of the Cold War has yielded to a more insidious assault—an attempt to smother the national, indeed, the international legal status of the GDR under a suffocating "special relation" with Bonn. A denial of international sovereignty, if you will, in favor of the facade that but one German nation exists, and that the relation of the two German states is to a large extent a unique internal problem rather than an international one. It has been precisely this argument with which the Brandt government prefaced its controversial *Ostpolitik*, imploring its restive NATO partners (including Canada) not to recognize East Germany until the GDR consented to this "special" arrangement. Until East Berlin, in other words, agreed to accept less than full international status in its dealings with Bonn, thus leaving ajar the door to eventual German unity. A new version, if you will, of a long familiar theme.

A strange element of this new policy, often unstated but always at the root of futuristic scenarios, is the discredited academic theory of convergence: the idea that Communist and non-Communist states are becoming more alike; or in this case, that the two Germanies, despite obvious political differences, will become more similar as affluence and prosperity erode the doctrinal underpinnings of the GDR.

Briefly stated, the argument for convergence presupposes that industrialization imposes inexorable uniformities in skill, technique and organization; that it simultaneously spawns a multiplicity of interest groups competing for rewards and services; that it engenders material affluence—supposedly corrosive of political discipline and ideological orthodoxy; and that by increasing cultural and international contact, by breaking down the barriers of exchange, these trends can be accelerated.[5] In this sense, convergence becomes a euphemism for snuffing out the separate existence of the GDR—a euphemism with which Canadians now wrestling with the pernicious aspects of foreign ownership are only too familiar.

But the case of the GDR is unlike Canada, where increasing convergence with the U.S. is a fact of everyday life. In the first place, Canada and the U.S. share a common political creed and a common social philosophy. The two German states do not. West German affluence derives from a more-or-less privatized economy, more-or-less devoid of political ideology. In the GDR it is just the opposite. The present affluence enjoyed by the average East German can be traced directly to the policy of the state. Economic abundance, the New Economic System, the rationalization of production, agricultural reforms, individual initiative, have been embraced by the SED and supported by it.[6] In West Germany, political liberty preceeded material abundance; not vice versa. Affluence might change the nature of that liberty, but it could not bring it about. In the GDR, the fact is that material abundance traces to the Berlin Wall—an act of state (perhaps of statesmanship) that has permanently sealed Germany's division. And it was Walter Ulbricht himself who repeatedly took the lead during the decade of the Sixties to champion the cause of economic reform. Indeed, there is no more serious indictment of the contemporary study of the two German states on this continent than the shabby treatment given to Walter Ulbricht—who has never been the personification of evil depicted by Cold War publicists, and in historical perspective may even succeed Adenauer as the greatest German chancellor since Bismarck.

The fact is that economic reform is part and parcel of the GDR, and the cold reality of that fact is that technological change, modern industrial management, and the techniques of economic analysis are as adaptable to a highly developed socialist economy as to a capitalist one.[7] Indeed, as GDR affluence increases, the periodic production crises and strains to which the economy was repeatedly subjected during the late Forties and Fifties becomes a thing of the past, further reducing the arduous demands made by the state on its citizens.

On a more abstract level, the idea that Communism cannot survive the affluence of modern industrialization is a curious conceit reserved to what John Galbraith recently described as the "sub-Imperial" style of the U.S., and perhaps by extension on this issue only, to the Federal Republic. It is an idea akin to classical arguments that democracy could survive only in a poor, egalitarian, rural environment, and ignores the evidence available—especially in the GDR—that Communism and economic modernity are scarcely mutually exclusive.

It ignores in the first instance the hard won stability of the GDR—a stability won at great cost over many years and for which the people of the GDR are justly proud. Exploited first from the East, then by the West, the GDR limped along until 1961 unable to establish its national *bona fides*. Since then it has enjoyed not only a significant economic resurgence, but has navigated a difficult change of leadership—a vital test of the legitimacy of any one-party regime.

In point of fact, past images of the GDR have been filtered through the hostile lens of the Cold War at its coldest. They ignore, for instance, the fact that Marxism is scarcely an alien philosophy in Germany. Marx and Engels were nothing if not German, and the entire logical structure of Marxist thought rests on the imposing edifice of 19th century German philosophy—especially the works of Hegel and Feuerbach.

In many respects, if there was a Marxist movement in the late 19th century, it was German. The cities of Eisenach and Gotha—located in the GDR—gave birth to modern socialism. And with the exception of Lenin, most early interpreters of Marx were German. It was in Germany alone in the Europe of 1912 where the Marxists constituted the largest single party in the parliament, and the split of the party following the voting of war credits to the Kaiser in 1914 was a traumatic experience from which German Marxism never recovered. It is a split embodied in many respects in the two German states that now exist. But it scarcely reinforces the idea that Marxism is an alien philosophy in Germany, or that the GDR is a departure from the normal pattern of German development. For the Left Marxists—under Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg—were almost as significant in the International as Lenin and Trotsky. The abortive Spartacist uprising in 1919 provided East German Marxism with its own martyrs—as did the Hitler period. And these are authentic German heroes.

Aside from the German heritage of the GDR, consider the question of popular support and national consciousness. As the past ten years in most Western democracies made abundantly clear, it is probably true that most governments are not so much supported as they are tolerated. The same is as true for East Germany as it is for France, for Belgium, for Canada or the U.S. If citizens have abdicated from political concerns in the GDR—a not uncommon German trait—it is because their basic needs are satisfied and not the reverse.

The decade of enforced solitude since the Berlin Wall has also had its effect. If anything has been eroded during these ten years, it is the residual longing for German unity on Western terms. Even that longing, to the extent that it existed before 1961, is easily exaggerated, for while it is true that almost 3 million people fled the GDR, another 17 million remained—attesting at least a minimal commitment to the regime. More important, the past ten years have seen ten classes grow to maturity—classes whose commitment to the GDR is scarcely a matter of conjecture. The revived East German economy provides immediate opportunities for employment and advancement, plus a stimulating sense of pride toward East and West alike. Social equality, educational opportunity, and a pervasive system of care and benefits have led to an increasing adaptation—indeed, a reciprocal adoption—between the citizen and the state.

Two additional factors in the East German *milieu* which militate to the regime's advantage are the Lutheran tradition of Prussia and the so-called administrative state—the *Rechtsstaat* of Bismarck and the Emperor. Lutheranism, almost by definition, is an inward experience. Accommodation to government—whatever that government—is a fundamental trait. The church got along with Ulbricht's predecessor; now it gets along with the SED. And on its part, the government reciprocates. The population is not deluged with atheist propaganda; the church does not raise its voice against the state.

The tradition of the administration state likewise functions on the GDR's behalf. Government is institutionalized; coercion is bureaucratic. The citizen obeys, but he does so freely. The tradition is as old as Prussia itself, or Saxony, for that matter, and the SED is the beneficiary.

Another important factor is the longevity of the GDR. Neither Weimar nor Hitler has endured so long, and the ramifications are extremely far reaching. Djilas, for instance, wrote of a "New Class" in Yugoslavia in 1956. But what do fifteen additional years mean in the creation of new elites—elites who owe much of their position to the GDR?

Domestic stability reflects more than ideological agreement or charismatic leadership. For the more important questions relate to the degree of integration of the entire social fabric. In East Germany, a new social order has been established, and the government has been the locomotive of that change. By whatever test has been set against it, the GDR has proved time and again an exceptional capacity to endure—and increasingly, even to flourish.

This makes Brandt's *Ostpolitik* all the more dubious, since it rests on the unfounded expectation that relations between the two German states can be placed in a unique national category. Rather than bite the bitter apple of full diplomatic recognition, a step that Canada for one may soon take, the West German government pursues a policy of potential territorial aggrandizement under the phony guise of peace and good-will. With the right hand the Brandt government accepts West Germany's existing boundaries; with the left hand it retracts its approval. Article 3 of the Moscow Treaty pledges the FRG to respect "as inviolable . . . the frontier between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic." Yet on the very day the treaty was signed, Foreign Minister Scheel delivered to Moscow a "Letter on German Unity" proclaiming the Federal Republic's intention, indeed, its "political objective" for "the German nation" to "recover its unity in free self-determination." The Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic goes so far as to state:

> **The Treaty does not conflict with the efforts to restore German unity. It creates possibilities. Any possible doubts are excluded by the letter on German unity, in which the Federal Republic made clear its objective . . . .[8]**

Such slight of hand, combined with the FRG's refusal to consider full diplomatic recognition for the GDR, reveal the essentially adventurist nature of Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. Where Adenauer's fierce anti-Communism failed to bring the GDR to its knees, Brandt's bear hug embrace may offer better hope. But the goal, to judge from the Federal Republic's official statements, remains remarkably similar.

At long last, sober second thoughts are being directed in West Germany at Brandt's policy—though largely for the wrong reasons. Nevertheless, it remains an indisputable fact of political life that you can't work both sides of the street indefinitely without getting caught. And Brandt, it would appear, is about to be caught.

Indeed, the current CDU opposition to the Moscow Treaty exposes the full duplicity of Brandt's policy. Until the advent of *Ostpolitik*, it was axiomatic in West German politics to take no foreign policy initiative without a broad base of support—doubtless a wise course for a country not fully recovered from the surgery administered by the wartime Allies. Yet Brandt, largely for partisan-political reasons, turned his back on this policy and set out in pursuit of what in reality were two mutually exclusive goals: on the one hand, to treat with the nations of Eastern Europe, including the GDR, on the basis of the status quo; and on the other to assure his domestic critics that he was aiding the process of German unification by so doing. That this finally got the Brandt government in trouble should be not surprising. What is most distressing, however, is that in his pursuit of domestic political capital, Brandt has come dangerously close to upsetting the precarious equilibrium in Central Europe. Should the Bundestag reject the Moscow Treaty—and the signs point increasingly in that direction—Brandt will have succeeded in alienating West Germany's new friends in the East, while losing many of her old friends in the West, and the fragile treaty system Brandt was building will come tumbling down like a house of cards.

How serious is this? Except for the fact that it will mean that foreign policy has become a divisive issue in the Federal Republic for the first time since 1949, I would hazard that the dangers are more apparent than real. The inequities of *Ostpolitik* in relation to the GDR represent a major hurdle. Until a government in Bonn is prepared to deal on the basis of international equality with East Berlin, including full diplomatic recognition, it is probably just as well to do nothing. Indeed, there may likely be some gains in this respect flowing from the Treaty's rejection, for it is unlikely that Bonn's former partners will sit idly waiting for the Federal Republic before recognizing the GDR. In the long run this may even help Bonn take the step she has resisted for so long.

As for Berlin, the so-called Berlin Accords have been oversold, just as the entire corpus of *Ostpolitik* was oversold. In essence, the accords take the form of an umbrella agreement by the four occupying powers sanctifying the status quo in Berlin, a series of annexes spelling out the respective positions of East and West, an "Agreement" between the FRG and GDR concerning transit to West Berlin, and an "Arrangement" between the GDR and the Berlin Senat regulating access by West Berliners to East Berlin and the surrounding countryside. The Quadripartite Agreement is not a bad document, but it achieves little that is not already a fact of life in Berlin. It pledges the four occupying powers simply to change nothing unilaterally. Why this represents such a victory so far has eluded me. After years of trying unsuccessfully to force the West out of Berlin, the Soviets settled in 1961 to wall their sector off—an action they could have taken at any time since 1945. The U.S., Britain and France now place their seal of approval on that action, which may be just as well since it is clear that nothing can be done about it, but it certainly should not be described as a diplomatic breakthrough.

One could quibble, in fact, with the long-term soundness of the Quadripartite Agreement on several grounds. First, it implicitly accepts GDR sovereignty over East Berlin, while it explicitly denies West German sovereignty over West Berlin. It does not detract seriously from the existing ties between the FRG and West Berlin, but it does break the pattern of symmetry thus far maintained by the Western Powers on Berlin. Namely, that the entire city, not just the Western sectors, come under four power occupation, and that what was precluded in the West was also precluded in the East. To be sure, in recent years this has been a formal position only. But to withdraw from that position with little in return seems a risky course, since by so doing the original four power basis of Allied occupation may now be called into question.

As for the two access agreements that have been concluded, here again the point has been underlined that West Berlin and the FRG are different political entities. The agreement on transit traffic was negotiated with the Federal Republic. The agreement on sector travel was negotiated with the Berlin Senat. This again is a risky precedent in a city as potentially explosive as Berlin. Indeed, it is an extremely serious compromise made by the Brandt government in its rush to get an agreement—a case again, of being too clever by half.

While it is true that these two latter agreements may marginally improve the present situation of the West Berliners—the exchange of enclaves particularly—they are nevertheless the type of housekeeping arrangements that were inevitable in any event. Thus the form in which they are concluded assumes a special significance. But even here the text of these agreements, particularly the transit accord, reveals the haste with which the Bonn government proceeded. Article 16, in particular, which specifies the grounds for denying access, is so loosely drafted that one may well wonder what exactly has been achieved.

Here again the Western public has been subjected to a carefully orchestrated propaganda campaign emphasizing the advantageous aspects of the agreements without mentioning their defects. Here again the fact that the Soviets and the GDR agreed to improve access to Berlin is portrayed as a major victory. The fact is that the USSR agreed to do exactly the same thing on May 4, 1949, in the agreement lifting the blockade, and again at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Paris one month later.[9] Yet the euphoria which at first surrounded the so-called Berlin Accords obscured this vital point, and Soviet willingness to sign a new agreement was regarded as an unprecedented triumph for Western diplomacy.

A far more serious long-term consequence of the Berlin Accords is that the Western allies, after concluding their umbrella agreement with the Soviet Union, left the detailed access arrangements to others. This represented a serious bargaining mistake, not only because it allowed the GDR to drive the wedge between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, but even more because it represented the possible first step in Allied withdrawal from Berlin. If the consummation of limited international agreements concerning Berlin's status can be delegated to others, so too can more far reaching negotiations. In effect, the Western allies abdicated their Berlin responsibilities to Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, and may now be left with the unhappy consequences.

It is, of course, difficult for any Western government to take a stronger stand on Berlin than Bonn itself, but in this case the Allies erred badly in not doing so. Whether West Berlin will now become the Formosa of Europe, only time will tell. But to an old Berlin watcher, the possibility looms more seriously than at any time since 1948.

The "Arrangement" between the Berlin Senat and the GDR is objectionable primarily because of the form in which it was concluded. But it too leaves serious questions dangling, particularly in terms of the verbal statement made at the time of initialling by the GDR representative (Gunther Kohrt), to wit:

> A precondition for entry permits into the German Democratic Republic is, in addition to the conditions stipulated . . . that the traveller has not violated the laws of the German Democratic Republic.
>
> That means that persons having committed acts punishable according to the laws of the German Democratic Republic . . . will not get permits for travel into the German Democratic Republic.[10]

Now what does this mean? In the first place, it represents either a dangerous first step in the unilateral reinterpretation of the "Arrangement" —which is unlikely; or else another clever dodge whereby the Western negotiators, in order to get an agreement, turn around and allow the other side to impose additional conditions not contained in the original document. Exactly who is to be denied entry under Mr. Kohrt's formulation? Doubtless this would include members of certain political groups in West Berlin—and, indeed, that may be just as well. But the difficulty is that a major reservation has been interposed which is so vague in its meaning as to allow the GDR to exclude anyone simply by the passage of the appropriate domestic legislation. What we have, in other words, is a bilateral agreement potentially susceptible to continuous reinterpretation by one party.

The technical defects of the Berlin Accords are serious. But more serious is that West Berlin has now become a hostage to Brandt's *Ostpolitik*.[11] And the Western Allies are partly to blame. Rather than control the Berlin negotiations, which their occupation responsibilities clearly demanded, they delegated authority first to Brandt, then to the Senat. That they must now bear the consequences is fitting, but it again reveals the adventurous nature of the entire episode. Rather than forthrightly recognize the GDR, the Brandt government risked a highly advertised but essentially fraudulent tactical victory on the slenderest of parliamentary majorities. And in a "pactomania" reminiscent of the Dulles era, the Western Allies went along. The result has been a dangerous erosion in the legal and moral position of the Western powers in Berlin; the immediate short term risks of serious confrontation in the divided city; a potential long term worsening of viability of West Berlin, as its ties to the Federal Republic are juridically undermined; the polarizing division of West German opinion on a dangerous foreign policy issue; and a major setback for improved relations between the two Germanies.

● **University of Toronto**

1 *Final Act of the Nine Power London Conference*, October 3, 1954. The governments of the U.S., the U.K. and France "DECLARE that 1. They consider the Government of the Federal Republic as the only German government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for Germany as the representative of the German people in international affairs." U.S. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: 1950-1955, Basic Documents*, Vol. I (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 1481-2. The London Declaration was explicitly recognized in the Paris Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, Oct. 23, 1954. (TIAS 3428; UST, pt. 5, p. 5707). Ratification was advised by the U.S. Senate, April 1, 1955; and entered into force May 5, 1955.

2 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, *East Germany (Soviet Zone)*, Background Notes, Jan. 1971 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971).

3 Robert Gerald Livingston, "East Germany, Moscow and Bonn," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 50, No. 2, Jan. 1972, pp. 297-309.

4 See e.g., Melvin Croan, "East Germany After Ulbricht," *Survey*, Spring, 1971, p. 76. Said Croan, "Far from being the 'major political paradox' that the present writer depicted earlier, the DDR may perhaps now appear to be a paragon of progress and possibly even a model of Communist political development."

5 See Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power: USA/USSR* (New York: Viking Press, 1963), pp. 10-11, 419-20.

6 See esp., Thomas A. Baylis, "Economic Reform as Ideology," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 3, No. 2, Jan. 1971, pp. 211-229. Michael Bothe, "The 1968 Constitution of East Germany: A Codification of Marxist Ideas," *American Journal of Comparative Law*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (1969), pp. 268-91. Peter Christian Ludz, *The German Democratic Republic From the Sixties to the Seventies* (Cambridge: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1970), pp. 11-17. Arthur Hanhardt, "Political Socialization in the German Democratic Republic," *Societas*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1971) pp. 101-21.

7 Peter Christian Ludz, "Politische Aspekte der kybernetischen Systemtheorie in der DDR," *Deutschland Archiv*, Vol. I, April 1968, pp. 1-10.

8 Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, *The Treaty of August 12, 1970* (Bonn: 1970), p. 85. The comment goes on to state "The letter on German unity is valid in international law, since the Soviet Government has accepted it without demur."

9 According to the final communique of the conference, the Foreign Ministers (Acheson, Bevin, Schuman and Vyshinsky) agreed "to improve . . . the movement of persons and goods and communications between the Eastern zone and the Western zones and between the zones and Berlin . . ." U.S. Department of State, *Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 69-70.

10 German Democratic Republic, "Arrangement Between the Government of the German Democratic Republic and the Senate," (Dresden: *Zeit im Bild*, 1972) p. 29. (Italics added.)

11 Not only Leonid Brezhnev, but Conrad Ahlers, official spokesman of the West German Government, has warned of a "confrontation which would have dangerous consequences for West Germany *and especially for West Berlin*." *Globe and Mail* (Toronto), May 21, 1972. (Italics added.)

THE CONTRIBUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION TO THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE DEVELOPED SOCIALIST SOCIETY IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Hans Dieter Schaefer

I appreciate this opportunity to speak to you about the role of universities and colleges in our society, especially concerning some features of the third reform of higher education we have been engaged in since the end of the sixties.

Today the question of the position and function of the university in society is becoming more and more important, and the answers have more and more far-reaching consequences. The universities and colleges, the whole structure of the third level of education represents an important factor in the scientific potential of every country. Their work is decisive for the quality and the extent of conveying the highest education to the people they serve. Science is becoming increasingly a main productive force with a direct influence on all social processes, above all on the production of material goods. This is a well-known and often analyzed procedure. It cannot, however, take place independently of social processes. On the contrary, a dialectic, reciprocal relationship between the social and the scientific-technological aims and their realization comes into being.

The GDR, as a socialist country, aspires to combine the achievements of the scientific-technological revolution with the advantages of the socialist economic order. This order is characterized by people's ownership of the main means of production, by the system of directing and planning production consciously in the interest of the people, and by broad democratic cooperation and participation of all working people in administration and planning.

This complex and complicated task, as a long-term process, demands ever more qualified people. This is an objective law. On the other hand, we in the GDR do not live as yet in a developed communist society with huge or unlimited material resources and opportunities. We must calculate our possibilities. However, the development of education for all people, on the various levels of education, was and is a central goal of our policy.

The objective requirement for more education corresponds to the interests shown by the people for education, for the development of each individual's abilities and aptitudes. The compatibility of social requirements with the interests of the people is one of the advantages of the socialist order, a powerful force in its development. Socialist society, in which the conscious planning in the interest of the whole of society is decisive, can only be built up by highly qualified people who are among the best of their age, who are capable of recognizing the laws underlying social processes and of applying them creatively in the interests of mankind. This cannot be just a few people, an "elite," while the masses can at best possess enough knowledge and ability to carry out their jobs in a given phase and at a particular stage of production, without the ability and the opportunity to understand each process in the whole of production and in its social consequences and without input in guiding it. Socialism can only be constructed on the basis of the full, increasingly comprehensive development of the human personality. This is why the GDR, from the very beginning, has paid so much attention to the development of education, and managed rather early, at great cost and under difficult conditions, to build up a system of education in which, on the basis of an all-round secondary education, a growing number of young people receive an education in the third level. By 1975 we shall have realized the comprehensive, compulsory, ten-grade secondary school. About 90% of all children will graduate from the 10th grade. This education is comprehensive, uniform for all children, irrespective of social origin, financial conditions, religion or race. This secondary school is the basis for our system of higher education.

Tables 1 and 2 show the development of access to the third level of education in the GDR, the entering students and the graduates being related to a roughly corresponding age group. As a corresponding age group for the entering students the average of the 18 to 21 year-olds for each year is used and for the graduates the average of the 22 to 25 year-olds. It need hardly be emphasized that this is a statistical, relative figure and does not mean literally that all first-time students are between 18 and 21, etc. However, for a longer period this figure gives a relatively reliable indication even for the GDR with its numerically highly variable age-groups. (This breakdown is probably more meaningful than speaking of "students as a percentage of the age-group" or "students per 10,000 inhabitants.") Above all—and this seems to be decisive—it shows the efficiency of the education system.

The tables show the steady growth in the capacity for higher education which is undergoing a planned further increase. In 1970 the number of those beginning full-time studies at universities and colleges was almost 70% higher than only three years before.

Table 1

Entering students in the third level (incl. *Fachschulen*) and at academic degree level as a percentage of a corresponding average age-group

Academic year	Third level of education	Academic degree level
1950/51	11,7	5,0
1955/56	27,2	7,5
1960/61	28,6	10,5
1965/66	38,7	13,4
1969/70	38,9	16,7



Legend: white area—third level
black area—academic degree level

This process of expanding the numbers of students is planned and administrated in accordance with the social structure of the population. This means that, for example, the percentage of students coming from the working class and from the class of the peasants is wavering around 50% of all students. About 90% of all full-time students receive sufficient scholarships.

I need not underline that substantially increased student enrollment has been creating some problems in terms of classrooms, housing, social services for the students, etc. Thus it has become necessary—and so the decision was made—to freeze the number and percentage of the students till

1975, lest we overcommit ourselves and exceed our possibilities. For the time being, then, student numbers will be held on the present high level. The long-term development of higher education made possible an important increase in the number of scientifically trained cadres working in the GDR economy. The number of employed persons with a completed higher education, in all industries, increased from 43 in 1960 to 86 in 1965, and 113 in 1970 per 1,000 persons employed. Almost 40% of those have been awarded academic degrees.

Table 2

Graduates of the third level of education (incl. *Fachschulen*) and of the academic degree level as a percentage of a corresponding average age-group

Academic year	Third level of education	Academic degree level
1950/51	9,0	2,1
1955/56	17,6	4,6
1960/61	14,7	5,2
1965/66	19,2	7,9
1969/70	33,8	12,5



Legend: white area—third level
black area—academic degree level

The quantitative aspect of fulfilling the needs of the economy is, however, only one side. No less important are the qualitative developments and measures with the help of which we are trying to do justice to the high demands of the social and the scientific technological development of the next decades.

Of course it would be less complicated by far to improve the quality of education only for a privileged few, but this cannot be in line with our concept of social and scientific development. We are convinced that every person — not only the one with a higher education — wants to be able and must be able to think beyond his own particular field and to understand the social nature of his work and its consequences. This necessity is illustrated, for example, by the fact that the value of the plants which are operated in industry has rapidly increased in the past few years. The average stock of fixed assets of the manufacturing industry per employee rose from 34,350 Marks in 1960 to 55,500 Marks in 1969. In many jobs the basic outlay is more than a million Marks. This gives rise to a high and growing responsibility for each individual, realizing the fact that the main means of production are nationally owned. We need a man able to understand the processes in society and in nature, willing and ready to take part, consciously, in directing these processes. Activity, responsibility, and creativity are characteristic attitudes which we intend to develop through educational work at all levels. And, logically, in our opinion there is no doubt that one can only do justice to the responsibility of the scientist in our times, if the discoverer of scientific or social laws and of the possibilities of their application and exploitation also understands his society and its laws and driving forces, if he is able to understand the historical tendencies of his times. The scientist must be able to analyze and evaluate himself and his results not only in relation to their significance for the further development of the concrete branch of his science, but also in regard to the possible consequences of these results, either in the interests of mankind or for the prevention of human progress. Therefore, in our university and college education there is a close relationship between training in a particular subject and the study of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. The study of Marxism-Leninism provides the epistemological basis of the individual sciences. Such a unity of specialist and Marxist-Leninist study is an important condition for a person to take advantage of his right and his duty to take part in developing socialist democracy.

The cadres trained in our universities and colleges will be working in responsible positions in their professional activity, they will be leading teams and will contribute to the further development of society, science and technology. Their work must be of a creative character. Activity in the interests of society is becoming a determining feature of a person. Appropriate attitudes and abilities cannot be left to emerge and to be developed after the completion of studies; they determine the contents and method of our training, being characterized by the unity of teaching and research, which has proven itself for many years.

The formula "scientific-productive study" which we have been using since the beginning of the third reform of higher education at the end of the sixties can only give some indication of the changes, or, better yet, further developments on the basis of existing experience (not only in the GDR but in other socialist countries, too). What is important is to arouse the creative abilities of the student. Already during his studies the student should take part actively, as the producer of scientific results, in the process of further development of science and of its application in socialist practice. Of course, even in the future it will not be possible to do without practicing skills and abilities already gained, without memorizing and absorbing already known facts. But all this will be more closely oriented to the creative application of knowledge and ability in socialist practice. We consider the incorporation of students in research work, concerning projects of real social importance, the highest form of scientific work by the students. We believe—and our experience over a few years confirms it—that future engineers, teachers, research workers, doctors, civil servants, etc., will find this the quickest and most thorough way to obtain the qualifications which they will need in their future work. In this process they learn to work in collectives cooperating with their teachers, with representatives of socialist practice, and with other students. The closer connection with practice, with industrial enterprises, state organs, etc., that is, with a possible future place or sphere of work, plays an essential part in our third reform of higher education. This purpose is served by such developments as "scientific-productive study."

We believe—and this is supported by our experiences—that scientific-productive study as a measure of raising the quality of graduates can at the same time lead to lowering the number of "drop-outs." A student whose interest has been aroused, who has been incorporated into collective work, who knows about the social usefulness of his work and has learned the joy of having found something new in a particular field, however limited this may be, and of having contributed to the development of science—a student like this will work energetically towards a successful conclusion of his studies. It is important to involve all students in this work and to make such experiences possible for everybody.

I should like to draw your attention to a further aspect of such a development of studies: to the possibility of finding out the level of performance of a student more precisely and, at the same time, more convincingly for the student himself. In a course designed for scientific-productive work, in studies including research work, the number of examinations can be reduced. The performance of a student is crystallized, so to speak, in the course of his concrete task. The student can assess himself better and understand his reports better because he is able to compare his work with the demands made by society, with the concrete task, and with the work of his fellow students. Above all, cramming for examinations is reduced; the student works for a cause, for an aim, and less—and certainly no longer exclusively—for the purpose of displaying knowledge for the sake of examinations.

In the past few years a closer connection between universities, other scientific institutions and industry came into being. The universities have been working together with industrial enterprises and their research centers and/or with research organizations, e.g., the German Academy of Sciences, thus sharing capacities and experiences for real efficiency of scientific work. Students are incorporated into this collaborative effort to an ever greater extent. This is also due to the fact that specialized study (a third phase of study following the preceding basic and subject study) has, in many subjects, been transferred to practice. Naturally, this is only possible on the basis of appropriate measures in the factories. It also demands a very close cooperation between industries and institutions of higher learning. Those institutions, on the other hand, offer more and more continuing courses for personnel from industry, education, etc. Thus the relationship between university and practice partners is indeed of mutual advantage, not only in the field of research and development, but just as much in the fields of training and further education.

Such comprehensive development in higher education first of all requires intellectual preparation and the prior orientation of all concerned towards the task at hand. In the past few years the work on drafts and plans became a veritable mass movement amongst students and teachers; intensive and hard work is thus going into the realization of the plans.

Obviously these processes take time. They presuppose the working out of qualitatively new study programs for training in all subjects. We are at present still working out and testing the new study programs. In 17 subjects, including most natural sciences, students have been working since autumn 1969 according to new curricula for the basic studies. Further plans are being worked out by the scientists and students of our Republic which are contributing to a higher standard and to fostering better cooperation within and between disciplines. At the same time we endeavor to keep these plans flexible.

We can say that all important steps of the third reform of higher education were planned and are being realized in close cooperation between students and scientists. We can observe a very productive and companionable relation between students and teaching staffs in many cases, a relation of real cooperation. In our opinion, an improvement of the quality of education according to the demands of social and scientific practice can be realized only by cooperative work of all persons involved: by students, scientists, administrators – in fact, by the whole society.

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Source: *Statistisches Jahrbuch der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, Berlin, 1971.

SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE FRG AND THE GDR*

Peter C. Ludz

Preliminary Remarks

1. Social change in its proper meaning is an all-embracing concept. It includes processes of change in all spheres of social life, containing economic and political changes as well as developments in the educational field. Since its point of departure is a rather general one, this paper is so designed as not to conflict with others presented before this Conference which cover specific sectors of the West or East German societies.

2. This paper describes certain trends of development which have been deduced from a variety of data provided by empirical sociological studies as well as statistical documentation. It does not examine the causes of social change in East and West Germany. Such an examination would have broadened the subject inordinately. It would have forced me not only to resort to German history in order to find appropriate explanations, but would have also compelled me to take into account global political developments, at least since 1945.

3. A study of two societies that intends to relate their structures and trends of social and political change involves certain methodological and methodical problems. These problems are familiar to those who have engaged in comparative politics, comparative sociology, and comparative social change. It is also known that in comparative studies of specific socio-political strata, or phenomena, such as elites or migration, relatively simple methodological questions have to be encountered. Problems of procedure, however, increase in those investigations that aim at a quantitative approach and focus on dimensions of conflict behavior[1] or patterns of political development and modernization, or relationships between domestic and foreign conflict behavior.[2] In other words, those conceptual frameworks that refer to dynamic factors, such as values and attitudes, are extremely difficult to convey into empirical devices.

In addition, the difficulties in the methodological situation are compounded when two social systems are compared which originally have been one. This happens to be the case with the two German social systems. Both systems are in the process of change; both display trends of economic growth, modernization and development; both are oriented toward performance and career; both are committed to technological progress in the sense that they recognize the growing importance of research and development, and enact the necessary educational reforms. In some respects, then, the comparison between the two Germanies can be conducted as though there never had been one unitary state of Germany. However, what happens when we ask questions closer to a general historical and political assessment? If, for example, we want to evaluate the character of legitimacy and/or authority in the divided Germany? What methodological tools, if any, qualify for an analysis of such phenomena? Should we start with a comparative analysis of the East and West German constitutions by treating them as a "type of normative arrangements"?[3] Or can we conceive of legitimacy and authority when analyzing "governmental structures" as "crystallized patterns of behavior"? These questions can only be asked in this paper; they cannot be answered. However, I wanted to present them here in order to show the encompassing range of an investigation into social change in the FRG and the GDR.

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* Revised version of the paper delivered at the German Studies Conference

Compared to this, my approach here is rather modest and limited in scope. On the other hand, and aside from the methodological implications, this topic also covers a wide range of substantial questions and needs systematization. I have chosen to arrange my remarks and the materials referred to in a set of propositions.

I

We may start from the fact that today there exist two German states and—as has been common knowledge for some time—two German social systems: the state and society of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the state and society of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). Nevertheless, both German systems are still linked together; they still share history, in particular recent history during National Socialism; they share language and culture with each other.

On the other hand, both Germanies are deeply integrated into their international alliances. I mean their economic as well as political ties on the governmental level. I also mean, as far as the FRG is concerned, integrative processes on a socio-psychological level, i.e., in the everyday life of the people, in their life styles and attitudes which are largely Western-oriented. Many people, if asked, would display a strong feeling for the West and Western Europe. This attitude not only expresses a political stand or a political volition; it also becomes politically effective itself.

My *first proposition* takes into account this broad context just outlined. In reference to Ralf Dahrendorf,[4] Hermann Krausnick, et al., I would like to express it in the following terms: Both German states have been deeply affected by the social revolution, or the modernization process, set in motion by the National Socialist movement. National Socialism, in its totalitarian fight against progressive as well as traditional norms and values, succeeded in destroying tradition or at least attenuating it. Processes of both "co-ordination," or *Gleichschaltung*, i.e., the abolition of uncontrolled autonomy, as well as mass mobilization are as characteristic of this social revolution as are the emerging strategic cliques, i.e., small elite groups which conducted these processes by making use of advanced instruments of agitation and propaganda. For both Germanies these changes imply two important facts: first, the National Socialist revolution created the conditions for processes of industrialization and modernization to take place in Germany; second, it helped to make the German type of modernization take on an ideological garb.

On the other hand, this forced process of modernization did not bring a solution to tensions then deeply affecting the German social system. I am referring to those tensions and conflicts between political and social norms and the social groups involved that were typical of the Weimar Republic. In the course of the War and the postwar period, most prewar structures have been destroyed. However, some of its components have been preserved or absorbed in new social structures. Thus, both Germanies today are confronted with the problem of blending modernity and backwardness, rationality (i.e., the kind of rationality that the industrial welfare state is based on) and traditionalism. This problem has its ultimate roots in the German history of the thirties and forties.

II

A *second proposition* emerges from this overall context. Both Germanies have reached a considerable stability in their socio-economic spheres, but not as much with regard to their political and ideological or belief systems.

Our generation has witnessed two "economic miracles" in Germany as well as the concomitant processes of socio-economic stabilization. While in the FRG these processes took place in the fifties, in the GDR they occurred one decade later. On the other hand, both Germanies still lack completely restored, binding authorities in state and society. In other words, although we find the FRG— and GDR—governments well-established in their extrinsic aspects and both economies relatively affluent, the political systems have not taken root yet. This means that the political elites in both Germanies are more or less isolated from the majority of the people. Regarding West Germany, the gap between the rulers and the ruled has to be evaluated in the light of similar phenomena in other Western countries—even those with longer traditions of democratic rule. As Jean Edward Smith rightly observed, in the West "most governments are not so much supported [by the people, P.C.L.] as they are tolerated."[5] This is why loyalty vis-à-vis the state on the part of elites and the public at large may be questionable in general. Nevertheless, there still exists a very important difference between the older and well-established political and social systems and the relatively new regimes in both the West and the East: In the more established systems, authority and legitimacy of power are anchored in a traditional value system. While legitimacy in older democracies, such as the U.S., may denote an "ability to maintain the stable legal and procedural environment of the classic rational-legal order," the new regimes are more likely to define their legitimacy by performance criteria.[6] In our context, i.e., for the FRG and the GDR, performance was more or less identical with economic success, a goal which the FRG achieved in the fifties and sixties and which the GDR started to move toward with its "new economic system" in the early sixties.

So far West and East German developments may be parallel; but beyond that point there is little parallelism to be discovered. In the FRG the common goal of economic success was launched by the neo-liberal economic and social philosophy as adopted by the State. In the early years of the GDR's development, on the other hand, the authorities in Party and State were opposed to the notion of the ability of economic success to substitute for legitimacy and were helpless in achieving such economic success. While in the FRG prosperity being attained under a long-term CDU/CSU rule helped to start a process of identification of the people with the State, the GDR did not experience such a development until the early sixties. But even when the achievements of the "new economic system" could be seen and were eagerly used by the consuming masses, a genuine relationship between economic success and the legitimacy of the Party failed to materialize. The Party's legitimacy remains uncertain, although it is questioned less by the people today. In the FRG, on the other hand, political identification on the grounds of economic success broke apart once the economy began to slacken and a certain prosperity was reached. In politics this led to the crisis in the Erhard administration and the formation of the Great Coalition with Kiesinger as Chancellor and Brandt as Secretary of State in 1966.

Thus, in the seventies, both Germanies show more similarities with regard to political stability/instability in terms of legitimacy and/or authority than in the sixties and fifties.

Despite our inability to discuss this more extensively, we should, however, point to some manifestations of the lack of legitimacy and authority. In the Eastern as well as the Western part of the divided Germany, the larger segment of the populace seems to display a basically apolitical attitude. A feeling of apathy and/or estrangement vis-à-vis political issues is typical of the masses in both systems. The political attitude of a so-called "do-it-but-without-me," which emerged as a broad pattern in both East and West Germany after WW II, is still widespread. This should not be overlooked, even though political activities of specific groups in both Germanies attract our attention today. I am thinking of the various protest groups in the FRG and active ideological groups in the GDR. From our perspective of social change in the FRG and the GDR, both kinds of politico-ideological groupings—despite their obvious differences—have to be seen as "marginal;" their place is at the periphery of their respective societies.

Generally speaking, both Germanies suffer from their common history and the experience resulting from the necessity of charting new directions and establishing new authorities. And even more so, all governments and most of the other authorities in both parts of Germany have lived with the ideas of historical discontinuity and actual partition in mind. An identity—national, or whatever it may be called—is still missing on either side. Therefore the stability that now constitutes the foreground of both systems should not be misinterpreted. Behind it there is still some basic lability—which may bring about a situation of stagnation, apathy, and alienation (instead of stability). A manifest state of lability, or instability, or even a major domestic crisis is not likely to emerge in the near future, unless a major international conflict or a crisis among the members of the respective treaty systems develops.

III

Leaving this general perspective behind, I would like to draw attention to the fact that both Germanies have been existing for more than twenty years now. They developed separately, displaying, at least officially, a hostile attitude against each other for a long time. Their hostility not only gives expression to "querelles allemandes" which have not yet been resolved; it also is another manifestation of the crisis in identity and legitimacy which both Germanies are suffering from. Beyond their hostile relationship, each of the two parts has its own history, its own processes of social change. I therefore would like to continue with a brief sketch of what, in my view, are some of the major trends of social change in each of the two systems.

The *third proposition* is concerned with social change in the FRG since 1945. The National Socialist social revolution has been stopped. Indeed, as a reaction to National Socialism, some traditional institutions were restored. For many years the establishment of a democratic and social *Rechtsstaat* was juxtaposed by a return to pre-modern structures. To mention just a few examples of the latter: The *Länder* re-emerged; the central state was destroyed, pre-industrial structures in the society at large as well as in the family system were promoted by the State; the churches were assigned a major role in West Germany's social and political life; and, as a symbol, the national anthem was preserved.

After WW II all forces were concentrated on rebuilding what had been destroyed. Politically, the attitude of a "do-it-but-without-me" prevailed. Those professionally interested in politics had little to fear as long as they could establish domestic stability and guarantee economic progress. The CDU/CSU under Konrad Adenauer was successful in both. Domestically they pursued a "policy without experiments;" in foreign affairs they promoted West Germany's integration into the Western alliances. Ideologically they resorted to anti-communism which then, i.e., in the late forties and the fifties, was the dominant *Ersatz*-ideology in the Western hemisphere. This policy of consolidating the economic and social bases of West German society was dominant until the end of the fifties. It helped to develop the democratic and social *Rechtsstaat* as well as what is called the liberal capitalist welfare state. An example for the latter is provided by the new system of social security for all workers and employees. The guarantee of co-determination (*Mitbestimmung*) for workers in heavy industry serves as another illustration.

Nevertheless, at the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties the situation in the FRG began to change with the strengthening of the SPD after the *Godesberger Programm* (1959) as well as with the emergence of a dissenting youth and a critical intelligentsia. Social conflicts and tensions developed. It then became clear that change had so far been heading into two directions: backward and forward, as it were. Thus, much conflict and political antagonism in the FRG results from clashes between old and new structures, attitudes and values. To give a few examples:[7]

—The FRG Constitution has established equal citizenship rights to a considerable extent. However, some of the social preconditions of its effective realization are lacking. For example, in higher education equal opportunity is not a reality yet; the proportion of students from workers' families who are admitted to universities is still much lower than that of workers in relation to the total working populace. This holds true even in the light of recent efforts by the *Länder* and the State to advance educational reforms.

Generally speaking, clashes between the old and the new are evident everywhere in present West German discussions on educational matters.

—The explosive rate of development of the West German economy intensified processes of social mobility (horizontal and vertical), of inner migration and urbanization. Already by the middle of the sixties, 24 densely settled areas (i.e. *Verdichtungsräume*, according to governmentally established statistical standards) could be found in the FRG.[8] They have been growing in size since then, partly because the population growth rate is very high.[9]

On the other hand, at least for the first twenty years of the existence of the FRG, it was one of the guarded principles of the economy that small and medium businesses had to be supported. Thus, the "economic miracle" took place on the grounds of organizational structures and behavior patterns typical of highly industrial societies, but to a certain extent only. The policy of combining modernization and traditionalism was effective for many years; but, as has been stated very often recently, it is breaking apart now—for structural reasons, I would like to add.

What may be called a restorative period in the FRG came to an end in 1966-67 and 1969, at the latest. The need for changes was then expressed widely and led to the rather enthusiastic welcome that Willy Brandt's government of the Small Coalition received in its first days. Chancellor Brandt is known in this country for his policy of détente vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, Poland, and the GDR. However, his impact on changes in domestic affairs should not be overlooked. During his chancellorship many new laws became effective, e.g., a new law on workers' co-determination and laws concerning urbanization and housing problems. Broad reforms in the educational field are under planning and so are reforms concerning a rearrangement of the tax system.

IV

My *fourth proposition* deals with some major trends of social change in the GDR.

The National Socialist social revolution was continued insofar as those relics of bourgeois society left untouched by National Socialism were destroyed too. A radical new beginning took place—resuming the processes of mobilization and co-ordination, albeit under a completely different political and social program. Under the control of the SED, other parties, mass organizations, new institutions and organizations were established and old ones, if kept at all (e.g., the churches), re-shaped. A new "socialist" and "democratic" one-party state emerged. Its claim of being democratic points to an understanding of democracy quite different from that known in the West. For example, in the GDR Constitution the legislative, executive, and judicial powers are not separated from one another, as is required by any democratic constitution in the West. Or to give another example, the SED, as the leading party, has its claim for leadership laid down in the Constitution. All other parties and mass organizations, as well as individual citizens, have to subject themselves to the SED's "leading rôle," on the grounds of the postulate that there exists a "common interest" between the individual and the society which is represented by the Party. On the other hand, certain formal requirements of Western democratic constitutions are present in the GDR Constitution. For example, basic rights are guaranteed—although some important ones, such as the right to strike or the right to emigrate, are missing. And basic social rights are covered even more extensively.[10] Furthermore, the GDR's political system includes a parliament (the Peoples' Chamber or *Volkskammer*) and public elections.[11]

Certain problems which the new rulers in the GDR had to face were similar to those which the West German government was concerned with. The concept of radical change put forward by the GDR elites, however, was different from policies advanced by West German leaders. There was a common goal of destroying traditional socio-economic structures which was not—as in the West—juxtaposed by officially accepted restorative principles. Thus, in the GDR we find no manifest conflicts of the kind just elaborated for the FRG.

The nationalization and collectivization of industrial and agricultural private enterprises in 1945-46, the abolition of the professional civil service (*Berufsbeamtentum*) and the concomitant removal of all former Nazis from their positions created a situation different from that in the FRG.

The SED exercised a high degree of political and social control. Political and social antagonism, outside of a narrow range defined by the Party, was not permitted. Rather canalized conflicts and steered discussions are typical of that society. Consequently, at least up to 1961, millions fled from the GDR to the FRG, thus imposing considerable strains upon the GDR economy.

A process of political and social change became apparent since the erection of the Wall in 1961; it was strengthened further after the Sixth SED Congress in 1963. The construction of the Wall and the resulting halt in the exodus to the West forced many social groups within the population to "integrate" themselves into the social, though not necessarily into the political system of East Germany. A partial identity of interests between the Party and the people stimulated a process of mutual adaptation. The most explicit illustration of such a growing identity can be seen in the common striving for a higher standard of living.

Furthermore, since 1963 changes have occurred in the SED's methods of rule. In the forties and fifties, the major social and political objectives of the SED leadership had often been achieved through mass terror. Ideological and political in their motivation, these terror tactics were directed against entire social classes. In the GDR the bourgeois farmers, the old middle and upper classes were particularly subject to this terror over a period of many years. Although the SED in recent official and semi-official publications[12] explains its early measures to have been inevitable consequences of the "laws of the class struggle," this does not alter what really happened in those years.

Finally, the attitude of the younger people in the GDR may be cited as an example of the integrative process. In the GDR the rising adult generation is basically not hostile toward the existing social order. The Party has succeeded in winning a considerable part of it. The youth is not only supported generously; it is also given various responsibilities in politics and other fields.

V

In a *fifth proposition* the general trends of social change in West and East Germany as outlined in the third and fourth propositions shall be summarized.

In the FRG conflicts between modernization and traditionalism, whether occurring in the social, political or economic spheres, were covered up by the common striving for a better economic and social life for many years.

The common goal was achieved under constitutional conditions which, from the very beginning, permitted the individual to organize his personal life on a free and self-chosen basis. However, since the attainment of economic and social welfare, vehement conflicts between modernity and traditionalism have arisen which, despite the prevalent attitude of non-engagement, determine to a certain extent the character of the present social scene in West Germany. There exists also a tendency toward institutionalization or quasi-institutionalization of subcultures, which are in conflict with the established system and oppose modernity and traditionalism alike. The main problem for all West German governments has been, and for the foreseeable future will be, to balance the plurality of all those social and political forces, an obligation made mandatory by the Constitution.

Compared to this, the GDR leaders have different concerns. Their main problem is to establish the new social order and to win the people over in the attainment of that specific goal. This has been the principal objective of the SED from the very beginning of its rule. In the early years, vigorous political and social controls were used in an effort to compel the people to follow the Party line. Today controls are still strong, but applied less forcefully, and the approach now takes on rather indirect forms instead of direct ones. For the population at large, social change has brought about increased economic initiative as well as a certain feeling of pride in their society's economic and social achievements.

At present, both Germanies, although consolidated in the socio-economic sphere, seem to approach a crucial point in their development. Their future may well be determined by the mutual contacts which their governments are now beginning to establish.

VI

When discussing trends of social change in the two parts of an original whole, one should also compare their actual structures. Therefore the following propositions (nos. 6, 7, 8, and 9) shall systematize certain social data concerning the present situation in both Germanies.

Given the differences in goals for development and modernization in both Germanies, the structures of the political elites, which my *sixth proposition* is dealing with, are quite dissimilar. I shall attempt to demonstrate this through empirical data compiled by social scientists and report them here in an abbreviated and sketchy way.

In the FRG, the political elite[13] consists to a large extent (up to 60%)

of lawyers and members of the civil service class (administrative elite). It includes also members of the self-employed professional groups as well as members of top management. Participation of members from other elite strata is not uncommon, and the movement may also proceed in the opposite direction. This holds for higher civil servants in the political administration, the legal system, the military and, in recent times, the universities. Most members of the political elite come from the upper-middle-, middle-, and lower middle classes which provide more than 60%; only 15-25% are from the lower classes. As far as social-class origin and occupational background are concerned, this political elite displays a high degree of self-recruitment. Continuity with Germany's past is sought, resulting sometimes in an ambivalent attitude toward National Socialism. The GDR's picture is different. The political elite in the SED Politburo and Central Committee as well as the People's Chamber, the Council of Ministers, and the State Council consists of members of the service class, i.e., functionaries of the Party, the State and the mass organizations, to the extent of 50%. The self-employed professional groups, in accordance with their proportion in the society at large, are of no importance at all. Thus, the GDR political elite is more of an administrative elite than that of the FRG. Exchange of incumbents between the Party and State apparatuses was high originally, i.e., in the forties and fifties. It declined when tendencies for specialization in training increased in the sixties. As for the social-class origin, more than 50% of the GDR's political elite come from lower-class homes, many from the working class. Self-recruitment of the elite in terms of social-class origin and occupational backgrounds is less high than in the FRG. Nevertheless, the GDR elite is a much more homogeneous body. Ties with the German bourgeois past have been cut off completely. Almost all continuity has been broken and an entirely new class has emerged. This holds not only for the political leaders in the strict sense of the word, but also for the diplomatic personnel, for economic functionaries, managers, military and educational elites. In this respect, there is little difference between the GDR and other countries under Communist or Socialist rule.

VII

A further dimension should be referred to in my *seventh proposition*: The patterns of values, attitudes, and behavior in general seem to be different in both Germanies today.

As was mentioned earlier, in the FRG the most widely-shared values are those that emerge from patterns of work. Efficiency, competition and cooperation, drive for economic success, etc. are values spread throughout the whole of postwar West German society. Philosophically these fundamentals can be derived from neo-liberalist schools of thinking which strongly emphasize the rights and potentials of the individual. The recently adopted philosophy which is denounced by some of its critics for being hyper-individualistic involves a radical change in German traditional values. In the sixties it became apparent that traditional values, such as discipline, orderliness, precision, had given way to new ones. Today there is little respect for authority (esp. among young people), a strong emphasis on economic success and on the acquisition of durable consumer goods. In other words, values that cater to the individual are adhered to and individual happiness constitutes the new credo. On the other hand, this individualism, regardless of how backwardish it may be, has had a strong impact on the FRG's economic stabilization and may also have contributed to the strengthening of democracy. Today, for many, the Constitution is a living part of their socio-political orientation; it is not only paid lip service to. Many, especially members of the younger generation, are committed to the basic rights, specifically the so-called "rights of independence" (*Freiheitsrechte*), as laid down in the Constitution.[14]

In the GDR, on the other hand, the pre-eminent ideas are those of a "socialist human community" and "solidarity." They are derived from the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism and outlined in the GDR Constitution as well as in the SED's Program and statutes. "Basic rights" and "basic duties," such as the duty to engage in work, are formulated. Since the political elite places a high premium on such virtues as responsibility and conscientiousness, it is not surprising that some of the traditional German values are more in evidence here than in the FRG. On the negative side, however, the new value system, proclaimed by the SED and imposed upon the population since the Party's accession to power, produces increasing resistance to over-bureaucratization and tight control structures. Attitudes of protest which today give cause for concern in the FRG also occur occasionally in the GDR. Some indicators are provided by certain attitudes of the younger generation, e.g., their sometimes outspoken will to have their personal lives shaped by themselves and their peer groups, but not by the Youth Organization (i.e., the Free German Youth or FDJ).

VIII

The *eighth proposition* concerns itself with certain aspects of the younger generation in both Germanies. Young people seem to be less integrated into the society in the FRG than in the GDR. This probably holds for all sectors of both societies; it can be proved relatively easily if only a limited aspect of the political system is considered. The GDR has a larger proportion of its youth admitted to top political bodies than the FRG. For example, in 1969, the proportion of those aged 25 to 40 in the GDR People's Chamber was 46%, while in the FRG Federal Chamber (*Bundestag*) there were only 12.1% representing this age group.[15]

Young adults in the GDR may be as career-oriented as their peers in the West. However, there may be less competition between career-orientation as a functional social value and other rather dysfunctional values (such as those promoted by Western protest groups) in the GDR than in the FRG. In any case, in my judgment, the younger generation in East Germany is more self-disciplined than the youth of West Germany. For the most part young people in the GDR have avoided direct ideological indoctrination and, as a consequence, made work and study their central values. They seek professional satisfaction, individually and in groups in the "collectives" in which they live.

IX

Having elaborated a few general and specific differences between East and West Germany, we shall now in the *ninth proposition* turn to some differences in the social structure in the narrower sense, i.e., to differences gathered from census data.[16]

1. In their demographic data, both Germanies still show quite a few similarities. Thus, birth rates do not differ greatly (GDR: 14.0; FRG: 14.8, in 1969), although the age structures are dissimilar. The GDR's population is relatively older than the FRG's. While in 1968 in the FRG 10.9% of the total populace were 60 years and older , in the GDR 22.0% belonged to that age group. The average age of marriage is nearly the same (28 years for men and 25 for women, in 1969) and it is declining for both sexes. Trends toward early marriages and the acceptance of family planning are in evidence in both East and West Germany. Divorce rates, however, are much higher in the GDR than in the FRG. This indicates a social situation the complexity of which has not been fully studied yet. Undoubtedly such factors as dissimilarities in divorce laws, religious structures, and women's social positions contribute to that state of affairs.

2. Besides the demographic data, data on the labor force also reveal some interesting similarities and differences characteristic of its present situation in the two Germanies. The working population in both Germanies tends to be employed in industry rather than in agriculture. Furthermore, the rate of employment in industry is similarly high, and the service professions are on the rise, while trade professions stagnate. Nevertheless, the GDR's overall rate of occupation is higher than that of the FRG (50.9: 44.4%, in 1969). The proportion of those not employed as workers (*Arbeiter*) or employees (*Angestellte und Beamte*), i.e., those running their own businesses, is four to five times larger in the FRG. The rate of women employed is higher in the GDR. 80.8% of the total female working population, i.e., those aged 15-60, are employed in the GDR (in 1969) as compared to the FRG's 50.3%.

3. The average individual income in the FRG is considerably surpassing that in the GDR. The monthly family income (after taxes) is also much higher and the gap is widening rather than diminishing, if one takes the period 1960-69 as the basis of evaluation. In 1969 an average four-person family in the FRG had an average monthly income of 1,520 marks, while the figure for a comparable family in the GDR was 970 marks only. Although the prices for many groceries and other household expenses, such as rent, are much higher in the FRG than in the GDR, this difference is offset by the prices an East German family has to pay for durable consumer goods, such as refrigerators, washing machines, textiles, etc.

X

With my *tenth* and final *proposition* I would like to summarize my general points and emphasize the basic problem of those two societies and states which both stem from the one German nation.

Developments in both Germanies since 1945 show certain parallels: the immediate needs of starting afresh have been overcome; socio-economic consolidation and stabilization is now evident in both German societies.

Today the FRG and the GDR exist independently of each other in many respects. They differ to a large extent in their social, economic, and political systems.

However, each of the two Germanies seems to have to face the same basic problem in the future. With their socio-economic consolidation completed, they will have to establish political legitimacy and/or authority in order to stabilize their respective political systems. In the foreground, thus, there is the problem of constituting a self-image and, concomitantly, an image of the other system.

A process of self-examination or self-reflection is under way in both

Germanies. The East as well as the West German political elites are deeply concerned with defining "state" and "nation," which implies tracing lines of demarcation and delimitation. The East German official ideology, in emphasizing the concept of "nation," connects it with the Marxist class theory and conceives of the GDR as establishing a "new type" of nation, i.e., "the socialist nation." It maintains that the socialist nation should take the lead in German history and that the "bourgeois nation," existing in the FRG, should be overcome. Insofar as the GDR's state border is not a class border, it follows that the class struggle has to be fought in the FRG too.[17] The West German official formula for the concept of "nation" is at present less consistent ideologically. "Nation" denotes, as the FRG leaders believe, the shared history for which all Germans are responsible. Furthermore, the patterns woven by personal relationships, language and culture still provide a basis of national existence, as Willy Brandt has put it,[18] even though the drawing of ideological demarcation lines vis-à-vis the SED is the crucial trade of the moment, especially within the SPD.

The future remains open to assessment. This I strongly believe: We should refrain from engaging too eagerly in the exercise of pushing similarities and differences of the two German states and societies into theoretical models that allow evaluation and/or prediction of convergent and divergent trends of social change.

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[1] R. J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within Nations, 1946-59," in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis: Conflict, Development, and Democratization*, ed. by John V. Gillespie & Betty A. Nesvold (Beverly Hills, Cal.: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 39-48.

[2] Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Between Nations, 1958-60," in *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* (op. cit.), pp. 85ff.

[3] Jean Blondel, *An Introduction to Comparative Government* (New York, Washington: Praeger Publ., 1969), pp. 11ff.

[4] Cf. Ralf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968). To this brilliant and consistent analysis I am indebted for many intellectual stimuli.

[5] Jean Edward Smith, "Convergence, *Ostpolitik* and the Berlin Accords," in this volume, p. 44.

[6] Cf. Thomas A. Baylis, "In Quest of Legitimacy," *Problems of Communism*, March-April 1972, pp. 48-49.

[7] Cf. Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (op. cit.), who treats the first-named point *in extenso* (pp. 75ff., 149ff.).

[8] In the GDR, on the other hand, only eight comparable centers exist. Cf. Bundesminister für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, *Bericht der*

Bundesregierung und Materialien zur Lage der Nation 1971 (Bonn: Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Feb. 1971), pp. 75-76.

9 Cf. the index of population density (i.e., residents per square kilometre)

	1964	1969
FRG	235	245
GDR	157	158

Bericht der Bundesregierung und Materialien . . . 1971, (op. cit.), p. 71.

10 For further information cf. Peter C. Ludz, *The German Democratic Republic from the Sixties to the Seventies* (Harvard University: Center for International Affairs, November 1970), p. 9.

11 For an evaluation of these institutions cf. Bundesminister für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, *Bericht der Bundesregierung und Materialien zur Lage der Nation 1972* (Bonn: Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, Feb. 1972), Ch. I.

12 Cf. the recently published study *Wissenschaftliche Entscheidungen — historische Veränderungen Fundamente der Geschichte. Studien zur Geschichte der DDR in den sechziger Jahren*, ed. by the Institut für Gesellschaftswissenschaften beim ZK der SED (Berlin: Staatsverlag der DDR, 1971).

13 Here defined as including the members of the *Bundestag* and the *Länder* Parliaments as well as the staff members of the *Auswärtiges Amt* (i.e., the West German State Department).

14 Cf. *Bericht der Bundesregierung und Materialien . . . 1972* (op. cit.), Ch. I.

15 *Bericht der Bundesregierung und Materialien . . . 1971* (op. cit.), p. 217.

16 All percentages etc. referred to in the following are taken from the *Bericht der Bundesregierung und Materialien . . . 1971*, chapters III and V.

17 Cf. Peter C. Ludz, "Zum Begriff der 'Nation' in der Sicht der SED. Wandlungen und politische Bedeutung," *Deutschland Archiv*, vol. V, no. 1, Jan. 1972, pp. 17-27.

18 Cf. e.g., his speech on the occasion of his Erfurt meeting with Willi Stoph, Chairman of the GDR Council of Ministers, on March 19, 1970, in *Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik*, ed. by the Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen, vol. IV (Bonn-Bad Godesberg: Vorwärts-Druck, 1970), pp. 350ff.

GERMAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS FROM THE TEXTBOOK AUTHOR'S VIEWPOINT

John H. Herz

As an ancient pun has it, there are three reasons for being a college teacher: June, July, and August. Without these three, however, I could not have become what I am: a teacher who is also the author of a textbook on German politics and government which, first in the context of a text dealing with four major powers, and then also separately, has gone through six editions over the last twenty years.[1] I mention this only in order to establish my credentials for talking to you this morning on "Teaching Postwar Germany" from the viewpoint of the social sciences. That is, I shall talk from the double viewpoint, or double bias, of a teacher and a textbook writer.

That we, in the U.S., teach courses and have textbooks on German government and politics constitutes an exception. Few other countries, Germany included, regularly offer social science courses on specific foreign countries in their institutions of higher learning. The American student thus has an enviable chance to learn about other nations, more so than his opposite number in the countries he learns about, in regard to the U.S. What advantage have we taken of this opportunity?

The social sciences, and political science in particular, of course, are relatively young areas of study and research even in this country. A more systematic study of German government and politics, for instance, hardly existed prior to the interwar period. Even then the emphasis, as in political science in general, was on the institutional framework: laws and constitutions and such. It was also limited to European systems, chiefly Britain, France, Germany, and the Soviet Union. As far as Germany was concerned, I remember Karl Loewenstein's treatment of Germany in a volume edited by James Shotwell and typically entitled: *Governments of Continental Europe*. Then came the war, and with it a greatly enhanced interest in German affairs. No wonder, since scores of Americans who subsequently went into teaching—and writing—became actively involved in governing a part of Germany. Prior to the occupation period, a mixed band of native Americans and such assorted, then so-called, "friendly enemy aliens" as Franz Neumann, Herbert Marcuse, and Otto Kirchheimer worked in war agencies such as OSS on Germany, not as spies but as writers of handbooks and guidebooks to subsequently serve and guide military government officers in Germany. I was one of them and can testify that none of these guidebooks had any perceptible influence on occupation policies, which may have been just as well, but we did constitute the fulcrum of subsequent interest in, and study of, postwar Germany. OSS, of all places, had turned out to be the place where the left-Hegelian *Weltgeist* had found a temporary abode!

Thus the postwar period offered a very favorable ground for greatly increased emphasis on German studies, increased number of courses dealing with German government and politics, increased number and interest of students. After all, where did you have a country that had so fatefully affected our lives and which, through the Cold War crises centering around it, continued to affect all of us? But there were also other factors, counter-factors, so to speak, which endangered the prominent status of postwar Germany in the social studies, or, at least, presented serious problems. Let me, in the few minutes that I have, mention some major ones.

The first problem is in the tendency, in comparative politics, to become "genuinely comparative"; that is, to give up the country-by-country type of study in favor of dealing with institutions and processes as such, drawing upon specific countries and systems merely for purposes of illustration. Thus one analyzes the process of political socialization of the young, or party systems, or composition and recruitment of elites. I am far from contesting the importance of studies like these but, didactically, in my opinion, it makes sense only for advanced students who already know something about specific systems and countries. It is something for graduate students, but as far as undergraduates are concerned, I am skeptical. However, it is the fashion nowadays, and country or area study is in danger of falling by the wayside or, at least, of being de-emphasized.

But even when we deal with countries as such and their political structures, there is another problem. It is one close to the subject matter of this conference, namely, how to integrate German studies. Comparative politics has moved from an emphasis on formal structures and institutions to one on functions and processes, and that is all to the good. This same trend, however, tends also to give up a more integrated, especially a history-based, approach in favor of what is considered more "scientific" nowadays: quantification of data, attitude studies, and similar so-called behaviorist methods. I frankly represent the more conservative, or traditionalist, school which believes that, at least for the undergraduate, the results of the scientific method are lost unless it is grounded in a broad historical and cultural framework. My co-author, Miss Carter, and myself from the beginning have emphasized in our text the functions of institutions, the importance of attitudes, and so forth. But it is largely a question of time and space available, especially when a country like Germany is one among several dealt with in one course, and the text, therefore, must be brief. In the case of mine on Germany, I so far have resorted, battered but victorious, from a protracted battle with editors who, understandably, want the *dernier cri* of what the market seems to demand. I still have lengthy sections dealing with culture and history in my text, because I fail to see how one can present a clear picture of present-day Germany without them. There must be a separate presentation of at least three consecutive layers of historical antecedents which have influenced postwar German systems decisively: that of the Bismarckian and Wilhelmian Reich; that of Weimar; and the Nazi system.

Consider how even now the memory and legacy of Nazism haunts not only the Germans but all of us. Permit me to read a few sentences from a recent article by Fritz Stern, who says (in *The Columbia Forum*, Winter 1971):

> **"In our moments of outrage or perplexity, we talk of storm troopers and Reichstag fires, of concentration camps and genocide, of Munich, Auschwitz, Lidice, of book burning and Gleichschaltung. Beyond these labels lies the dim, collective memory of the ultimate crime of the Nazis, and activists of whatever persuasion often condone their revolutionary pranks by pretending they are exorcizing the ghost of six million Jews who, they say, allowed themselves to be marched to their deaths. The young sometimes see their elders as accomplices or perpetuators of earlier crimes, and they confound a moment of repression with the long night of totalitarianism; the older generation, in turn, see in youthful militancy tne pacemakers of a fascist backlash."**

Can the experience of Nazi totalitarianism be made understandable or, at least, visible to students without treating it, in textbook and classroom presentation, as a comprehensive whole? I believe not. What of Weimar, that fleeting liberal period in German history that had so much of previous illiberalism in it and became so pregnant with the monstrosity to which it gave birth while dying of it, and which yet strangely attracts us by its glittering display of intellectual and cultural achievements? That Weimar which, when liberal democracy was given another chance, served in some respects as a model, in others as a warning to the fledgling Federal Republic? On the other hand, both these systems, Weimar and Nazism, had inherited traits from that earlier period which can be said to have served as incubation period for all that came later, conveying fundamental features to modern Germany: the Reich of 1871. I believe that it is impossible to give the unsophisticated student of Germany a clear picture of the present Germanies without describing each of the antecedent systems as distinct and separate entities. To proceed, as most textbook treatments do, in such a fashion that only the present system, or systems, are analyzed, with occasional reference to what preceded them, can hardly lead to deeper understanding. Whenever it is a matter of more overall problems—such as German parliamentarism or German federalism, authoritarian features of the executive or the peculiar character of the civil service, or functions and weaknesses of civil liberties—I do not believe that a clear picture emerges by mere occasional flashbacks to what preceded the present system. Judgment must be based on comparison and contrast with preceding periods and systems, and on all the crises and apprehensions, all the tragedy and irony involved in their emergence and their passing.

As I said, the drawback of this method is that less time and space is left for the treatment of the present two Germanies in terms of current political processes and governmental institutions. I consider this the minor evil.

Another problem confronting the textbook author on Germany concerns the treatment of foreign policy. In the case of other nations a clear line can perhaps be drawn between foreign and domestic affairs. And, in agreement with the general trend toward specialization, these two areas will then be dealt with in separate courses (e.g., one on the Soviet domestic system, the other one on Soviet foreign policy). This means, however, that it is a mere coincidence whether the non-specializing student and, among undergraduates, the non-major in political science, makes the acquaintance of a country's internal regime or of its status in the international society, or both, or neither. But in the case of Germany we cannot even distinguish between domestic and foreign affairs anymore in a situation where the existential problem of the nation, its partition, belongs neither to the one nor to the other but indistinguishably to both. To write a text on postwar Germany confronts one with this problem already in regard to the title: *Germany*, or *The Two Germanies?* Not to mention Berlin, which is neither here nor there! Thus, from the beginning in 1952, I have included in my text foreign policy questions, and in particular those of the relations between the two units, reunification, and now *Ostpolitik*. This, however, once more is in contrast to the usual textbook of Germany, where foreign policy is either ignored or dealt with only incidentally.

I apologize for seemingly being critical of my confreres in an area as competitive as that of textbook writing, but I do not mean to engage in invidious comparisons. There is great merit and excellence in some of the others. I may mention Lewis Edinger's text, which is ideal for advanced students in its combination of structural and behavioral method; or Arnold Heidenheimer's, which is one of the few paying due attention to the DDR. All I had in mind was to emphasize some major problems of dealing with everything in a limited context, and how I have tried to solve them.

Let me conclude by stressing the responsibility in a more general sense of a teacher of German politics, and even more so—because he reaches more—of a textbook writer. It is a country's image in the minds of another country's younger generations that is formed this way. Therefore it is our duty to aim at objectivity in the case of a country where impartiality is particularly hard to come by. To cite from the introduction to my text:

> "To the world Germans have alternately appeared as good and bad in the extreme; even a more temperate judgment is likely to be called anti-German by some and pro-German by others. Whoever seeks to understand the Germans, rather than to idealize or to condemn them, appears biased to some."

Thus, over and against the simplifying tendencies of the *terribles simplificateurs*, the complexity of things German must be made clear to the student. Once more a quote from my text (I promise it is the last one!):

> "Germany is not only beer gardens and pigs' knuckles with Sauerkraut; nor is it only the Volkswagen and I. G. Farben, the Prussian general staff and the SS; neither can it be reduced to Schiller and Beethoven, Kant and Luther. A nation is not summed up so easily. And this is good, for even if Germany is a land of contrast and contradiction, that is better than if it were a country where all contrast and dissension were buried under enforced silence or conformity."

It is a country where even semantics has its political implications. I confess to the sin of having called one section of my book "The Soviet Zone" instead of "German Democratic Republic" until recently. Only in the present edition have I given up the *Alleinvertretungsanspruch*, junked the Hallstein Doctrine, and espoused the theory underlying Brandt's *Ostpolitik*. Of course, pointing out to students such terminological difficulties can by itself constitute a lesson in contemporary politics.

An even greater responsibility is closely connected with the thrust of this conference: to utilize country studies for the purpose of internation understanding. This can be done, but not by embellishment and denigration, or by embellishment of certain aspects and phases and denigration of others. Facts must speak for themselves. It is no use to play down Nazism because it might darken the picture. We must try to explain what happened and why. Not in a spirit of *tout comprendre est tout pardonner* but in a spirit of *comprendre*. Perhaps those among us whose background is German are particularly suited to this. The danger of an emotional and even biased approach is great, but so is the chance of overcoming it and contributing to understanding from the twofold vantage point of the "old country" in which one was born and grew up, and the country where one spends one's life now. At best one can gain a viewpoint *au dessus de la mêlee* that permits one to distinguish the characteristics of both the German and the American scenes in all their contrasts and acuities. One can then realize what, to an American, appears strange in German affairs and what familiar, what needs explanation and analysis more than anything else. It is in this spirit that I have approached the teaching of and writing about German government and politics.

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[1] Gwendolen M. Carter and John H. Herz: *Major Foreign Powers*, 6th ed., New York, 1972; John H. Herz: *The Government of Germany*, 2nd ed., New York, 1972.

COMPETITION IN "MIRACLES"? HOW TO STUDY THE POST-WAR DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERMAN ECONOMIES*

H. Dieter Renning

I. Introduction

The economic recovery of West Germany after World War II has often been called an "economic miracle." It is not certain when this characterization first appeared, but it is still popular today. From time to time other countries, e.g., Japan, are said to have experienced a similar transformation. At least three works have dealt with the East German economic miracle.[1]

Economists, whether of the Marxist or the "bourgeois" blend, tend not to believe in "miracles," at least not in connection with economic events. Their professional attitude is to view any economy as part of (or as *the*) real world. To understand economic phenomena one may have to approach them *in abstracto*, but in the end a rational answer will be found for every question, and every puzzle will find its solution. Among economists, professional self-confidence outweighs professional frustration. At any rate, there are no "economic miracles."

What has happened in the FRG and the GDR since 1945 economically can be described fairly well today. It seems more difficult to explain it. The purpose of this paper is to outline briefly the post-war economic growth of the two German economies, to identify the conditions under which the recovery of the two economies was accomplished, and to examine some aspects of the economic system and economic policy in the context of post-war economic advance. Finally, we will analyze the external economic relations of the two Germanies—with the outside world and with one another.

This approach (outlined in a more formal way in the Appendix), I believe, recommends itself for the treatment of the German economies in the context of a German Studies program, because it relies on published materials which are fairly easily accessible, and because it enables the student with no, or only limited economic training to gain a basic understanding of the post-war economic experience of Germany.

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* The sub-title of this paper deviates slightly from the title of the Conference. I cannot claim without personal discomfort to be able to tell others "how to teach" the subject at hand. In any case, a subject must be "studied" before it can be "taught," and this paper aims primarily at providing suggestions for the former, leaving the latter decision mostly to the one who will do the teaching.

II. Post-War Economic Performance[2]

What has been the record of the post-war economic revival of the two Germanies, how does it compare with the economic performance of other countries, and how did the two Germanies perform in comparison with one another?

For the first three years after the war, only limited statistical data are available. We do know—even without statistical evidence—that those were harsh years when everybody struggled for survival, and economic revival was hardly the issue. The crucial turning point came with the currency reforms, especially in West Germany's case, in 1948. The stabilization of the monetary system and the removal of a number of economic controls at this time caused West Germany's gross national product (GNP—total market value of all goods and services produced) and industrial production to jump. In 1950-51, GNP increased at an annual rate of about 20%.[3] During 1951-55, it rose by more than 9% annually, and it has grown since then by 5% and more every year. This growth rate has been substantially higher than the average rate for Western Europe in general or that for the U.S. West German industrial production alone increased by 8.2% annually between 1951 and 1964.

East Germany, by comparison, had a slower start, as will be shown, but her GNP rose by 5.1% annually during 1951-64, a rate somewhat higher than that of Eastern Europe (without the USSR). Industrial production increased, over the same period, by 7.7% per annum, again at a higher rate than that of Eastern Europe in general.

These figures tell only a small part of the story, of course. They do not reveal, for example, how much more rapidly the West German economy advanced during the first post-war decade, compared with that of East Germany. By 1950, West Germany had reached the level of pre-war (1936) output, while East Germany achieved this level only about five years later.[4] On the other hand, per capita output increased from 1950 to 1964 at about the same rate in both Germanies (West Germany: 114%; East Germany: 113%).[5] This similarity is a reflection of the different ratios of total output to population in the two areas.

In personal consumption per capita, East Germany achieved a more rapid increase between 1950 and 1964 (134%) than did West Germany (110%). Yet, starting from a lower base in the late 1940's, the East German consumption level per capita has been consistently below that of West Germany (by approximately one-third at the present time).

These data (as well as others not stated in the present context) suggest two major questions:

a How can the rapid post war progress of the two German economies be explained?

b What factors account for the "lag" of the East German economic advance behind that of West Germany?

The remaining sections of this paper will address themselves to both these questions.

III. Post-War Economic Conditions

After the war had ended, the first job to be done in both parts of Germany, obviously, was to clear away the rubble, to start up the most essential lines of production and communication, and to organize the distribution of food and other essential consumer goods.

In later years, it came as some surprise to many analysts of the German scene that, in spite of the rubble, Germany's overall productive capacity after the war was actually quite close to what it had been, on the same territory, before the war: evidence of the fact that enough production capacity had been created during the war to make up for damages sustained during hostilities.[6] Thus the most painful loss for the remaining German economy was not the destruction of plants, etc., but the loss of the industrial (e.g., Silesia) and agricultural territories east of the Oder-Neisse.

While war damages and the loss of the eastern "hinterland" certainly affected the economic recovery of both the western and the eastern zones of occupation, other conditions had a more pronounced and lasting effect on the speed and pattern of post-war economic growth in the two parts of Germany.

1. *Destruction of an integrated national economic structure.*

In the pre-war German economy, basic industries, such as (hard) coal and iron ore mining, iron and steel production, and various branches of capital goods industries were mostly concentrated in the region which was to become the FRG. The GDR region, on the other hand, had a highly specialized industrial structure (electrical equipment, precision instruments, chemical products, textile machinery, etc.) and had therefore been heavily dependent on supplies of raw materials and basic capital equipment from the West. The partition of Germany disrupted the complex links between two diversified and inter-dependent economic areas, and East Germany clearly suffered more from this disruption than did West Germany.

2. *Necessity of economic re-orientation.*

With most of the economic ties between the western and eastern parts of Germany broken, both parts had to re-orient themselves in regard to markets for their products and sources of their imports. West Germany was more fortunate in two respects: she had retained her heavy industry base, and she found it relatively easy to develop new markets in the Western countries compensating for the loss of her eastern outlets, and new sources for her traditional imports (e.g., agricultural products). General economic conditions in the West (plus sharply increased demand for industrial goods during the Korean War) were clearly in West Germany's favor.

East Germany, in her eastward orientation, on the other hand, had to deal with potential trading partners who were busy repairing their own war-ravaged economies and, for a while at least, had very little to offer. Partly for this reason, and in part as a conscious policy choice, East Germany newly created or expanded basic industry sectors which she was lacking because of pre-war intra-German specialization. In East Germany's case, "reconstruction" meant much more than the term implies.

3. *Reparations burdens.*

One of the most controversial issues of the late 1940's, not only among the Germans, but also among the occupying powers, was that of German reparations. In the western part of Germany, this issue was rather quickly resolved: by 1951, and after repeated reduction of the dismantling lists (the "Level of Industry Plan" of 1946), West German reparations had ceased.[7] While they lasted, these reparations consisted of the dismantling of plants and industrial equipment.

In East Germany, by contrast, reparation payments to the Soviet Union continued through the mid-1950's, and on a much larger scale than in the West. In addition to the dismantling of plants and equipment (e.g., railroad tracks), East Germany's reparations consisted of shipments of goods from current production, and the employment of 1/7 to 1/5 of the industrial labor force by so-called *Sowjetische Aktiengesellschaften* (SAG). These were industrial complexes seized by the Soviet Union and operated as Soviet corporations on East German territory. At one point, those corporations represented about 30% of East German industrial capacity. By the end of 1953, all of these plants had been returned to German (state) ownership, most of them, however, at a purchase price totalling an estimated 2 billion German Marks.[8]

What bears emphasis in this context is, (a) that the reparations burden which West Germany had to shoulder (estimated at somewhere between 1.5 and 5 billion German Marks)[9] was much lower than that carried by East Germany (estimated at 40 to 50 billion German Marks until 1953),[10] and (b) that during the first eight years after the war, East Germany had to devote 20% or more of her current output annually to reparations, this amount therefore being lost for domestic use in investment or consumption.[11]

4. *Foreign aid*

At a time when East German reparations were still high and continuing, West Germany began to receive substantial foreign aid under the Marshall Plan. This aid, received between 1948 and 1952, amounted to $1.5 billion.[12] This was, on the whole, more than offset by reparations during the same period, but, conversely, Marshall Plan aid substantially eased the reparations effects and, in addition, it provided West Germany with raw materials and modern machinery which contributed not only quantitatively, but qualitatively to her economic recovery.

As the preceding comments show, the two German economies began their post-war recovery under widely differing conditions. While none of the factors mentioned fully explains the rapid economic progress of Germany during the 1950's and 1960's, together they do reveal, I believe, the main causes of the time lag in the growth of the two economies.

IV. Economic Systems and Policies

Turning now to some institutional and policy aspects of the two Germanies, there seems no need to stress that two fundamentally different economic philosophies prevail in the FRG and the GDR. One is that of a "market economy," the other that of a "centrally planned and administered economy." (Or one system is described as that of "monopoly capitalism," the other as the "economic system of socialism.")

In the popular press, as well as in academic discussions, there has always been the tendency to contrast the two economic systems with one another and to interpret the relative successes or relative failures of one economy or the other as the results of systemic differences, at the exclusion of causal factors which may not be system-related. (To the hard-core opponent of any form of socialism the economic performance of the GDR may actually appear to be the only one deserving the epithet "economic miracle," i.e., it should not have happened, since the combination of central planning and economic success is a *contradictio in adjecto* . . . .) As a matter of fact, it is difficult to determine to what degree the post-war success of the two economies is to be attributed to their economic systems.

West Germany's economic system, the *Soziale Marktwirtschaft*, incorporates essential parts of the "neoliberal" economic doctrine with which especially the "Freiburg School" of economics was identified. In principle it is a system which combines political freedom with economic efficiency. This combination is to be achieved through a policy which prevents the concentration of private or public economic power, through a policy, in other words, which protects competition (prevents private monopoly) and abstains from any form of government planning. Part of this system's policy program should be the protection of jobs and incomes (through stabilizing, counter-cyclical measures) and a progressive income tax system to prevent excessive income inequality. (Those latter policy prescriptions refer to the "social" features of the social market economy.)[13]

West Germany's "market economy" came into existence with the currency reform of 1948. Shortly after the reform, about 90% of existing price controls had been removed. At the end of 1950, the rationing of consumer goods ended. Output soared, so did incomes, sales, and, for a while, also prices. The new system was not a market economy in the classical sense. Rent controls remained in effect for many years. The agricultural sector received (and receives to the present day) special treatment, through government price regulations for various food products and a variety of subsidies paid to farmers. West German tax laws were designed to favor, in Wallich's words, the "strong" rather than the "weak."[14] In other words, taxation was consciously used as an instrument to stimulate investment. As a result, investment in the West German economy has, since 1950, amounted to 20-25% of GNP, a very high rate indeed.

In the defense of competition, the West German governments have never taken a firm stand. The "decentralization" of the highly cartelized industrial structure of Germany which was carried out under the Allied occupation governments has never been followed up with determination after the FRG came into existence. In 1952, a draft "Law Against Restraints on Competition" was prepared, but it was not passed until 1957. Since then, both the Law and the Federal Cartel Agency established under its provisions have been under constant fire from all sides. Its effectiveness as an instrument to protect competition is doubtful.[15] Today, economic concentration causes as much concern in West Germany as it does in other Western countries.[16]

Although — or because? — the "social market economy" concept has not been implemented to the letter, the West German economy has succeeded in achieving a high rate of economic progress. Economic policymakers, it seems, can be credited for this success on two counts: (a) The predominant reliance on free markets and largely unregulated private initiative; (b) the orientation of overall economic, and especially fiscal policy towards production and investment.

Whereas in West Germany the abolition of economic controls and the establishment of a market economy did not begin until the currency reform of 1948, in the Soviet zone of occupation preparations for a centrally organized economy on the basis of social ownership of the means of production began the moment hostilities ceased.

Through the land reform of 1945, all agricultural estates above 100 hectares were confiscated, and most of the land was distributed among agricultural workers and refugees. (In the late 1950's and 1960, a "second agrarian reform" occurred, resulting in the transformation of the private farms into agricultural cooperatives.) All financial institutions were socialized. All major industrial enterprises, as well as industrial property of war criminals and members of the National Socialist Party were confiscated and became state property. In 1945, the first central administrations (*Zentrale Fachverwaltungen*) were created and began to function under the control of the Soviet Military Administration (SMAD). These administrations were later absorbed by the "German Economic Commission," and the latter was eventually replaced by the Government of the GDR.

The economic system that evolved, patterned in its main features after that of the Soviet Union, is characterized by concentration of industrial production in the socialized sector of the economy and agricultural production by farming cooperatives; administration of the economy by the Council of Ministers (i.e., the executive branch of the government) through a set of industrial and other ministries; and planning of economic activities for specified periods of time through the State Planning Commission in cooperation with state ministries and agencies at all levels.

Private enterprise, while its importance has continuously declined over the years, still exists and accounted for 6.3% of total net product in 1968.[17] The share of enterprises under mixed ownership (private, with state participation) amounted to 8.6% of net product.[18]

East German economic policy, over the whole post war period has in several respects been fairly similar to that of West Germany. After the main task of economic reconstruction during the immediate post war years had been accomplished, stress was laid on industrial expansion and the development of a balanced industrial structure. However, in spite of these basic objectives and an ideological predilection towards high rates of investment, the investment share of East Germany's GNP remained much below that of West Germany (1950-59: GDR—16.9%; FRG—22.7%),[19] as well as below that of the other countries in Eastern Europe. One major constraint on East German investment growth has undoubtedly been the necessity to achieve rising consumption levels. The "competition" between the systems, frequently referred to by Party and government officials, was that between East German socialism and West German capitalism, and with the noticeable rise in the West German standard of living every year, it was a foregone conclusion that efforts should be made to raise that of the East German consumer.

Another constraint on East German economic progress, one that is especially difficult to measure, was the continuous manpower loss through migration to West Berlin and West Germany, especially of professional people and skilled workers. About 3.5 million people left East Germany (partly for political reasons, partly because of higher real incomes in the West) between 1950 and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961.[20]

In the light of these and other restraining factors the question is inevitable: Are the economic accomplishments of the GDR due to central planning? There can be no doubt that the centralized organization of economic activity and the identification of economic objectives in "perspective plans," "five year plans," and annual "plans of the national economy" have enabled the GDR to concentrate productive efforts on those tasks which, at any given time, were identified as the most important ones. The economic plans have never been complete successes. Bottlenecks, distribution problems, delays in the completion of construction projects, quality defects in capital and consumer goods—all these headaches have plagued the planners and the Party leaders and have been castigated in the GDR press. Planning errors, over-centralization, insufficiency of incentives, and unrealistic price structures have been blamed for these shortcomings. In 1963, the realization that the increasing complexity of economic processes could not be dealt with any longer through established planning and administrative techniques resulted in the preparation and, beginning in 1964, the implementation of a reform program, known as the creation of the "New Economic System of Planning and Managing the Economy," and, in a subsequent reform phase, as the "Economic System of Socialism."

Yet, the problems which existed before the reforms had not been worse in the GDR than in other centrally planned economies, and the GDR has moved from a position of almost total economic destitution at the end of the war to the first position among socialist countries with regard to the average standard of living of her people and to second position (behind the Soviet Union) among those countries in national production.

V. External Economic Relations

No account of German economic revival would be complete without some observations about the relations of the German economies with the outside world—and with each other. Given their economic systems and political alliances, it is certainly not surprising that the foreign trade of the FRG is primarily Western-oriented and that of the GDR is oriented towards the East.[23] For West Germany this has meant widening and lucrative markets for her industrial products, for East Germany the supplies of raw materials not available at home because of an insufficient resource base and markets for her (in many cases technically specialized) industrial goods. West Germany, trading predominantly with highly developed Western countries, has undoubtedly benefited greatly in her own economic advance from this exchange. East Germany's benefits from her foreign trade have, one can assume, been more moderate, partly because the state of development of her trading partners (with the exception of Czechoslovakia) was below her own. Furthermore, the GDR is part of a trading system which, through its bilateral trade agreements and non-convertibility of currencies is rather inflexible, in contrast to the so-called "capitalist world market." However, over the last decade or so, the share of East Germany's trade with capitalist countries has noticeably increased (as has that of other socialist countries, including the Soviet Union).

Aside from the regional orientation of their trade, both Germanies are parties to international arrangements which, in theory at least, are designed to achieve economic integration beyond mere trade linkages. The European Economic Community (EEC, or "Common Market"), to which the FRG belongs, was conceived as a construction leading eventually to an economic as well as political union of the European nations. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON or CEMA), founded in 1949, is designed to facilitate the trade among the socialist nations, and beyond that, to achieve an integration of national economic plan perspectives and structural policies. The GDR is, next to the Soviet Union, the most important member of that Council. Even though CEMA has proven less effective in terms of its professed aims than was the EEC, both organizations have to be viewed as sources of strong influence on the economic policies of the two German states.

Finally, what about trade between the two Germanies? Here exists the only remaining, but, as it seems, promising, economic link between the FRG and the GDR. This link has survived cold war rhetoric, border incidents and ideological shifts remarkably well. The relative importance of this trade for the two partners is quite lopsided: trade with the FRG accounts for 10% of the total trade turnover of the GDR, but only 2% of West Germany's trade turnover consists of trade with the GDR. Nevertheless, both sides have viewed this exchange as beneficial, and there is no compelling reason to doubt that it will grow in the years to come.

VI. Conclusion

Did the two Germanies achieve an "economic miracle"? The preceding comments were designed to throw some light on the actual accomplishments of their economies, as well as on some of the causes, but they certainly did not touch on all of them. However, once we take not only economic, but also political and other factors into consideration, the notion of the "miracle" dissolves. What remains is the picture of two economies doing better than others as a result of economic and political circumstances beyond their own control, of economic policies which, on the whole, turned out to have been fortuitous—and of a lot of hard work.

In conclusion, let us recognize that both the FRG and the GDR had something to build on when they entered the post-war era: for many decades prior to World War II, Germany had been one of the leading industrial nations. Aside from the economic structure which had evolved over the years, both Germanies came out of the war with a precious legacy consisting of a skilled labor force, established work discipline, technical knowhow, and sophisticated organizational and administrative techniques. While none of those factors—and least of all the proverbial "obsession with work," often cited as a fundamental trait of the German national character—can be accurately measured, and while, therefore, the contribution of those factors to economic growth in East and West Germany cannot be assessed, there can be no doubt that without this inheritance the post war economic performance in both parts of Germany would have been much less spectacular.

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12 Stolper *et al.*, p. 238. On this and other foreign aid to West Germany, see Wallich, pp. 354ff.

13 Wallich, pp. 113ff. For a discussion of "neo-liberal" economic policy by the founder of the "Freiburg School," see Eucken, Walter, *Grundsätze der Wirtschaftspolitik*. Bern: A. Francke, 1952.

14 Wallich, p. 130.

15 For a detailed discussion, see MacLennan, Malcolm, Murray Forsyth and Geoffrey Denton, *Economic Planning and Policies in Britain, France and Germany*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968, pp. 58ff. Also Stolper *et al.*, pp. 158f.

16 See Shonfield, Andrew, *Modern Capitalism—The Changing Balance of Public and Private Power*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965, pp. 240ff.

17 *Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR, 1969*. Berlin, Staatsverlag, 1969, p. 39.

18 *Ibid.*
19 Ernst, p. 890.
20 Stolper *et al.*, p. 305.
21 See Tables 6 and 7 in Appendix A.

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APPENDIX A

Table 1

Growth of GNP, 1951-1964 (per cent per annum)

	1951-55	1956-60	1961-64	1951-64
East Germany	7.2	4.9	2.7	5.1
East Europe (a)	5.7	5.2	3.6	4.9
West Germany	9.1	6.2	4.8	6.8
West Europe (b)	5.9	5.2	5.1	5.4

(a) Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania.

(b) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, West Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway.

Source: Ernst, *op. cit.*, p. 88[illegible]

Table 2

Growth of Industrial Production, 1951-1964 (per cent per annum)

	1951-55	1956-60	1961-64	1951-64
East Germany	11.2	7.2	4.1	7.7
East Europe (a)	8.5	8.1	5.8	7.6
West Germany	12.1	6.6	5.5	8.2
West Europe (b)	8.3	6.2	5.9	6.8

(a) (b) See notes to table I.

"Industrial production" excludes construction for East Germany.

Source: Ernst, *op. cit.*, p. 883.

Table 3

Growth of Personal Consumption Per Capita (per cent)

	1950-64	1960-64
East Germany	134	3
West Germany	110	16

Source: Ernst, *op. cit.*, p.886.

Table 4

Comparative Levels of Personal Consumption Per Capita, East Germany (West Germany = 100)

	1936	1950	1955	1960	1964
East Germany	95	54	68	68	60

Source: Ernst, *op. cit.*, p. 887.

Table 5

Regional Structure of West Germany's Trade (per cent)

From/To	Exports 1958	Exports 1969	Imports 1958	Imports 1969
EEC & EFTA	53.2	62.4	44.0	58.9
USA & Canada	8.3	10.5	16.6	11.6
Others	38.5	27.2	39.3	29.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

NOTE: Because of rounding, totals do not add up to 100 per cent.

Source: *Bericht der Bundesregierung und Materialien zur Lage der Nation 1971*. Hrsg. vom Bundesministerium für innerdeutsche Beziehungen. Bonn, 1971, tables A5 and A7, pp. 240f. and 248f.

Table 6

Regional Structure of East Germany's Trade (per cent)

From/To	Exports 1960	Exports 1969	Imports 1960	Imports 1969
CEMA	68.5	67.7	66.3	69.1
Among these: USSR	41.9	39.9	43.7	42.5
Industrial capit. countries	20.2	22.4	22.0	23.7

Source: *Bericht . . . zur Lage der Nation 1971*, *op. cit.*, table A9, p. 254.

APPENDIX B

Suggested Outline for a Course on the Post-War German Economies

I Background: The economy of pre-war Germany.
II Economic conditions after the war.
    War damages.
    Population and refugee problem.
    Economic controls and inflation.
    Reparations burden.
III Post-war economic performance: A comparison of West and East Germany.
    Gross national product and national income (growth rates, total and per capita).
    Industrial and agricultural output, services.
    Wage and salary scales, income structures.
    Consumption levels and patterns.
    Social services.
IV Economic philosophy in East and West Germany.
    "Neo-liberalism" and "social market economy".
    "Marxism-Leninism" and "centrally planned economy".
V Economic system and policy: West Germany.
    The market system.
    Public enterprise.
    Fiscal and monetary policy.
    Social policy.
    The subsidy maze.
    Anti-cartel policy.
    Industrial and employers' associations.
    Trade unions.
VI Economic system and policy: East Germany.
    Nationalization of industry, banking, communications.
    Land reform and farming cooperatives.
    Private and mixed-ownership industry and trade.
    Structure of economic administration.
    Perspective and annual plans and their implementation.
    Price system.
    Economic reform, 1963 to the present.
VII Post-war changes in economic structure.
    Industrial structure.
    Infrastructure.
    Agricultural structure, production patterns.
    Orientation and priorities of structural policy.
VIII External economic relations.
    Partnership in trade blocks:
        West Germany—OECD and EEC.
        East Germany—COMECON (CEMA).
    Intra-block trade patterns.

Regional and commodity structures of trade:
West Germany, East Germany.
Trade between West and East Germany.

IX System-related growth and stability problems in West and East Germany.

X Political developments and the German economies.

THE *BUNDESWEHR*: A NEW PHASE IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

H. Pierre Secher

Probably no twice defeated military organization has been the object of more fear, suspicion and distrust than the armies of Germany. Speculation concerning the real military potential of modern Germany and how to create adequate defenses against it has occupied much of the Western World for well over half a century. Neither the defeat of its armies in W. W. I nor the total destruction and disbanding of Germany's military potential immediately following W. W. II has rid the Western world of the notion that a special genius—evil or otherwise—resides in a German war machine that must be contained at all costs. Partly, such an attitude was historically conditioned by the emergence, in the 19th century, of a German military apparatus that had incorporated all the principles of industrial efficiency and organization and amalgamated them successfully with a purposeful and resourceful planning agency—the German General Staff. The recognition that wars too can be made to yield to the rationality of scientific as well as organizational innovation earned the German armies the reputation of invincible technological juggernauts—and contributed to the creation of a political culture which, twice in a generation, was able to subordinate domestic considerations to military exigencies in such a way as to produce a solidarity of purpose among its people unequalled in the Western world.

Today, of course, the introduction of principles of managerial efficiency and scientific innovation into the military apparatus is hardly regarded as a feature worthy of much comment. For better or worse, political systems have come to rely on the smooth interaction of a "military-industrial complex" to give it security and enhance its capacity for withstanding hostile policies backed up by the threat of war. It has become a commonplace to rate a system's capacity for making war by the quantity and quality of its industrial resources, the availability of skilled manpower, the reliability of technical, managerial expertise, as well as the actual size and state of preparedness of its standing army. Thus assessment of the role and quality of the present West German army, the *Bundeswehr*, must necessarily be taken out of its purely historical context, focusing instead on its specific relationship to the West German state, present West German society, and on its role within the Western system of alliances.

The *Bundeswehr* is indeed a new creation whose roots can hardly be said to lie very deeply with its illustrious and feared predecessors. This should become apparent after our examination of first, the legal and constitutional foundations of the *Bundeswehr*, the military mission under which it is designed to operate and, lastly, the peculiar organizational and political problems that seem to surround much of its existence within the Federal Republic.

The *Bundeswehr* is actually a "contractual" army—i.e., it was brought into being as part of the agreement to permit West Germany to become a member of the NATO Alliance—such membership including the raising of a suitable defense force in order to fulfill Germany's collective security obligations.[1] But, unlike any other member country of NATO, Germany's military contribution was to be totally committed to the alliance making the defense objectives of Germany at all times identical with those of NATO. Stated somewhat differently, it meant that West Germany's membership in NATO became in effect a pre-condition for the establishment of a military force—a point insufficiently stressed when discussing the role of the new German Army. It means that in time of peace *all Bundeswehr* units are under NATO command and that, therefore, the *Bundeswehr* has no independent operational staff since each army corps receives its operational orders directly from SHAPE Headquarters in Brussels and not from the *Bundeswehr's* top military organization lodged within the Federal Ministry of Defense; under no circumstances is the Federal Ministry of Defense and its military personnel to be confused with a General Staff organization. There is, technically, no command authority available to any one of the German army's highest officers who make up its top hierarchy within the Defense Ministry, and there does not exist a Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed Forces in the traditional sense, traditionally meaning someone who, either by hereditary right or direct, universal popular election assumes this power as part of the mantle of legitimacy which surrounds all governing authority. Rather, the supreme command is formally entrusted to an appointed cabinet officer, the Defense Minister,[2] who is, of course, a creature of the government party in office and may be asked to relinquish his office at any time. Only in times of emergency and war is this command transferred to the chancellor[3] whose electoral constituency is also not a national one. Whether this arrangement makes the Defense Minister a far more powerful political figure than was originally intended has been the subject of considerable controversy in the Federal Republic of Germany and one that can be settled only with reference to the personal characteristics of the individuals occupying that office. The fact of the matter remains that the West German armed forces do not have a symbolic head combining both national and democratic ethos in one office and person.[4] Certainly the Defense Minister can arrogate to himself the complete power and authority of a commander-in-chief only in defiance of his chancellor and if he has the unquestioning support of the military. Such a situation, though obviously not impossible, is certainly very improbable—and under the circumstances this arrangement alone would make the *Bundeswehr* subject to one of the most effective systems of civilian control anywhere. Unlike his American counterpart, for example, the German Defense Minister need not be concerned about a military establishment that lies beyond the control of his command authority: the generals are politically and organizationally subordinate to the Defense Minister. They do not, therefore, enjoy the nearly institutionalized opportunity of the American military to create independent political support for themselves for policies which, not infrequently, may run counter to the policies of both the President and his Secretary of Defense. Most importantly, they are subject to the constitutional provision permitting only the granting of annual appropriations that "reveal immediately the size and structure of the armed forces"[5] and which make military expenditures merely another budgetary item to be arrived at in the course of normal negotiations with the Minister of Finance.

An additional source of formal, limiting civilian authority over the military derives from the institution of the Parliamentary Defense Commissioner.

The Parliamentary Defense Commissioner is undoubtedly the most important albeit controversial innovation of the West German governmental system. Briefly, this institution was conceived as an agency of the *Bundestag* designed to help this assembly in its exercise of civilian control over the military. Unfortunately, the constitutional character of this office has been surrounded by an ambivalence of purpose which has led to considerable uncertainty with respect to its role vis-à-vis both civilian and military authorities.

The Basic Law contained only a vague provision regarding the appointment of a Defense Commissioner and his duty to safeguard the basic rights of the soldiers, leaving clearer definition of his powers, functions and manner of election to later enabling legislation.[6] The law setting up the Defense Commissioner office and defining his functions was not much more precise, however. There was no clear distinction between the real, "control" tasks of the office and its role as a "trustee" between the military and civilian, i.e., legislative authorities.[7] It very soon became obvious that the real strength of the office lay in the willingness of the legislature to provide it with both financial and moral support, and the *Bundestag* so far has not been particularly anxious to insist on both. So, despite the fact that the first two occupants of the office were extremely dedicated, serious and, in fact, "control-minded," the *Bundestag*, reluctant to create obstacles that would interfere with the rapid build-up of the new army, has treated the office with great reserve, even coolness. When the first two commissioners tried to caution publicly against the dangers inherent in the manner with which certain officers organized the structure of armed forces followed by a pattern of recurring unwelcome behavior among the troops, the *Bundestag*, instead of carefully investigating these charges, reprimanded the Commissioner for projecting the operations of the *Bundeswehr* into the limelight of political conflict.[8]

Generally, it is necessary to distinguish between the control and the protective functions of this office. It is as a "control" organ that the office has in effect failed—and it is at least arguable how seriously this function was ever meant to be exercised. But as a complaint office and one that jealously protects the basic rights of the individual soldier, the Parliamentary Defense Commissioner has become increasingly more effective and respected among the troops. The Office has accomplished much to insure that the rights of the soldiers who actually complain receive the most careful consideration and its remedial actions in this respect have been considerable.[9] Also, the annual report to the President of the *Bundestag*—but hardly ever debated and scrutinized by that assembly—has become an important source providing information on the attitude and morale of the armed forces for those who wish to avail themselves of these facts. Probably, the greatest handicap of the Parliamentary Defense Commissioner lies in his inability to initiate the kind of legal proceedings that can serve as preventive action against the repeated violation of certain rights. Until the law is formulated in such a way as to confer mandatory powers of both initiative *and* control on the Parliamentary Defense Commissioner, that office's role will always fall short of its originally conceived purpose to act not only as protector of civil rights for all military personnel but also aid in the oversight of laws and regulations affecting military organization under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defense. To this day the *Bundestag* has failed to issue the kind of directives to the Parliamentary Defense Commissioner that would define his tasks more concretely and thereby present the objectives of the office more clearly to both the public and the military authorities. Especially in times of crisis—involving conflicting views of the exercise of civilian control over the military—it will be necessary for the *Bundestag* to endow its "agent" with more than just auxiliary character and provide it with the kind of supportive authority that will add real sanction to its operations. The attitude that any parliamentary control which interferes with the function of the Minister of Defense should be avoided—repeatedly voiced by both political parties in the course of the debates accompanying the setting up of the office—obviously is not wholly suited to achieve greater effectiveness for the Parliamentary Defense Commissioner's control function.

One other novel institution designed to aid in the control of military authority needs to be mentioned: the Parliamentary Defense Committee. The creation of this committee as a permanent institution with far reaching powers of investigation and the right to subpoena was without precedent in German political history and deliberately modelled on the influential role of investigating committees in the U.S. Congress.[10] But despite its formidable powers this committee has only rarely exercised its watchdog function and has been relegated primarily to a forum for perfunctory acceptance of the Parliamentary Defense Commissioner's annual report, usually without debate and without even requiring the appearance of the Commissioner himself. During earlier encounters between the Defense Ministry and the Parliamentary Defense Commissioner, the Defense Committee frequently gave the impression of providing a sympathetic audience for the Defense Ministers indignant refusals to tolerate any deliberate interference by the Parliamentary Defense Commissioner in the internal organization of the *Bundeswehr*.[11]

Despite some of the obvious shortcomings of the constitutional provisions—mainly the result of the unwillingness of the opposition party, the SPD, in the 1950's, to become identified as the anti-military party and press for less flexible provisions—it is a fact that for the first time in German political history the military has been subordinated completely to parliamentary control and deprived of the kind of quasi-independent status which formerly gave rise to its characterization as a "state within a state." Certainly the constitutional provision demanding the detailed publication of military spending so as to reveal at all times both numerical strength as well as the main feature of internal organization of the armed forces—no longer permits the secret manipulation of public funds which prevailed even during the Weimar Republic.

An additional observation needs to be made with respect to the exercise of the supreme command authority which rests in the office of the Minister of Defense, and which has been the subject of considerable controversy.[12]

The controversy turns on the allegedly ambivalent position of the Defense Minister. Four main functions are concentrated in the exercise of the office of Defense Minister. As member of the cabinet his role in major policy decisions is important and direct; as head of the largest ministry it is his task to formulate the military budget in cooperation with other government institutions in such a way that the needs of the armed forces are met but the limits of governmental budgetary policy are observed. Neither one of the above roles is, of course, at all unusual. But in addition, he is also a member of the NATO councils which imposes on him the duty to integrate German defense policies into the overall plan developed by the NATO powers, a process which, in turn, requires close cooperation between him and the Foreign Ministry. Last but not least, the Defense Minister exercises the authority of supreme command over the armed forces, already referred to above. That means he functions in the office of commander in chief in an authority which can be delegated no more than that of the American President. The highest ranking officer in the *Bundeswehr* is the Inspector-General who reports directly to the Defense Minister and whose position is strictly that of a military subordinate receiving his orders from the Minister lacking all discretionary command authority. From this situation arises a curious conflict between civilian and military authority that is uniquely "German" in its main characteristics.

At the time of the rebuilding of the Armed Forces, German legislators were concerned not only with subjecting the military to the more or less usual political controls discussed initially, but also insisted that the decision making ability of the military with respect to internal organizational matters would be heavily circumscribed by a civilian bureaucracy — the so-called *Wehrbereichsverwaltung* (Defense District Administration).[13] This bureaucratic apparatus which parallels the military organization — every one of the 6 major military districts into which Germany is divided is identical with the field operation of this administrative agency — is directly responsible to the Deputy Minister of Defense (*Staatssekretar*) and through his office — or the heads of the respective Defense administrative districts — are channelled all requests for expenditures involving food, clothing, shelter and transportation equipment. Normally such a division of labor — with the civilian organs acting as an auxiliary housekeeping agency — would hardly be viewed as extraordinary.[14] Nevertheless, because of the high legal authority alloted to civil servants (*Beamten*) in Germany, reinforced by the traditional status consciousness of the civilian government bureaucracy, what emerged was a truly competitive relationship between the military hierarchy and their civilian counterparts in the Ministry of Defense.[15] The complaint of the military hierarchy can be reduced to the assertion that the civilian bureaucracy has literally interpreted its role as one of actual "civilian control" over the military, which in practice subjects military planning down to the lowest level of organization to a detailed scrutiny that inhibits the effectiveness of the armed forces. It is significant that the most serious crisis involving the leadership of the *Bundeswehr* did not arise with respect to any interference by them in domestic political affairs but revolved around the refusal of the commanding generals of the *Bundeswehr* to be relegated to the status of "subordinates" vis-a-vis the State Secretary of Defense. Their objectives were directed at the supposed delegation of authority as commander-in-chief to this State Secretary, who, even though only a civilian "employee," outranked all generals and specifically the military head of the *Bundeswehr*—its Inspector General. The State Secretary was accused of a "power play" which would add to the already questionable control over all administrative functions affecting the military, the power of supreme command "in the absence" of the Defense Minister.

What began over a seeming triviality—a question of precedence at ceremonial functions where both the Inspector General and the State Secretary had to be present—had its denouement in the resignation of two top generals, including the Inspector General. Still, it would be misleading to dismiss this and similar crises which have plagued the *Bundeswehr* since its inception merely as a manifestation of personal vanity or of jurisdictional disputes. The organizational tensions within the *Bundeswehr* are symptoms of much more pressing problems with which the military in West Germany has to contend. These problems center around the difficulty of finding for the *Bundeswehr* in Germany a fully acceptable role as an integral part of German society. The attempt at such harmonious integration of the *Bundeswehr* is taking place not only against the background of a divided nation but also in the contemporary climate of public opinion—especially among the youth of Western nations—in which the military has long since ceased to occupy either a heroic or even a particularly dignified position.

One of the chief considerations of both military and civilian planners of the *Bundeswehr* is the continued improvement of its professional character. Until 1966 the army could count on almost unlimited financial support and its growth proceeded rapidly if not always efficiently. Then came the first major recession of the '*Wirtschaftswunder*' and the army experienced its first reduction in overall strength. This slowdown, which was only partially made up following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, left its mark on the military which continues to argue that purely quantitative increases in manpower could not be equated with increases in quality and fighting effectiveness. The first White Book on Defense issued by the Defense Ministry focused sharply on the personnel, financial, and material problems that have plagued the *Bundeswehr* since its inception; it raised again the issue of whether continued increases in size, purely to satisfy demands for ever larger defense contributions made by West Germany's allies, are not counter-productive with respect to the creation of a qualitatively satisfactory, performance oriented as well as socially integrated fighting force.[16] The crux of the problem was really that improved effectiveness lay certainly with greater economical use of a compact army, significantly reduced in strength—yet any reduction in the force pledged to NATO would immediately be interpreted as a lagging of the German defense effort and certainly lead to a corresponding decrease in the U.S. forces stationed on German soil.

Much of the arguments surrounding the internal organization and effectiveness of the *Bundeswehr* have centered around the concept *Innere Führung*.[17] Originally, *Innere Führung* was meant to introduce a new spirit of human dignity and democratic participation into the new army—produce the "citizen in uniform"—but it became very soon apparent that there were as many interpretations of what *Innere Führung* "really meant" as there were commanding officers in the *Bundeswehr!* Even the latest—1972—White Book on Defense still cautions that there is no need to constantly redefine *Innere Führung* without, however, in any way improving on the very general, if well-meaning, statement included in the 1970 White Paper on Defense.[18] Rather than engage in semantic or even philosophical attempts to arrive at the true meaning of *Innere Führung*, I would like to single out here a certain aspect of the growing pains of the new German Army which normally has not been associated with the *Innere Führung* principle but which, I believe, is more closely connected with the complexities of *Innere Führung* than has been recognized so far. Basically the role of *Innere Führung* is related to the size and efficiency problems that have plagued the *Bundeswehr* from its hurried inception until its spectacular growth in a relatively short period of time. Organizational problems relating to size and efficiency have surfaced characteristically in the chronic shortage of trained NCO's that has underminded every effort of bringing the *Bundeswehr* to its planned strength; similarly the struggle over broadening the basis for officer recruitment has been reflected in the changing attitudes toward *Innere Führung*.

The armed forces of the Federal Republic of Germany depend primarily on a draft system—initially for 18 but now reduced to 15 months—and volunteers signing up for a period from 2-15 years. In general the ratio of draftees to volunteers is approximately 50:50. However, it is necessary to distinguish, especially at the NCO level, between short-term and regular volunteers.[19] The short term volunteer usually signs up for an average of six years to seven and his chief aim is to acquire some technical skills which are readily marketable once he returns to civilian life. Thus the army provides him essentially with apprenticeship training and he views any assignment with suspicion that may take him away from his 'place of work' within the army. It is obvious that this type of NCO is *eifrig*, learns easily and quickly and in general is well adjusted to a competitive, performance oriented system. Which is precisely the reason why most of them leave the army as soon as they feel they have completed their 'training period,' thereby contributing to a permanent shortage of over 30,000 NCO's! On the other hand those who sign up for eight to fifteen years, though much more suited to the army routine, with its emphasis on career mindedness based on faithful service, obedience and discipline, are much less desirable from the point of view of technical skill and mental agility. Since the proportion of 'short' short-term volunteers to 'long' short-term volunteers is nearly 78% : 22% this relationship creates tensions between the former, industrial (or performance) minded, and the latter, "military" (or security) minded group, which acts as a deterrent to reenlistments. The *Bundeswehr*, at the NCO level is therefore assuming more and more the characteristics of an army of "regulars" who are committed to a military career first and, only secondarily, if at all, interested in the opportunities available for training in technological skills.[20]

The interesting aspect of this development is that it is the direct consequence of the attitude displayed by the above mentioned civilian (*Beamten*) hierarchy in the Defense Ministry. This group views short-term volunteers as a species of civil servant and all the so-called improvements in pay, welfare, etc. issued by the Ministry, designed to induce the short-term volunteer to enlist or reenlist, are, in effect an enhancement of the status of the security minded who are already committed firmly to military service as a career. This is precisely the opposite of what the army originally intended with this system of recruitment: i.e., to attract technologically trained personnel from the private sector of the economy for their long term service cadre, who would then return to their civilian careers with even more specialized technical training.

Undoubtedly, this is a problem which most intimately affects the German army but which in a general way can be found to exist in every modern industrialized nation and which few nations have been able to solve to their satisfaction. (Israel may be an exception.) Essentially it means raising a truly citizen army, whose technical and vocational training in the military could be dovetailed with such training in industry and/or civilian colleges. This could hardly be accomplished without standardizing civilian or military technical qualifications as well as equipment so that specialists could easily transfer between army and industry. It would, last not least, depend on the introduction of a performance oriented ethos within the military organization which would bring that organization closer to the practices of industry. There is little question that such linkage would lessen the tensions now prevailing between military and civilian sectors of society as a consequence of the continued existence of closed military institutions; especially if military service were to be made part of a wider kind of national service which gave young people the opportunity to engage in a variety of socially useful and constructive type of work.

The frequent clashes over the role of the concept "*Innere Führung*" can thus be better understood in terms of the difficulty of adjusting a new army to an equally new political and economic system rather than as an attempt by tradition-minded officers to hold fast to the behavioral modes of a bygone era; an era which put a premium on toughness, contempt for the individual and on the exaltation of authority. It would be more realistic to view this conflict between the so-called "soft-liners" and "hard-liners" as one in which the former value training that produces the kind of "citizen soldier" who is readily interchangeable between the civilian and military system, while the latter value authority, discipline and similar virtues associated with a military frame of mind over whatever technical skills can be acquired during military training. Such conflicting views are even more discernible in the policies relating to the composition of the *Bundeswehr* officer corps.

Despite sincere attempts to broaden its basis for recruitment, the *Bundeswehr* officer corps still relies on the attainment of the "*Abitur*" as the surest guarantee of the candidate's suitability as a career officer; this "degree" plus a military family background whether through a tradition of service or via a father who died during WW II are still the most welcome indicators that the future officer will maintain an "ideologically" correct orientation. The problem is that these types of officers fit much more comfortably into the "regular" army environment than do the less educated but more performance oriented young officers who have technical skills that may be more immediately transferable to a civilian occupation. The officer corps thus presents a situation that is very similar to that of the NCO—with one cardinal difference, however. The proportion of regular career officers to short-term volunteers in the officer corps is exactly the reverse of that among the NCOs: 78% of its officer corps are "regulars" and 22% are short term volunteers. This differential contributes further to building up of tensions already in evidence because of the lack of a really integrated officer corps. The *Bundeswehr* officer corps today is far from presenting the kind of homogeneous, professionalized picture which ought to characterize efficient and dependable leadership.

There are today within that corps, a number of groups and cliques which treat each other with great reserve and even suspicion. There is, for instance, the division between those who have actually seen combat service and those who have not. At the rank of Captain those who have not seen combat service are in the majority but at the rank of Major and Lt. Colonel the reverse is true, leading to sometimes quite severe problems of adjustment and integration at the company and battalion commander level, respectively. Similarly there is the "generation gap" among officers of different ages but within approximately the same rank (especially true at Major and Lt. Colonel level). But most persistently there is the "education" barrier: the differentiation between those who have completed formal secondary schooling and university training and those who may have succeeded only in acquiring training as a skilled specialist in some civilian occupation. Those who have joined the corps via the specialist route as essentially "short-term volunteers" are again divided into two groups: there is the group which maintains its performance oriented attitude and is simply waiting to return to its civilian occupation profiting from experience acquired during their service, and the second group which intends to remain as "regular" officers. The latter group is much more concerned with assuming a "correct" ideological attitude and achieving "social" acceptability among the career officers who moved into the military profession earlier and immediately after completing their formal higher education. Not unexpectedly the officers who have not followed the track of formal higher education usually develop even greater status consciousness than those whom tradition and early motivation brought into the officer corps.[21]

In contrast, the "genuine" short-term commissioned officers who are achievement and performance oriented, soon become disenchanted with the corps since, as a minority group, they find themselves isolated and occasionally even ostracized because of their highly individualistic and competitive behavior. They resign their commissions after a comparatively brief period of time—even though many of them are promoted more quickly within the same time span than are those who aspire to regular commissions. Their chief complaint is the "ideological" gap between them and the traditionalists which they find so difficult to bridge. Thus, despite a sincere effort at making "performance" and merit the chief criteria for selection and promotion a self-screening factor prevails which, as the above cited proportion indicates, works toward the eventual homogenization of the *Bundeswehr* Officer Corps—an homogenization however, that may be detrimental to any successful articulation with the other leadership factors of German society. All indications are that within fifteen years the mass of the BWOC will be composed of young men with "*Abitur*" who hail from a traditional, military background, while only a small proportion will consist of those who are highly motivated toward an officer career yet without a completed higher education. At that point the evolution of the officer corps into an essentially "closed" system will have been accomplished but its efficacy as a leadership cadre for a highly complex technology oriented army will be cast seriously in doubt.[22]

It should be noted here, that the Navy and Air Force are, of course, also designed as "closed" systems—but in the context of their mission do turn officers into first class specialists whose performance orientation either predominates over or conveniently coincides with pure career objectives. Both Navy and Air Force also have the advantage of a much greater turnover among their highly trained specialists—air force pilots normally retire at the age of 40, and have hardly any problems finding equally suitable positions in civilian society. The "Officer problem"—i.e., how to retain the specialist in a primarily "generalist" structured career universe is almost a uniquely Army (*Heer*) based problem. The insistence on serving the required time "in grade" regardless of individual merit or special skills that need to be rewarded, discourage the Army officer from concentrating all his efforts at raising the efficiency level of a specific place of operation; he is much more concerned to broaden his record with evidence of having served in a variety of assignments and places.

Thus, in the *Bundeswehr* the selective process today still favors those whose elitist education can be combined with a correct "ideological" motivation! This type of officer can be expected to be concerned more with the perpetuation of the usual military virtues and standards than with maintaining an officer corps that reflects accurately the ideas and directions of society as a whole. Trends toward isolation and the nurturing of antiquated, even arrogant value concepts would have no chance to thrive in an environment that cherishes performance, and emphasizes technical, and/or managerial training over that of the traditional generalist. It is the latter perspective, operating on the principle that "there is nothing an officer cannot do" which, for example, takes a highly qualified electronics officer and assigns him to the press and information section of the Ministry of Defense! It is not surprising that many young officers in the *Bundeswehr* become dissatisfied and critical when they see the military profession discredited by inadequate officers: what they do not realize is that this inadequacy is frequently the result of placing officers who have been trained for one kind of task into situations that have no use for such training.

There does not appear to be any solution in sight for this problem since the trend continues to be in the direction of requiring even more formal educational prerequisites for the officer-candidate, thereby favoring the broad gauged generalist who is status and service rather than performance and task oriented. It is peculiar with what consistency the BWOC refuses to look toward the British or American experience as a model for this purpose. It is in this attitude that one can detect the remnants of an aristocratic, non-democratic if not necessarily anti-democratic tradition as still paramount among the interests of the Army officer corps of the *Bundeswehr*. In an industrialized society putting a premium on performance, innovation and specialization, the "generalist" and traditional character of the Army officer corps may very well again cause it to withdraw into isolation. Obviously, the more homogeneous the officer corps, the better its internal sense of solidarity, integration, and the greater its concern with ideology. Such an "ideologized" officer corps however runs the danger of confrontation with a heterogeneous society that will view without sympathy any developments that support the existence of a separate military elite whose roots in that society will be, to say the least, tenuous. Any meaningful integration of the Army officer corps into society therefore can be accomplished only if its membership represents as closely as possible a true cross section of that society.

The *Bundeswehr* must make every effort to achieve the necessary internal integration of its officer corps but without the outward isolation which seems to accompany this phenomenon. Leadership training must not be tied so closely to respect for authority based on rank and/or status, as is the case right now. There must be room for striking a balance between compliance and initiative. The complexity which now characterizes the military—as it obviously does any industrial, or commercial organization—and which leads to so much specialization—must not be looked upon as inevitably breaking down the hierarchical character of military authority. This seems to be the primary fear behind the resistance found in the German Army officer corps to modern concepts of management and leadership. Purely hierarchical differentiation not only impedes communication, it also produces conflict between the adherence to professional standards in the performance of specialist duties on the one hand and the disciplined compliance with formal procedures on the other. The end result is the stifling of individual initiative regardless of the type of organization where this problem arises. Yet the military, more so than any other type of organization, must be able to find ways of tempering the adherence to formal rules by a judicious exercise of independent judgment.

It is understandable that the Germans, more than any other nation after the war, were preoccupied with the problem of avoiding the dangers brought on by the excessive power of the professional military in the state; and they have indeed succeeded in creating an army which is far from acting as a source for the resurgence of authoritarian, anti-system attitudes. But this does not mean that the *Bundeswehr* is really "modern" in all respects; such modernity means today not only successful articulation into the socio-political fabric of the state, but also an organization open to innovation, viable in the maintenance of its large-scale functions and sympathetic to the specialist who by virtue of his special knowledge must participate in the determination of the major features of the model at hand.

I have dwelled on this aspect of the role of the military in the Federal Republic because I am convinced it is of greater impact than the continued concern with the number of former Nazis in commanding positions in the *Bundeswehr* or the percentages of titled aristocrats in the officer corps.[23] Since the *Bundeswehr* officer corps was recruited from former *Wehrmacht* officers, it is idle to speculate how many of them once supported Hitler even if they formally were not members of the Nazi party. It is a historically undisputed fact that the demand for rearmament and remilitarization originated with Germany's former enemies. At the time such demands were first made—ca. 1952-54—there was only one group to turn to in West Germany: the former professional soldiers who, as part of the whole denazification period had come into their share of wholesale condemnation. Since neither the former occupation powers nor the Adenauer government had been willing to risk a social revolution in Germany beyond the introduction of perfunctory and legalistic denazification procedures, the only course open to the organizers of the *Bundeswehr* was to establish a rigorous screening system which would eliminate the most obvious former Nazi stalwarts and then rely on a form of political control that would ensure the "liberalization" of the Army.[24] The screening operation of future *Bundeswehr* officers was indeed a success—none of the men selected could in any way be linked either legally or morally with actual crimes against humanity committed by either Nazi troops or regular soldiers. But this condition precisely brought on the dilemmas over the internal structure and mission of the army epitomized in that highly ambiguous term mentioned above: "*Innere Führung*."

Under this term was encompassed a system of training and command designed to treat the soldiers as a "citizen" in uniform and imbue the officer with a sense of responsibility and self-discipline vis-a-vis the individual soldier as a human being.[25] Unfortunately, the argumentts which developed around this idea soon became polarized and ideologized to the point where the advocates of *Innere Führung* were regarded as non-professionals who were more interested in mollycoddling the new soldier, and its opponents were identified as favoring the traditional indignities that marked officer-men relationship in the Wilhelmine army: e.g., hazing, a practice which was hardly followed any more even in Hitler's army![26] Neither one of these alleged positions really reflected the true divisions.

These were, as I have tried to indicate, the recognition by some—Baudissin among others—that the new army must reflect the socio-political changes which had occurred in the nation; they envisioned an army whose members could move back and forth comfortably between the civilian and military sectors of the system, while their opponents were more intent on the creation of a well defined, professionally competent as well as ideologically correct officer corps, even at the risk of establishing again a caste conscious military. Not the treatment of the individual soldier, his rights, liberties, etc. was at issue, but the willingness to admit that in a complex, technologized society, a military divorced from its technical functions and its high level of specialization, really had no role to play. The "functional" army, whose "job" it is to defend or deter in the same sense that it is the function of engineers to build bridges rather than determine the cultural ethos of society, that was anathema to many of the traditional minded officers who helped build the *Bundeswehr*. It is curious that many of these so-called "traditionalists" had a better anti-Nazi record than some of the proponents of the more radical ideas associated with *Innere Führung*. The reason is that they had once already objected to the popular character of Hitler's army which promoted officers from the ranks on the strength of their skills rather than social or educational background. The *Bundeswehr* obviously could not become a "People's Army" that was never a viable alternative, but the problem was and is whether in a highly materialistic, middle class type society with its premium on technical competence and scientific sophistication, an army could ever be successfully integreated whose professionalism was always in doubt, and whose officers represented both a marginal and dysfunctional role in that society. It may be discouraging but we may wonder whether the conflict over *Innere Führung* will ever be resolved as long as the *Bundeswehr* is kept from access to modern weapons, i.e., nuclear armaments, or as long as its mission is defined in vague international rather than concrete national terms. The young *Bundeswehr* officers want status as a condition of their special training and in terms of the need which the system has for their expertise; it rankles to be an army of "foot soldiers" among the big powers that determine the nature of the alliance. The West German situation will remain volatile as long as this problem exists. The Russians but also the Americans are very well aware of it: not the *Bundeswehr* as such could represent a threat to the peace of Central Europe but its dissatisfied officer corps whose expectations for sophisticated professionalism remain unfulfilled.

It is significant that the latest White Paper on Defense no longer treats the concept of *Innere Führung* with the care and concentration lavished on it in earlier and similar publications of the Defense Ministry.[27] Instead, the emphasis is on the problems created by the continued manpower shortages and the means available to reduce them: such as improved social welfare benefits and expanded in-service training for civilian occupations. There seems to be recognition implicit in this change of attitude, that further ideological discussions of the principles of *Innere Führung* are pointless, and that much more can be achieved by bringing the military environment closer to the competitive standards set by civilian society. However, the White Paper is extremely vague on a date by which these improvements can be fully incorporated into the armed forces. Also, such reforms are still based on the continuation of a draft army—rather than the volunteer army already projected by many military professionals.

Since the NCO shortage appears to be a permanent feature of the *Bundeswehr*, as it is conceived today, its operational readiness must be seriously put into question. Conventional armies so far have found no substitute for well trained, ideologically reliable cadres. The worst that can happen to an army is trying to function under a continuous state of internal tension for which there are no immediate remedies. Such a source of tension must also be looked for in the steadily increasing numbers of soldiers who are applying for conscientious objector status.

The Basic Law in Art. 4, para. 3, states that "No one may be compelled against his conscience to render war service involving the use of arms." This makes the Federal Republic of Germany the only country in the world incorporating such a guarantee into its constitution. The broadness of this constitutional provision and subsequent legislation makes it possible even for those who are already in uniform to be given conscientious objector status with relative ease. Thus between 1967 and 1968 the number of servicemen filing applications for recognition as conscientious objectors quadrupled; it declined somewhat in 1969 but climbed above three thousand during 1970 and again in 1971. In 1970 and 1971 nearly 4,000 servicemen succeeded in achieving formal recognition as conscientious objectors—i.e., nearly 65% of those making the initial application.[29] The younger the age group, the higher the incidence of conscientious objectors; similarly, the higher the level of formal education the greater the likelihood of applications for conscientious objector status. Most disturbing, from the military's point of view is the fact that soldiers who apply for conscientious objector status remain within their units where their mere presence constitutes a source of trouble and tension. This condition was reinforced by a recent decision of the Federal Constitutional Court which held that "the requirement of doing military duty pending the soldier's recognition as conscientious objector is consonant with the letter and spirit of the basic right to conscientious objection because it leaves the essential content of the basic right untouched; a soldier can therefore be expected to render military service while the recognition procedure is still pending . . . . . A conscientious objector who is required to render military service in peace time *pending his final recognition*, cannot be compelled to kill another person, against his conscience and conviction in an act of war."[30] It should be noted, also, that the German soldier does not lack information on such rights. It is not unusual for off-duty soldiers wearing civilian clothes to distribute leaflets containing information on the right to conscientious objection, outside *Bundeswehr* installations. Such activity will be prohibited only if it can be shown that its immediate interest is to weaken the *Bundeswehr* or to disrupt military discipline; such action has been brought only in very isolated instances and even fewer have been upheld by the courts.

In this context it should also be mentioned that German *Bundeswehr* soldiers are the only ones in the world who can join a trade union! Since 1966 the ÖTV (Federation of Public Servants and Transport Workers Union) has been accorded the right to recruit soldiers as full fledged members. As could be expected, there was great resistance to the introduction of unionization into the armed forces on the part of the traditionalist officers. Not even the joining of the union by General Baudissin, the foremost exponent of the modern principles of leadership training identified with the *Innere Führung* concept and, at the time also NATO Chief of Staff, did much to change the views of the anti-union group among the officers. Though General Baudissin's sensational action removed some of the stigma of "subversiveness" from the existence of military unionism—very few junior and senior officers followed his example.[31] It would appear to be extremely difficult to obtain any hard data on the distribution of officers and men in the ÖTV since neither the Union nor the Government are very eager to have such figures released. It seems curious that the latest Defense White Paper (1972)—or, for that matter any one of the two preceding it—makes no mention of the work of the ÖTV in the armed forces. For example, an ÖTV Congress was held not too long ago which brought together both military and nonmilitary personnel employed by the armed forces. It was indeed a curious but positive experience according to some of the newsmen present to observe ranking *Bundeswehr* officers and senior trade union officials conferring and debating many of the issues currently agitating the internal organization of the *Bundeswehr*.[32] The present Socialist Minister of Defense, Helmut Schmidt is, of course, also a member of the ÖTV.

Despite such signs of encouragement with respect to the role of the ÖTV, unionism is far from being accepted as a normal component of military life by the ranking *Bundeswehr* leadership. The vast majority of regular army men and officers join the *Bundeswehr Service Association* which has acted traditionally as the representative interest group of the serviceman (somewhat analogous to our American Legion). When, sometime ago, the ÖTV demanded the disarmament of the *Bundesgrenzschutz* (Border Protection Guards) on the grounds of economy as well as a means of avoiding armed clashes with East German guards, the old antagonism broke forth again: responsible military spokesmen intimated the worst of motives behind the labor unions demands.[33] Though it has often been held that the ÖTV's main purpose was to gain future civilian members from the ranks of the military, the aura of suspicion surrounding it remains. It is viewed by many as simply another instrument designed to interfere, somehow and not always predictably, in the harmonious workings of the military organization. Especially the NCO appears to have difficulty in reconciling "unionism" with the exigencies of miltiary discipline; much of the confrontations concerning the correct role of the ÖTV in presenting the demands of the soldier occur at that level. It is only too understandable that the proponents of a reduced, volunteer and highly professionalized *Bundeswehr* would discontinue the activities of the ÖTV in its ranks.

It should be obvious from the foregoing that this writer views the effectiveness of the *Bundeswehr* in carrying out its assigned mission as inextricably related to its internal organization and the prevailing morale with which this organization is imbued. From this vantage point the effectiveness of the *Bundeswehr* as a vital link in the Western system of alliances is considered to be, at least, problematical. This position of doubt, however, arises not from any fears of a resurgent German militarism but from a questioning of the ill-defined role which the *Bundeswehr* until now has had to play within the West German socio-political system.

A great effort is currently underway to improve the internal organization of the *Bundeswehr* and adapt it to the needs of a modern industrial society, but such efforts have hardly passed the planning stage.[34] The very heat of the debate surrounding reform plans designed to make the *Bundeswehr* more competitive in the face of ever rising demands by the civilian sector of society, point to the dangers of placing too much strain on the armed forces during a period of social change. Also it is questionable whether the crisis that appears to be affecting soldiering in Western industrial nations generally can simply be overcome by a series of technological solutions. Because the concept of war has changed—it is the prevention of war that has to be "won" rather than the war itself—the soldier's idea of his profession is, necessarily, radically affected. The changed role of the armed forces demands that the soldier or officer is aware of his overall responsibility to society. Integration into society is not the aim but the pre-condition for the existence of armed forces in the nuclear age.

The *Bundeswehr* is almost literally caught in a vise not of its own making. On the one hand the North Atlantic alliance is looking toward the Federal Republic for military strength to compensate not only for the earlier withdrawal of French forces but also for the expected reduction, even withdrawal of U.S. forces. On the other hand, the continued failure to establish a viable, deterrent organization due to the limitations imposed by social and political consideration on the raising of a large draft army in a period of dynamic economic expansion, would recommend a drastic reduction in the size and objectives of the West German military contribution. Currently the West Germans must be prepared to deter a war on their territory or of escalating it quickly to the level of nuclear scare. This goal, military planners aver, will be accomplished by enabling the *Bundeswehr* to raise the threshold of conventional war — but to this end the West German armed forces must not only have better conventional armaments, they must also be capable of organizing their available manpower resources more quickly than any potential enemy in a position to cross a West German border. There is a widespread feeling among expert observers that the *Bundeswehr* may not be militarily capable of meeting these demands. The latest, massive analysis of this kind was undertaken by Prof. Carl F. von Weizsäcker together with other West German scientists.[35]

The main thrust of their argument is to show that the Federal Republic of Germany lacks the means of defending itself against a threat of any kind, least of all a nuclear attack. There is no chance, says the Weizsäcker study, that the Federal Republic of Germany can withstand being either conquered and/or devastated by war — its only hope lies in preventing it. But the cost of deterrence may lie precisely in having to risk escalation to the point of self-destruction. Expressed somewhat differently: limited war on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany without the ultimate threat of nuclear retaliation is out of the question. This is, of course the reason why the Federal Republic of Germany has insisted throughout the years of rearmament that the nuclear threshold must be lowered — i.e., deter the aggressor with the high probability of nuclear retaliation by the U.S. By contrast, the U.S. continues to insist that it should be possible for the Federal Republic of Germany to achieve at least conventional arms parity with the powers of the Warsaw Pact on the assumption that such parity will deter the aggressor from achieving his military goal by conventional means. The trouble with this assumption is that it is based on an illusion: it is impossible for the Federal Republic of Germany to achieve parity, not to mention superiority, in conventional arms vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact countries given the latters' already existing great advantage, which includes, of course, the conventional capabilities of the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, in view of the present detente in Central Europe brought about by West German Chancellor Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik*, it would be a virtual impossibility to achieve the kind of redirection of German resources necessary to expand and strengthen the Federal Republic's conventional military preparedness level, given the economic and social strictures that it would entail for the general population.

Much of our above observations would seem to point to one inescapable conclusion. The *Bundeswehr* was rebuilt following a model which was already in need of reevaluation by the end of the second World War. This model was that of the *levee en masse*, introduced by Napoleon and perpetuated by the great powers in varying forms and degrees of effectiveness to this day; it seemed particularly well-suited to the emerging mass societies of the 20th century and could claim for itself an essentially democratic character since the army became indeed the "school of the nation" and no restrictions based on birth or inherited status kept the talented from rising to command positions.[36]

Also, in the highly industrialized, mass societies of Western Europe and North America the military learned to operate successfully within the political environment of a pressure group and as such was able to obtain access to most of the resources necessary for its effective operation. But with the growth of the increasingly complex and specialized character of modern industrial society the satisfaction of military demands became ever more difficult. In a straight out competition for equal shares of scarce material and man power resources, the military can no longer hold its own unless an external danger to the system can be presented as imminent and catastrophic. Even then, because of the changes in strategy brought about by nuclear weapons such claims on societal resources meet with popular resistance that tends to undermine the viability of large scale, standing military forces. The general proposition can be offered that precisely because of the interchangeability of civilian and military specialists, it is no longer possible for the military to act as a self-contained power-elite which simply enters into coalitions with other elites in the system in order to achieve its ends. West Germany stands as an outstanding example of the military trying to operate on the basis of outmoded concepts designed to maintain for that military its separate but equal status within the system.

Currently, all signs seem to point in the direction of an international system of arms control as the overriding determinant of national defense policies among the major powers. Deterrence based only on the aspects of a "balance of terror" can no longer be considered an effective guarantee of security. In this context, T. C. Schelling's concept of a special surveillance force as an instrument for implementing arms control arrangements becomes more than ever relevant.[37] It is to be expected that the successful conclusion of the SALT talks will bring with it a complete reconsideration of the role of standing armies in Western Europe and elsewhere. Certainly, steps will also be taken toward preparations for a European security conference. Such a conference will inevitably deal with significant mutual and balanced force reductions that would involve a complete reappraisal of NATO's role. Given these prospects, we can project, optimistically to be sure, that the *Bundeswehr* eventually will have to assume the role of a national defense force on a vastly reduced scale. The plans that are already under consideration to reorganize the German armed forces show that there is awareness of the impossibility of maintaining the *Bundeswehr* in its existing form and with its present mission.

The report issued a few months ago by the Personnel Commission set up by the German Defense Ministry issued a very serious warning that if the *Bundeswehr* continued to be run along traditional lines, it would indeed collapse before this decade was over. Central to the Commission's recommendation is the creation of a professional volunteer army backed up by a draft militia force. However, even this mixture of a professional army and one based on conscription is still a concession imposed by the necessity to fulfill the Federal Republic of Germany's obligation under the NATO agreement. Obviously any change in the fundamental character of NATO would make the reliance on a militia system no longer necessary and leave a compact professional volunteer army suitable to meet West Germany's purely defensive strategic needs. Such an army could easily be adapted to function as a "constabulary force" capable of cooperating with other national armies in any crisis situation requiring armed intervention by supra-national forces.[38] A *Bundeswehr*, oriented toward this necessary, if distant goal, would remain faithful to its original concept and vision as an army for peace as part of an international force. Only, then, its peacekeeping objectives would, hopefully, be indeed global, rather than remaining tied to the narrow considerations of bloc, "cold-war" type policies.

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1 The Paris Agreements were ratified on Oct. 23, 1954 and entered into force on May 5, 1955. A new government formed by Chancellor Adenauer on June 6, 1955, for the first time included a Minister of Defense.

2 Article 65a, *The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany*, English Language Edition, publ. by German Information Center, 1969, p. 21.

3 Article 115b, ibid., p. 41.

4 See e.g., *inter alia* Wolfgang Martens, *Grundgesetz und Wehrverfassung*, Hamburg 1961, p. 166 ff., also, Manfred Lepper, *Die ver-*

fassungsrechtliche Stellung der militärischen Streitkräfte im gewaltenteilenden Rechtsstaat, Bielefeld 1962, pp. 115 ff.

5 *Basic Law*, Article 87a, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

6 *Basic Law*, Article 45b, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

7 *Gesetz über den Wehrbeauftragten des Bundestages vom 26. Juni 1957, Bundesgesetzblatt* I :p. 652.

8 On the origin and later development of the office of the Defense Commissioner see H. P. Secher, "Controlling the New German Military Elite: The Political Role of the Parliamentary Defense Comsioner," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*, April 1965, pp. 63-84.

9 See Dr. E. Busch, *Das Amt des Wehrbeauftragten des Deutschen Bundestages*, Bonn 1969, for an excellent summary of the work of the Defense Commissioner.

10 *Basic Law*, Article 45a (1), *op. cit.*, p. 16; see Lepper, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-186 for a critical history of this institution.

11 Secher, *op. cit.*, p. 74 ff.

12 Lepper, *op. cit.*, p. 114 ff; also F. Hossbach, *Die Entwicklung des Oberbefehls über das Heer*, Würzburg 1957; cf. W. Rehm, "Die Wahrung des Primats der Politik in der militärischen Spitzengliederung," *Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau* 9. Jg. 1959, pp. 532-541; and D. Goethel, "Wer befiehlt in der Bundeswehr?" *Politische Studien*, Jg. 1967, pp. 675-678.

13 *Basic Law*, Article 87b (1), *op. cit.*, p. 30.

14 Reinfried, H., "Die Bundeswehrverwaltung," *Die öffentliche Verwaltung*, 1958, p. 142 ff.

15 These observations are based on personal interviews by this writer with the Präsident der Wehrbereichsverwaltung IV, Dr. Wagner, as well as correspondence with him during 1962-1963. Since then references to the "administered" army have become commonplace among *Bundeswehr* officers. In 1964 the *Westdeutsche Rundfunk* broadcast an hour long program on that topic which went into considerable detail concerning this problem: H. Heine, "Verwaltete Armee," 1. *Programm* WDR, 28. *Juli* 1964; transcript of this broadcast is in possession of writer. The *Wehrbereichsverwaltung* also issued a lengthy memorandum on this topic on the occasion of the debate by the *Bundestag* of the *Bundeswehrbeamtengesetz*, mimeograph, 10 Jan. 1963; cf. also, Goethel, *op. cit.*, p. 683 ff. To this date no law spelling out the actual organization of the armed forces and their civilian auxiliary services, i.e., the Federal Armed Forces Administration has been passed by the *Bundestag*, chiefly because of the unwillingness of the military of having the present system permanently legalized.

16 *White Paper 1969 on the Defence Policy of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany*, ed. by the Ministry of Defense, authorized English translation, publ. by the *Presse- und Informationsdienst der Bundesregierung*, 1969, pp. 19-22.

17 The latest in a long series of volumes on this problem is by Carl-Gero von Ilsemann, *Die Bundeswehr in der Demokratie: Zeit der Inneren*

Führung, Hamburg 1971. Another work which deals exhaustively with this topic is W. v Baudissin, *Soldat für den Frieden: Entwürfe für eine zeitgemasse Bundeswehr*, München 1969.

18 *White Paper 1970 on the Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and on the State of the German Armed Forces*, pp. 115-128, and *White Paper 1971/72: The Security of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Development of the Federal Armed Forces*, both publ. by the Federal Ministry of Defense for the German Federal Government and available from the Press and Information Service of the German Federal Government.

19 The following observations, pp. 17-27, are based primarily on investigations made by the West German polling institute *Systemforschung* under the direction of Dr. R. Warnke. The work was part of a project under contract to the Ministry of Defense designed to gain more information about the reasons for the chronic NCO shortage; this writer, aided by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, was able to participate in much of this project during 1966-67. Though none of this work was ever classified, only selected portions have been publ. by the Ministry of Defense in a series aimed at broadening public understanding of the problems inherent in training for military leadership. See, *Schriftenreihe Innere Führung*, Warnke, R., and Bierfelder, Wm., *Zur wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Lage des Unteroffiziers*, Heft 2, Bonn, 1967; *Die Bundeswehr als Arbeitsplatz auf Zeit*, Heft 3, Bonn, 1968; *Der ehemalige Zeitsoldat*, Heft 4, Bonn, 1968, and, *Personelle und strukturelle Schwachstellen der Heereskompanien 1963*, Heft 5, Bonn, 1969. A report on some of these findings was made at the conference on the armed services and society sponsored by the Sixth Seminar in the Social Sciences held at the U. of Edinburgh in May 1969 and publ. together with other conference papers by the U. of Edinburgh Press; it is now available as *The Armed Services and Society*, ed. by J. N. Wolfe and John Erickson, Aldine Publishing Co., Chicago, 1970.

20 Warnke, R. and Bierfelder, W., *Die Bundeswehr als Arbeitsplatz auf Zeit*, Bonn, 1968, chapters V, VI.

21 This regrettable trend in the direction of status consciousness was already ~~noted~~ earlier, in 1963, in an excellent study which appeared in the magazine *Der Spiegel*, Nr. 52, December 1963, pp. 38-49.

22 Wolfe, J. N. and Erickson, J., *op. cit.*, pp. 60-62.

23 Werner Baur, "Deutsche Generäle: Die militärischen Führungsgruppen in der Bundesrepublik und in der DDR," in *Beiträge zur Analyse der deutschen Oberschicht*, Hrsg. W. Zapf, Piper Verlag, München 1965, pp. 114-135.

24 A. Grosser, *Germany in Our Time*, New York, 1971, pp. 223-24.

25 Wolf Graf Baudissin, "Grundsätze der Menschenführung und Einordnung," in *Der deutsche Soldat in der Armee von morgen*, Veröffentlichungen d. Inst. f. Staatslehre und Politik, e.V. München 1954, p. 314.

26 For a decidedly anti-*Innere Führung* viewpoint see, W. Picht, "Vom künftigen deutschen Soldaten," *Wort und Wahrheit*, XI Jhg., Nos.

1, 6, 8 (1962). Picht faults *Innere Führung* because it ignores the concept of organic community, which he regards central to military organization, and instead relies on mere technological functionalism.

27 *White Paper 1971/72*, p. 79ff.

28 "The Basic Law," *op. cit.*, p. 6.

29 *White Paper 1971/1972*, pp. 85-89.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 85.

31 Grosser, *op. cit.*, p. 226.

32 *Kölner Stadtanzeiger*, Feb. 2, 1970 as reprinted in the *German Tribune*, No. 413, March 10, 1970, p. 5.

33 *Münchner Merkur*, 21 Feb. 1970, *ibid.*

34 *Equity in Conscription in the FRG*, Report of the Force Structure Commission; also the report by the Manpower Structure Commission of April 6, 1971, and the findings by the Education Commission (Prof. Thomas Ellwein, Chairman), publ. 15 June 1971; summaries of these reports are cited in the *White Paper 1971/1972*, pp. 41, 64 and 67 respectively. Public comments on these reports were, in general, quite favorable: see, e.g. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 14 Sept. 1971; also *Der Tagesspiegel*, 14 August 1971, and, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 16 June 1971.

35 C. F. von Weizsäcker, (ed.) *Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhütung*, Carl Hanser Verlag, München 1971; see esp. the contribution by Utz-Peter Reich, "Die wirtschaftlichen Schäden eines atomaren Krieges in der BRD und ihre Folgen," and, H. Afheldt and H. Roth, "Verteidigung und Abschreckung in Europa," pp. 199-302. These and other contributions to this volume are outstanding in their scholarly objectivity and scientific thoroughness. In an unofficial but widely circulated reply by the *Bundeswehr*, the Weizsäcker study was severely criticized for underrating the significance of NATO capabilities and the role of U.S. forces in keeping the peace in Western Europe, *Kieler Nachrichten*, 29 Juli 1971.

36 Some very insightful comments on these and similar developments can be found in the series of articles on "Armed Forces and Society in Western Europe," *European Journal of Sociology*, Vol. VI, No. 2 (1965), pp. 225-308.

37 Qu. Wright, Wm. E. Evans, and M. Deutsch, *Preventing World III*, New York, 1962, p. 87ff.

38 This necessary redefinition of the military's role and self-conception was first offered by M. Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, Free Press, Glencoe 1961, ch. VIII.

EDUCATION AS CHANGE AGENT AND CHANGE OBJECT IN THE TWO GERMANIES

Robert F. Lawson

To understand a given society is to understand the historical ideas and the present cultural forces which are integrated into a dominant pattern of institutional structure, social organization, and individual behavior, and which, through this pattern integration, identify the form and dynamics of that society. To understand a given institution is to understand its place, function, and development in terms of this social configuration. Thus, the study of education as a social institution requires a cultural approach, and since education has a specific institutional responsibility for transmitting established cultural content and for socializing the young, the cultural reference of education must be very direct indeed.

Unfortunately, education has most often been treated as an isolated institution, as a passive cultural object, and as a creature of past actions in other social sectors. Neither the tendency to isolate nor the inclination to retrospective-determinist thinking has been confined to the study of education, of course, but that is little consolation. If present studies are to be meaningful, they must account for the identification given to education by the norms and relationships pertaining in the culture, specifically attending to the unique contemporary aspects which may be altering that identification. In short, the task is to deal specifically and contextually with the continuous dialectic of change and conservation in education.

Education, within functional limits prescribed by the society, can be seen to have a general relationship to other institutions as an *object* of comprehensive social development, and to have a particular role as development *agent*. There is no argument about the fact of social and educational change; there is need, however, to clarify the relationship in a given case, and to conceptualize that relationship as a function of a social form having both static and dynamic elements.

One way of viewing change is to assume that the usual pattern is one in which the society, as a whole and with minimum disturbance or conflict, steadily reconstructs itself; but that this evolutionary progression may be modified, even to the extent that its form and direction shift, through a sudden political change or through the intervention of external "noise" into the social communication system.

This formulation applies to the consideration of education as an object of change. I will attempt to show that an evolutionary progression may be assumed in both Germanies, but that the modifications occasioned by both political changes and external influences have produced divergent lines of educational development. This much may be shown in concrete actions and structural results; the angle of divergence and the elements of the common culture actually retained are less easily discerned, but may be interpreted from overt educational intentions, accepted ideological presuppositions, and planning procedures.

Analytically separate, but integral to the cyclical function ascribed to education in society, is its active role as agent of development. The educational definition of this role depends on the acceptance of one of two principles of development, which I will call the conservative and reconstructive principles.

The conservative principle rests on the assumption that all social systems have functional identity only in terms of the cultural whole, that structures, linkages and casual mechanics in the culture-system can be known and maintained. By and large, the system is assumed to be adequate, to run itself, and to be generally independent of particular present decisions. Occurrences of obsolescence, breakdown, or disfunction will appear, but these are to be remedied by repair, replacement, or refinement of isolatable parts. Malfunctions are in fact only discernible through comprehension of the system whole, and there is no serious challenge to the appropriateness of it, nor even an attempt to manage it as a system.

Alternatively, the reconstructive principle has its point of departure outside the culture-system. That is, the conditions and goals of development can be identified without cultural reference, then assessed against culture-system characteristics to determine where and how change mechanisms should be introduced. Under this principle, knowledge of the culture is primarily a matter of inventory; social goals or effects have to be achieved through the utilization of cultural raw material, but they are not derived therefrom. In action, the intention to achieve a reconstructed social form specifies initial institutional changes at what are thought to be pivotal points in the mechanics of the system, then sequential changes in linking sub-systems until the desired total change is effected.

Although these principles must be further elaborated and qualified to apply to any actual case, they do indicate a basic difference in the development strategies utilized in East and West Germany. West German strategy proceeds on the assumption that educational reform is to be adopted to a fundamentally acceptable cultural base and institutional arrangement, while East German strategy proceeds from the assumption that a social form not attained in the culture is to be achieved, and that this form requires institutional re-design toward that end. Technocratic and pragmatic motives penetrate both strategies with somewhat different outcomes, but these may be viewed as modification forces rather than alternatives of principle.[1]

East Germany

The goals of education and the structures established to achieve them in East Germany were determined by the Soviet Union initially, and the Soviet influence has continued to be decisive for policy. Basic educational decisions were thus made externally, but this is not to deny the existence of tension between the German tradition in education and the philosophy of communist education as interpreted in the Soviet Union or defined by the German communist party. Nor is it to deny any connection between these two schools of thought. European communism carries a particular theme of social organization with European cultural content. Moreover, the development of socialist thought, organizational strength, the political voice in Germany had prepared a social alternative to prevailing forms long before the middle of this century. While a basis for the social change did exist in Germany, however, it had never been dominant or instrumental in the ordering of institutions. As a result of the political solution after 1945, institutions were abruptly restructured. From that time, education was to be organized so as to reflect a current interpretation of socialist institutional form, and was to accept the task of operationalizing the social philosophy through behavioral modification and direct contribution to economic growth.

This process is defined by 1) the ideological foundation of school instruction, which determines the active role incumbent on education in the society, 2) the structural developments which show education to be the object of institutional decisions made in general social terms, and 3) the planning procedure which motors the cycle of socio-economic input and output through schools.

Co-equal with the instructional goal of developing the productive potential of the workers' society is that of forming a "socialistic consciousness" in its members. The realization of these goals depends on adequate instruction in the social and natural sciences, the natural sciences being primarily responsible for the material-technical basis of the society, the social sciences for the socio-economic and political bases.[2]

Educational statements repeatedly admonish the teacher to organize the subject matter so it illustrates the "natural law" as that is determined for a given science by the general political theory. There is no assumption of non-political instruction, so there can be no value in allowing students to draw their own social conclusions from their studies in any subject.

> The essential difference between the different pedagogical positions is not in the alternative to teach politically or non-politically, but (in the alternative) of teaching scientifically and in favor of progress, or of supporting an obsolescent social order and being more or less consciously unscientific.[3]

In fact, the sciences are frequently used not only to reinforce the general political foundation, but also to substantiate particular points which can be related to the knowledge contained in a given scientific area. For example, studies in biology should contribute to the atheistic education of pupils. The essential principles of religion are systematically refuted by theoretical and laboratory work which shows the inadequacy of religious views of creation, purposefulness, and eternal life. If a new plant species can be produced in the laboratory, for instance, that accomplishment can be used as evidence against the view that life was fashioned by a *Creator*. Furthermore, it can be shown historically that the agents of religion, the churches and clerics, acted to retard scientific advancement by perpetuating superstitious ignorance, or worse, used the knowledge they did have to their own advantage, intentionally keeping the people ignorant, dependent, and afraid.[4]

While ideological themes permeate the entire instructional program, the strongest and most direct effort is made in the courses dealing specifically with politics, i.e., history and civic education (*Staatsbürgerkunde*). The methodology intertwines learning strands leading to patriotic feeling, readiness for the tasks of developing the socialist society, and internalization of normative codes for the individual in that society.

The "process of ideological-political and moral enlightenment" is the central element in the development of the socialistic personality.[5] Knowledge is to lead directly to the acceptance of political and moral convictions which will, in turn, stabilize and regularize the person's behavior according to established social expectations. There should be nothing accidental or subjective about the organization of the knowledge or about the behavioral expectations, then, for the pattern has been given in the scientific laws for social development and has been detailed through educational pronouncements of Party specialists.

The content of civic education is narrowly prescribed. For example, the curriculum for the ninth grade, released in 1964, specified coverage of 1) Laws of Development of Human Society—in which the Communist Manifesto and basic Marxism are studied, to arrive at conclusions on the inevitability of socialism and the obligations incumbent on the working class and the Party; 2) Capitalism and Socialism—in which the contradictions, exploitations, and essential failure of Capitalism are taught, and by comparison with Socialism, the pupils are led to understand the necessity of societal transition in the modern period; 3) the German Democratic Republic—in which the division of Germany is described, the national role of the G.D.R. is confirmed, and again by comparison, the anti democratic, militaristic, and imperialistic character of the Federal Republic (West Germany) is concluded.[6] These themes are also elaborated in history courses, and the instruction is to induce affective attitudes of political love and hate, loyalty and antagonism according to the basic dichotomies presented.

The love of country is associated with the consciousness of social class membership subsumed under the political order. The patriotism is extended, however, to the whole of Germany, whose western people are not yet freed from their yoke of exploitation. Thus, the Regime claims to represent the *German nation* today and to be legitimate heir to the German culture. This claim is substantiated by the assumption that Marxism has "assimilated everything valuable in the past two-thousand years of human thought and culture."[7] The East German Party, as intellectual as well as political leader of the masses, comprehends and guides the development by which the German nation has proceeded to its contemporary form in the German Democratic Republic. Since it claims to have incorporated the worthwhile achievements of the past and to represent the order of society most perfected in the present, the G.D.R. is touted as the carrier of German culture within a social order whose applications are universal.

To carry off this rather complex association of nationalism with internationalism, of cultural acceptance and rejection, critical selections and syntheses are made in the instructional material. For example, in treating the theme, "Who is a good German?" a list of historical figures representing the cultural leadership of Germany was compiled. This list contained the names of August Bebel, Wilhelm and Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxemburg, Ernst Thälmann, Wilhelm Pieck, Walter Ulbricht, Wilhelm and Alexander von Humboldt, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz, Albert Einstein, Max Planck, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Johann Gottfried Herder, Johann Friedrich von Schiller, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Ernst Moritz Arndt, Heinrich Heine, and Bertolt Brecht.[8] The first seven names are directly related to the history of German socialism and communism, but the others are universally recognized as German contributors to western civilization. However interpreted, Einstein, Goethe, and others cannot be "owned" by a political ideology. The point is, however, that the combination of political figures with universal cultural figures illustrates one technique of associating the general culture with the present order.

Terms have been re-defined or given special connotations to serve these intended associations. Early statements made it clear that concepts such as "fatherland" would be retained, but infused with new content.[9] This infusion has been spelled out for many critical terms in political education, with the intention that they carry their traditional emotional load but refer that emotion to the specific institutions of the present society. Also, phrases using apparently contradictory terms are meant to convey an ideological reconciliation of certain double-edged attitudes. The search for peace, e.g., is a militant effort: "*Erziehung zum bewaffneten Frieden.*"

Perhaps the most difficult task of civic education is the reconciliation of the facts of political authority and state militarism with stated intentions to achieve a workers' democracy and to strive for world peace through international cooperation. This requires an intense effort to explain and justify the actions of the Party. Glowing accounts of Party history, including testimonials to Party leaders, past and present, are used to show the long struggle against reactionary and oppressive powers, culminating in the victory of the Party and the concomitant establishment of a moral social order, guaranteeing the "good life" to its citizens. The Party, like a good but firm father, must make hard decisions and carry weighty responsibility in the ultimate interest of all members of the society. Descriptions of the structure of government reassure citizens of the accessibility of their state authority. The rigidity of the central authority is allegedly modified by the cooperation and participation of all social segments in the total process of political life (*plane mit, arbeite mit, regiere mit*). Finally, the military and state security forces are praised for their part in protecting the society and its accomplishments from attack by enemies from outside or from inside (in the latter case, it is assumed that the source of the threat is outside).

It is finally the responsibility of the teacher to make good the plans to build ideological security into the course of instruction. If this did not follow logically from the organization of institutions, which everywhere lead educational policy to its practical conclusion in the classroom, it has been made clear and simple by Party leaders. As stated by Walter Ulbricht in 1961:

> It is the teacher's task to convince the children of the natural law of socialist development, of the certainty of the decline of capitalism, and of the victory of Socialism and Communism in the world . . . teachers and youth leaders are to recognize that political education and instruction must become an integral part of general education.[10]

In order to carry out this mandate, students in training, teacher-trainers, and practicing teachers must acquaint themselves with Party decisions and be able to apply those decisions intelligently in their educational work. The ability to *apply* them depends on the teacher's comprehension of the spirit of state socialism, in general and in its particular form at any time. This, in turn, depends on his own positive attitude and socialist conviction. If he is to educate children to "apply all their knowledge and abilities in the interest of the socialist society," he must be willing so to apply his own efforts. If he is to teach the universality of values of international solidarity, discipline, readiness for sacrifice in defense of the "proletariat," hatred toward the exploiting classes, as these are defined by the Party, he must himself believe in this universality. In short, the development of socialism must become his own personal obligation. When this is so, there should be no conflict between his words and deeds, and in fact, behavioral evidence that there is no such conflict is a primary criterion of qualification for teaching.

The teacher should show both political and pedagogical effectiveness, and while there may be some categorization of his duties into these two task areas, basically they are to be amalgamated in his professional endeavors. He should be able to accept the singularity of the Marxist-Leninist methodological bias in science; he should utilize the resources of the society in the formulation of socialistic personalities—that is, he should foster relationships among school, factory, farm, home, and youth organization which will impress on students the totality of the social effort. His own conduct should exemplify socialist leadership. As an agitator, initiator, propagandist, he should participate fully in the political work of the society, and be able to report to his students on his work. He should be so firm in his convictions that he does not fall back on academic evasions of political responsibility, and this firmness should allow him to go beyond his students to the re-education of parents whose views may still be tainted by backward social ideas.[11]

The inclusion of parents in the instructional reach of the school is just one indication of the totality of the educational effort. Implementation of this effort proceeds via a two-way flow of participation. State agencies, economic enterprises, social and professional organizations are assigned educational tasks which are to relate to the school program. Simultaneously, youth are to develop and actualize their school learnings by participating in extra-curricular activities which involve them in the productive work of the society and confirm the socialistic attitudes they have been taught. Education must be defined in terms of three basic, perhaps concentric areas of effort then: the systematic instruction given in schools, the extra-curricular involvement of youth in collective activities which supplement both social and academic learnings, and the continual re-education of the total population through the communication of Party decisions and propaganda. While qualifications and responsibilities are discrete, the various educational agents are not permitted to become independent of one another or isolated from the collective social effort. Correspondingly, youth are not allowed to withdraw from their obligations to the society, and these obligations are spelled out in both procedural and normative terms in communist pedagogics.[12]

For education to develop the human product desired in the new East German society, the institution had to be first treated as an object of social change, to be structured and equipped to perform its active role. In this structuring, education was defined much more broadly than was common in European history and practice. Although the emphasis here is on formal schooling, the definition of education was extended in a real and systematic way to include youth movements, mass communication media, social induction rituals, farm and factory training programs, artistic and sport activities, paramilitary and social tasks, and a variety of youth and adult pursuits outside the formal curriculum.

The model for the structural development was that used in the Soviet Union to instrumentalize a form of socialist philosophy in education. The use of an institutional model implemented in another society inevitably produces certain conflicts. In the East German situation, these conflicts were muted through the use of two basic strategies. The first was use of Party interpretation to strike a subtle, shifting balance between national independence and the interdependence of socialist countries.

Shifts in the balance were motivated by Party assessments of the appropriate relationship between the Soviet Union and the GDR in a given development period. Hence, the postwar fusion of Soviet-German interests gave way, after independence, to a general linkage of the two systems with increasingly discriminatory action on educational particulars. Neither the ultimate control of the Soviet Union nor the application of Soviet experience to the East German system has ever been questioned, but these realities have come to be more assumed than advertised, and the relationship is considered overtly now only in reference to particular institutional questions.

The second strategy required the re-establishment of a national identity compatible with international communism. The historical dimension has been accommodated by a logic which diverts the progressive ideas from German educational history through the Soviet Union and back into the German flow in the GDR. They return verified by Marxist universals, so the national question is basically irrelevant. To the extent that they have been interpreted under Soviet conditions, however, they must be re-interpreted to accord with social conditions and requirements in the GDR, and this becomes a continuous process. Theoretically then, educational forms are national in their reference to German history and the present society of the GDR, but, being based on common communist socio-economic assumptions, are coincident with developments in other communist countries and divergent from developments in Western Europe, including West Germany.

While these formulations may be satisfactory in general, they present the teacher and educational policy-maker with a great deal of uncertainty on specific questions. The construction of the East German school system shows their application, but it is a matter of interpretation whether the result shows a modern synthesis or an uneasy compromise. It is clear, however, that a German socialist school has been built, that education has been treated as an object of social change determined politically, and that the school system has been so constructed to act as an agent for the continuation of this change.

The educational structure established in East Germany immediately after the War was a rather simple, makeshift conglomerate, but one which embodied the educational demands of German socialists over the past one hundred years and which laid the foundation for subsequent development. The basic system principles were equality, unity, and secularity, and these were structurally implemented by building around an extended eight-year common school—below it, a program of pre-school education, and above it, alternative vocational and academic high schools, both leading to forms of higher education.

Although I have phrased it positively, the initial reform effort was characterized largely by negative thinking; the elimination of old structures and norms had to be accomplished before real, positive reforms could take place. From 1959, the development of the unified socialist school system has been dealt with positively. The central link in the system is the ten-year general polytechnical school, common for all children, and interlocking with differentiated types of intermediate schools offering alternative avenues to work and further education. Unless one goes into the details of a particular educational problem, the reforms since 1959 must be seen as a progressive development, implementation, and consolidation of principles firmly established by then for education. The pre-school program has been steadily expanded to provide more equality of opportunity and to free women for the work force; the ten-year school has been structurally refined to include three core levels, with continuous curriculum research aimed at scientific significance and productive application, and research into methods toward more effective, systematic teaching; upper-level programs have been further elaborated and differentiated, and their links to the common school strengthened—thus securing the integration of vocational and general education, and providing general horizontal mobility while promoting individual talents in the interest of economic development.[13] It will be seen that these reform directions are not unique to the Eastern part of Germany, but their specifics are determined by certain fundamental principles. This may be illustrated by referring to two principles which I consider most crucial to the system.

First, *unification* is a significant and extensive concept. It includes not only the combined parts of the system but the "essential couplings" among them; it includes all the schools, all levels and types of schools, the links between schools, between schools and other educational agencies, and between education and other institutions of society. It implies totality, and it requires singular central planning and authority. Education, through this concept, is treated in terms of the total social policy of the GDR and its treatment is determined by the state authority for that policy. Also, since unification refers to a standardization of goals and a collectivization of the school population, the same concept is used to promote conscious, active popular participation in the implementation of social policy.

Second, *polytechnical education* centralizes the industrial society in the curriculum of the school. It is, like Social Studies in the U.S., both a subject and a principle permeating the entire school program. The curriculum is organized around major areas of production, and pupils learn to use tools, service machines, and otherwise to acquire skills of the factory or farm. But polytechnical education has little similarity to vocational education as we conceive it. Its nearest specific reference to vocational pursuits is its function of preparing the young to make appropriate vocational choices. More important in general education is the utilization of polytechnical studies to induce the "technical thinking," the positive orientation toward work, and the acceptance of collective relationships which are characteristic of life in a modern industrialized socialist society. The latest reforms have emphasized more strongly than ever before the intention to develop a general science of technology and the centrality of this study in *general education*. While there is some recognition in Western countries of the appropriateness of this effort, nowhere outside the socialist bloc has it so redefined the content of education.[14]

West Germany

For West Germany, it is not necessary within the framework of this paper to spell out the ideological foundation of instruction, not because such a foundation is lacking, but because it is assumed in general and allows more room for alternatives in particular. It will be remembered that the model applied here to East Germany is *reconstructive*, requiring active instrumental efforts to redirect the society according to a normative system not directly derived from the dominant culture, and thus calling for attitudinal and behavioral re-direction through education. The model for West Germany being *conservative*, appropriate attitudes and behaviors are seen to be present in the culture, needing refinement or selective emphasis perhaps, but not general reconstruction. The change pattern tends then to be concentrated in those institutional re-arrangements which will underscore and develop selective social characteristics and facilitate the society's capacity to accommodate modern conditions and change pressures.

Analysis of this change pattern has essentially two parts: identification of the social and political factors bearing on educational policy decisions, and projection of these determinants through policy to the actual institutional changes. While cultural continuity has been assumed in West Germany, thus dismissing one of the largest interpretive problems in East German education, there can be no simple assumption about social organization, no singular direction of institutional development, no central authority to reconcile differences or overrule dissent. The cloth of development has to be made up from the patches of special interest and philosophy present in a pluralistic society, and woven together by the many seamstresses of a decentralized system.

West Germany was also subject to extra-national control during the Occupation period, but unlike the control exercised in the East, it was weakened by its distribution through three governments having themselves differing of views of society and education. Furthermore, it was perceived as extra-cultural, so without general, integrative, or permanent application. Thus, with some new international baggage of educational ideas and with vague liberal democratic goals for education, West Germany re-established the form and structure of schooling which had evolved in that society.

The need for social reform, initially referred to the National-Socialist disaster, necessarily impinged on education, however, with the result that debate on school reform has been active ever since. This debate has been complicated by the difference of opinion within and between various group sets, which had traditionally resulted in a non-system made up of a compromise of separate schools representing the variety of interests. In a very real sense, the question of reform in West German education can be seen as an effort to unify these diverse interests in a modern progressive educational movement.

The primary spokesmen in this debate came from the churches, the political parties, and the professional teachers' organizations. The main public issues were: the length and function of the common school; the time and procedures for separation of pupils into ability groups for secondary education; the place of religious education, and closely associated, the community school in the public school system; and the appropriate basis for curriculum, in general or according to school type. All of these issues could be referred to the question of the school's role in social change, and positions were dichotomized on this question. Basically, those parties wishing the school to act as an agent of social change wanted to change education itself most radically; those attempting to preserve established traditions could countenance educational change according with modern conditions, but not to the degree that its essential character would change or that it would act to accelerate social change. This meant that the parties could come together on certain institutional revisions, but that far-reaching reforms were largely obstructed. Specific decisions were made regionally, according to the principle of *Land* autonomy in cultural affairs, and were determined by the regional strength of the respective disputants and by the compromises acceptable to the professionals involved. It has been politically impossible to overcome "states' rights" in West German education, with the result that educational reform as a general achievement has been retarded by the inaction of the least progressive *Länder*.

Certain impulses to reform have begun to cut through this diversity, however. These impulses have not come from the schools, but they are now coursing through education to effect certain social expectations. They are primarily the impulses of economic development, social democracy, and political participation—all of which are seen to be sustainable only with educational support. Moreover, the reference of these terms becomes clear only in the framework of a particular political community, and that community is increasingly defined by West European agreement—which overrides particularistic differences. The standards and common expectations deriving from the European interpretation of these impulses have in fact dictated certain educational actions and thus forced a degree of conformity in normative and structural decisions. There is no longer any real argument against the extension of common schooling, the restructuring of higher levels to accommodate various interests and talents, or the modernization of curriculum through core studies and differentiated courses, both having reference to the society outside the school. There is no tenable argument against the proposition that social welfare and economic advancement require the encouragement of generally higher levels of educational attainment across the school population. There is no objection to the central importance of political education, to the school's responsibility to communicate directly the principles and behaviors of democracy to the youth of the nation.

Given the pluralistic norms in the society and traditions of diversity on educational issues, however, it is not to be expected that these impulses have resolved all conflicts on detail and implementation. They have given direction to educational developments, which is a substantial achievement. To rationalize, unify, and detail the actions along this line of development, planning procedures have been set in motion. The earliest attempt at unified planning was undertaken by the Permanent Conference of Cultural Ministers, and progressive *Land* governments have established their own planning bodies to act on basic federal decisions and to further develop their own systems. These moves did not really touch the autonomy of the *Länder*, but recent years have seen the establishment of two planning bodies, specifically charged with the coordination and development of educational planning in the *Bundesrepublik*: the German Education Council and the Bund-Länder Commission for Educational Planning. This machinery does not automatically lead to unified planning in West Germany; in fact, its complexity is indicative of the difficulties faced in arriving at consensus on the future of education. However, the increased planning activity of the present and the determined role recently assumed by the federal government promises acceleration in those areas where basic agreement exists.

The foregoing suggests a reform dynamic, which builds the fundamental structure of education consistently into the future. Such a process is difficult to summarize, but certain accomplishments and projections can be identified. In order to increase the basic preparation and afford a better start for all children, pre-school provision for three- and four-year-olds has finally been given general sanction, the primary curriculum has been under continuous study, the old four-year minimum of common schooling has been extended to six years, with guidance functions incorporated into the last two years, and compulsory full-time schooling will have been extended by two years when present plans are implemented. The secondary level is now seen as a two-stage process, a first basic stage, and a second differentiated stage. The secondary basic stage is organized according to the traditional three types of secondary schools, but their rationalization as parts of a stage of schooling is intended to make for easier horizontal mobility, and the sequential secondary level is to provide vertical mobility in each channel. The old secondary categories have become meaningless through their incorporation into school levels, and also through their dispersion at the upper-secondary level into various academic and vocational sub-categories used as focal points for concentrated work. As academic programs include more modern alternatives, such as economics and social science, and as technical programs are based on general education and include studies in such fields as electronics, social work, and architecture, the gross categories necessarily disappear in favor of actual field distinction at a given educational level.

What emerges from these changes is a conception of the school system which still retains the principles of differentiation on a common base, but which extends both the horizontal and vertical dimension to encompass a greater school population and a wide variety of curricular programs—in its essential form, a conception not unlike that underlying the East German structure. To make this conception workable, a number of framework changes are called for. First, the structure of the school has to be able to accommodate the intended growth and flexibility. This requires direct action to re-structure geographically or academically isolated schools, ultimately along comprehensive lines. There are a number of possibilities here, and it is consistent with West German development procedure that various versions will be implemented simultaneously, but there is little doubt that new schools will be built as *Gesamtschulen*. Second, the teaching body will have to be better equipped to handle new tasks and deal with continuous educational change. To this end, teacher-training must encompass those pedagogical, social-scientific, and specialized learnings which will make for a uniform standard of professional competence and a cooperative, flexible attitude toward professional responsibilities. Third, the so-called "inner reforms," which have been regularly pursued within areas and school types, must be specifically referred to the new goals and organizations. When it is no longer legitimate to place the burden of educational choice and accomplishment exclusively on the child, and to organize the school system on a simple success/failure dichotomy, it is necessary to apply research and practice consistently to the social, psychological, curricular, and didactic questions whose answers will determine the *success of the school*.

The Significance of East-West Differences in Education

It may be noted that the pedagogical developments and the structures designed to accommodate them are not all that different in the two Germanies. It is to the society-education relationship that we have to look in order to deal with similarity and difference.[16] Both societies have retained a German cultural base, and both have adopted a social strategy for modernization. However, the elements of traditional culture retained and their outcomes in societal interaction are as different in the two states as are their development strategies.

On traditions of German socialism, but also on absolutist traditions of truth, authority, and morality, on idealistic dreams of a new cultural synthesis rising from the ashes of western decadence, the SED has built "the first modern society on German soil"—a totally public, totally unified, totally controlled society.[17] On traditions of private prerogative, earned privilege, social diversity, autonomy of institutions, and economic competition, the Federal Republic has revived a liberal society fumbling awkwardly toward effective individual expression within a modern framework. In each case, the mix of tradition and modernity makes for a new cultural profile, but the reconciliation of dissonant elements out of the past and present has not yet been accomplished in either society.

In the past, the need for such reconciliation was neither so obvious nor so urgent. Certainly, it was not the school's task to deal with it. Furthermore, the institutional islands, including education, managed conflicting norms and social beliefs by fencing them off into separate areas which could function autonomously as long as they did not disturb each other or the centers of power in the society as a whole. Now, there is an obligation incumbent on education as a unified institution to effect a convergence of attitudes and behaviors in the development of the respective societies.

The obligation applies equally to education in the DDR and in the BRD, but the means, the problems, and the envisioned ends are, of course, quite different. East German education is better equipped to deal directly with development tasks, since it has the political and intellectual mandate to organize learning in that pursuit. But the uncertainties of the normative reconciliation are deeper and more stubborn in practice for all the apparently righteous conviction. And the extremity of the change-agent responsibility, in face of these uncertainties, must weigh heavily on the school in a situation where, while interconnected with other institutions, each has a kind of independent responsibility for social success.

The difficulties for West German education are that its institutional terms of reference do not necessarily correspond with those of other institutions. It works within a general framework of social consensus, but it does not necessarily overlap in function with other institutions, and may in fact act counter to some, generally or in particular instances. The school is responsible to society, but only in general; it is not a vehicle for achieving specific political purposes. Finally, the outcomes of education are unpredictable, and they may as easily work against established interests or pre-planned social decisions as for them.

The educational systems of East and West Germany are not alone in confronting these problems, however. The reconciliation and development problems applied to education affect all countries in some form. The approaches taken are conditioned to some extent by the cultural heritage, which is of course common to both Germanies, but much more by the present cultural forms and dynamics, which irrevocably divide the two societies. Educational applications are now so thoroughly divergent that they can only further the division. This does not mean, however, that either society need fail in the attempt to achieve its vision of the modern German state.

If education can be instrumental in social development, either in its directed East German or open-ended West German form, it may have the effect in the BRD of integrating liberal and social democracy, and in the DDR of decreasing the gap between economic and political socialism. It may, in two very different senses, liberate the consciousness of individuals so they may respond confidently to their respective worlds. Thus, with a concluding flight of optimism (unsupported by the inclinations of powerful interests in either society), I present the possibility of educational advancement toward two German versions of a modern, humane society.

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1 Using a different conceptual model, these have been used as principles of policy and decision-making. See S. B. Robinsohn, "Bildungspolitik und Öffentlichkeit," *Bildung und Erziehung*, Heft 4, 1970, p. 243.

2 See F. Kohlsdorf, "Marxistische Philosophie und sozialistische Bildungskonzeption," *Pädagogik*, 1965, p. 106.

3 L. Barth, "Einheit von Politik und Pädagogik im Erdkundeunterricht," *Zeitschrift für den Erdkundeunterricht*, 1963, p. 10.

4 P. A. Grigarow, "Die wissenschaftliche-atheistische Erziehung der Schüler," *Biologie in der Schule*, 1962, p. 203.

5 Über die Erziehung junger sozialistischer Patrioten," in M. Engelbert and S. Baske, *Zwei Jahrzehnte Bildungspolitik in der Sowjetzone Deutschlands* (Berlin, 1966), V. 2, p. 146, and stated in reverse order: "The central issue of education, especially in the school and universities, is the development of a socialistic attitude toward work, toward the working man, and toward the defense of our socialist homeland," from "Beschluss der 14. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED," V. 2, p. 154.

"Lehrplan für das Fach Staatsbürgerkunde an den allgemeinbildenden und berufsbildenden Schulen," in Engelbert & Baske, V. 2, pp. 352-3.

7 Walter Ulbricht, address of 20 Oct. 1960 "Über die Traditionen, die wir schätzen und wahren," in Engelbert & Baske, V. 2, p. 118.

8 Wolf Paschmann, "Zur Stoffeinheit 'Wer ist ein guter Deutscher' in den Klassen 7 und 8," *Geschichtsunterricht und Staatsbürgerkunde*, Jahrgang 1961, p. 1006.

9 K. Günther & G. Uhlig, *Geschichte der Schule in der DDR.*, (Berlin: Volk und Wissen, 1969), p. 31.

10 Engelbert & Baske, V. 2, p. 151.

11 "Die Parteilichkeit des Lehrers und Erziehers," *Beilage zur Deutschen Lehrerzeitung*, 1958, No. 9.

12 Gerhart Neuner, Director of the DPZI (Central Research Institute), utilized the research of the Soviet psychologist, L. J. Boshowitsch, to establish the following principles in 1961:

1) Since moral concepts can become effective only as they accord with the generalized social experience of the child, political-moral directions must run parallel to the life experiences of students in the socialistic community.

2) Internalization can only occur through the independent action of students in the spirit of goals and tasks set by the educator; thus, civic education must lead the individual student and the entire collective to work actively to meet the challenges confronting them.

3) The prevention of conflict between thought and deed depends on the crystallization of political-moral norms in firmly established cultural habits. The students must be faced with situations and problems which compel them to prove their patriotic consciousness, decisiveness, and strength of will in the test of doing. Engelbert & Baske, V. 2, pp. 148-9.

13 See Oskar Anweiler, "Strukturprobleme des allgemeinbildenden Schulwesens der DDR," in W. Hilligen and R. Raasch (eds.),

Pädagogische Forschung und pädagogischer Fortschritt (Bielefeld: Bertelsmann, 1970).

14 The literature on polytechnical education is extensive. Some useful sources covering the theory, program, and changing interpretations are: Helmut Klein, *Polytechnische Bildung und Erziehung in der DDR* (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1962); "Sozialistische Bildungstheorie und polytechnische Bildung," among other documents in Engelbert & Baske, op. cit., V. 2, p. 411; Gerlind Hurtienne, "Die Entwicklung der polytechnischen Bildung in der Sowjetunion und in der D.D.R. in vergleichender Sicht," in O. Anweiler, *Bildungsreform in Osteuropa* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969) pp. 168-192; and Willi Voelmy, *Polytechnischer Unterricht in der DDR seit 1964* (Frankfurt a.M.: Diesterweg, 1969).

15 Comprehensive reports on educational development were publ. in 1970 by the Deutscher Bildungsrat, *Strukturplan für das Bildungswesen*, and by the federal government under the title, *Bildungsbericht '70*.

16 For a comprehensive study of this relationship, see Caspar Kuhlmann, "Schulreform und Gesellschaft in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," and Klaus-Dieter Mende, "Schulreform und Gesellschaft in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik," in S. B. Robinsohn u.a., *Schulreform im gesellschaftlichen Prozess*, I (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett, 1970).

17 The ramifications of this statement are developed in three classic works: Rolf Dahrendorf, *Society and Democracy in Germany* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1969), Ch. 26; Peter C. Ludz, "Entwurf einer soziologischen Theorie totalitär verfasster Gesellschaft," in *Studien und Materialien zur Soziologie der DDR* (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag); and Fritz Stern, *The Politics of Cultural Despair* (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 271-295.

TEACHING POSTWAR GERMAN CULTURE—AN UNDISCIPLINED DISCIPLINE

Gerhard H. Weiss

There was a time when the teaching of German culture was a rather simple thing. One spoke of a quiet, comfortable Germany which had not yet become a European nightmare, of a Germany which had its Goethe securely housed on its Olympus, its chancellor in the Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin, and the Loreley on her favorite rock along the Rhine. This was the Germany of *Gemütlichkeit* and Romanticism, the Germany of Alt-Heidelberg fame, the Germany where Schiller meant Friedrich and not Karl. It was a time when it seemed possible to speak of a homogeneous German culture and where "Civilization and Culture" meant nothing more and nothing less than a concern for "das Grosse, Schöne, Gute" in its peculiarly German form.

There was such a time — and it seems that this time is still with us when we look at some of the textbooks still being published today. While their photography and make-up may be modern, we still encounter the old clichés of jolly student life and pleasant rural customs. It is time that this Neuschwanstein-view of Germany be finally laid to rest, and we owe it to our students that they get an accurate, clear and, as far as is possible, an unbiased view of Germany as it really is. When we speak of contemporary Germany, we cannot limit ourselves to the great thoughts and the great ideas of the time, but we must get down to the "nitty-gritty" of everyday cultural contact. Teaching postwar German culture is, to my mind, a far cry from the "masterpieces" concept of the traditional culture course. Indeed, we need to come to a re-interpretation of the term "culture" to cover the much broader range with which we have come to apply it when we speak of "contemporary Germany."

It is a truism to say that to describe the present is an almost impossible undertaking. The vastness of information, the complexity of the moment, cannot be woven into a neat educational pattern. The selection process of time has not yet taken place. It won't do just to play the latest German records in order to be "relevant," or to use the word "prima" to show that we are with it. Such relevance is irrelevant. The presentation of contemporary Germany requires a selectivity that must be supplied by the teacher, it requires a systematization in order to bring some semblance of organization into a mass of undigested material. It requires a multi-disciplinary approach which is very challenging, but which is also very frustrating, and—alas, which is also always suspect of dilletantism. Most of us, teachers of German, are trained in German literature, some perhaps also in history, but only few are expert economists, sociologists, geographers, anthropologists, musicologists, political scientists and whatever else we SHOULD be to present an expert's view. We are not experts, and we should readily admit it. Does this, then, invalidate our work? Not at all. When we teach postwar German culture, or any German culture, we do this in order to give our students a general understanding, not in order to make experts out of them. What my students get from me is largely what the educated German layman knows about himself. If my students think that a discussion of contemporary German architecture will qualify them for a job in that field, they are very much mistaken. What it does qualify them for, however, is a recognition of certain trends in modern German city planning and a feeling for the various trends of postwar German reconstruction and construction. It also makes them aware of the vast differences between German and American urban developments. Our culture courses should be background courses, giving the student the kind of information that he needs to understand Germany better—and, since many of us are still interested in German literature, this makes it possible for the student to understand the complexities of modern German literature. Beyond this, these courses serve the important purpose of tuning our students to the reception of foreign cultural stimuli.

We are concerned here with a practical approach to the teaching of postwar German culture. I should like to propose a system which will serve as a structural basis for organizing our material, which will help us to come to grips with our undisciplined discipline. This "Grammar of Culture" is based on three elements, all of which slightly overlap. They are interdependent and necessary in order to come to a complete picture of contemporary German culture. The three elements are: 1. *Factual information*, 2. *Cultural comparison*, 3. *The vocabulary of culture.*

The first element, gathering of factual information, is by far the simplest and least controversial. Students need facts. They must know something about the topography of the country, a bit about its history, its political structure, the current socio-economic problems. They should be aware of the German educational system, and they certainly should be aware of Nazism, and the shadow that the Third Reich still casts upon Germany. to gather these facts is a simple matter. Books, magazines, films, etc. are readily available to help us. Even the daily American press supplies us with a wealth of material. However, even if we know exactly how many delegates there are in the *Bundestag*, we have not really understood Germany. We need the other two elements for the completion of the picture. *Cultural comparison* is essential for the proper perspective in which a foreign culture must be seen. The study of contrastive culture is rightfully the domain of the anthropologist, and we find ourselves again poaching on foreign territory. However, open eyes and a perceptive mind make it possible even for us to come to valuable results, and a careful study of Edward Hall's little book *The Silent Language* can be of tremendous help. Let us consider, e.g., the differences in eating manners which lead Germans and Americans to come to completely wrong conclusions about each other, or take the example of "Ich bin nervös" in a German and an American cultural setting. To be "nervös" in German is a sign of sensitivity, breeding, culture and managerial responsibility. To be nervous in American usage has the negative meaning of weakness. Those who are "nervös" in Germany, must "keep smiling" in American usage. Those who "keep smiling" in Germany are childlike, "unbeschwert," "beneidenswert in ihrer Unbekümmertheit." One can see to what strange results a misunderstanding of these cultural clues can lead! And then there is the concept of friendship in German and American culture. How often have we heard that Americans don't have any genuine friendships. Again, it is the misunderstanding of cultural clues that is in the way. In the American culture the word "friend" is used to include "acquaintance," in the German culture these two concepts are strictly separated. The list of cultural contrasts can be expanded at will. There is the interesting aspect of territoriality (a term which Hall uses), where we can show the difference between German closeness and American openness—the fence around the house, the "Verboten" signs, vs. the open lawn, there is the attitude toward leisure time—the concept of "Urlaub" vs. vacation, and the idea of "Luftveränderung" and "Erholung" (is it "recovery?" "rejuvenation?" "restoration?" "relaxation?") Finally, there is the contrast possible between such terms as "Wirtschaftswunder" and "Economic Miracle." What first was only a translation, has later become a political distinction. "Wirtschaftswunder" now has become a negative term in the Federal Republic, while "economic miracle" is still a positive term when used in the American context. There is the "eternal teacher" hidden in so many Germans, in contrast to the American "mind your own business," and there are the many cultural myths, which deserve a much greater analysis than has been given them so far. The myths tell us how a people see themselves: "Deutsche Gründlichkeit" as compared to "American knowhow." In this connection, one can also look at the heroes of each culture. In the American culture we have the doers, the

Horatio Alger types, in the German culture we find the ponderers, such as Faust, and the ultimate loser Siegfried.

A goldmine of cultural comparison can be found in an analysis of popular jokes. It is interesting, e.g., that the *New Yorker* has no real counterpart in Germany, and that magazines like *Pardon* or *Nebelspalter* appear clumsy to the American reader. Sex jokes in Germany lack the wit and elegance they have in this country, and one has the feeling of (still) fighting an inner cultural tabu. The Germans in turn are quite good at fecal jokes which, however, seem to be embarrassing to Americans.

Closely related and often overlapping with cultural comparison is the element of "cultural vocabulary," which includes not only words but the entire basic concept of culture as communication. In includes, therefore, also the silent cultural signals with which "in-group" communication is usually maintained. What is the true signal when we say: "We should have dinner some time . . . ," or what do we mean when in German we say: "Na, das ist ja eine reizende Geschichte?" What are the clues used in boy-girl relationships, what clues signify the relative position between employer and employee? What is the cultural significance of the change from "du" to "Sie," and what is signalled when the "Sie" becomes again a "du"? Is the use of first names really a sign of class equality in America? Again, the list can be expanded. Edward Hall's *Silent Language* is a superb source book here, since Hall sees in culture communication. Nelson Brooks' adaptation of these points (*FLA* 1968, 204-217) should also be taken in serious consideration.

The teacher can establish his own workbook of cultural vocabulary by analyzing the vocabulary bin of certain conceptual areas, as for example the city, or the school. In analyzing "School," e.g., one will soon come to the understanding that "Schule" and "school" are not necessarily the same, and that a "Student" is not necessarily the same as a "student." To "study" has often nothing to do with "studieren," and "to work" in English means the opposite of "to study." "Der Student arbeitet" cannot simply be rendered with "The student works," unless we know that he is gainfully employed. We have here a rather interesting cultural contrast which sees "studying" as still a bit of luxury, and certainly not identical with "hard work" for which a man is paid.

The Germans themselves like to point to certain culture-laden words which they consider untranslatable, such as "Gemütlichkeit," "Freundschaft," "Heimweh," "Treue," — a list to which we can add "Kitsch" (which the other concepts represent, and which is equally untranslatable

To consider these words as particularly "German" strikes me as dangerous. A homesick American suffers just as much as a German "mit Heimweh," and the German term is in no way more inclusive. What we have in these words, however, is an interesting collection of national clichés, so to speak a "lexical national mythology."

An interesting phenomenon in the collection of cultural vocabulary is the borrowing of foreign words which then retain a specific, usually slightly negative connotation. A case in point is the American use of "Fräulein" and the German concept of "girl." We know that "ein Job" is much less than "ein Beruf," and we are aware that "er ist echter Ges[illegible]ftsmann" is much nobler than "er ist ein echter Businessman."

The methodology outlined here is only an attempt to bring order into the present chaos. It offers a structural cohesion which in my opinion will make it possible to bring together the multiplicity of elements that constitute contemporary culture in such a way that we can present to our students a comprehensive body of knowledge. As such, I think that this is our task. The task has severe limitations, but it is nevertheless an important one. We, as teachers of German, are responsible not only for the linguistic proficiency of our students, but also for their awareness of the cultural grammar, without which no true communication would be possible.

● **University of Minnesota**

A READER ON POSTWAR GERMANY FOR AMERICAN STUDENTS SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS

Wulf Koepke

1. Our profession has done little so far to explain the facts and consequences of the separation of Germany to our American students. We are still hesitant about teaching more than language and literature, and when we introduce German culture we are tempted to stress its non-controversial features, such as classical music, Gothic cathedrals, or the "romantic Germany." We are in fact hampered by American and by German taboos.

If we try to discuss conditions in present-day Germany, and we find that the separation of Germany is one of the basic facts of this German culture, we may even surprise some of our students. In the U.S., the separation of Germany seems to be regarded as a fact, and not too much thought is given to the problems involved. Apparently, it is assumed that the Germans themselves wanted it that way or, at least, are quite happy about it and do not really wish a reunification of their country. Of course, there are some Germans who are unhappy about it and don't feel at home in either part of Germany. Hans Magnus Enzensberger wrote the following lines in *landessprache*:

meine zwei länder und ich, wir sind geschiedene leute,
und doch bin ich inständig hier,
in asche und sack, und frage mich:
was habe ich hier verloren?

In typical Enzensberger fashion, the last line has a double meaning: *I don't belong here*, and *I have lost something*. But Enzensberger may be an isolated case, an outsider. Did the Germans really lose something when Germany was divided? Do they feel they lost something?

If we try to answer that question, and if we try to explain the unpleasant facts and complexities of the German situation, we get little help from textbooks or cultural readers that are on the market. Some cultural readers (e.g., Kufner: *Das Deutschland unserer Tage*) and quite a few textbooks equate Germany with the Federal Republic. A larger number of cultural readers include Berlin and discuss the problems of the divided Germany from that point of view. I myself have done so (*Begegnung mit Deutschland*), and a very recent textbook called *Language and Culture* uses the same approach. Very few writers or editors of such books can travel themselves to the GDR. They are much more familiar with the FRG and Berlin than with the GDR.

Others, including myself, have tried to describe the GDR and discuss the separation of Germany, but give much more emphasis to the Federal Republic. Claude Hill, in *Zweihundert Jahre deutscher Kultur,* tries to be more equitable; he quotes from the first constitution of the GDR together with the *Grundgesetz.* He also gives some facts concerning the cultural life in the GDR, although his treatment of the West is more complete. The fairest treatment of both parts of Germany from a Western point of view is probably offered in the student edition of *X-mal Deutschland* by Rudolf Walter Leonhardt. Leonhardt does compare the living conditions in both parts of Germany. For a casual reader, however, he seems to treat them as two countries apart.

Our students, it must be said once more, are casual readers. They know hardly anything about the separation of Germany, and they care very little about it. They probably know that there is or was a problem with Berlin, and they may have heard of John F. Kennedy's "*Ich bin ein Berliner*"—usually quoted out of context. But our students are usually not sure about the geography, and would hardly place Berlin in the middle of the GDR. They know more about the FRG, not only from the mass media, but also through friends or family members who were stationed there and who liked it. If we make a composite picture out of this, we find that the trend would be to equate Germany with the Federal Republic, largely ignore the Democratic Republic, treat Berlin as an isolated trouble spot, and casually accept that there are two countries in Germany.

In my opinion, this does not do justice to the actual situation in Germany. The country is divided, but this does not mean that there could not be enough features to define it as one culture. At least, I would propose to explore that possibility, and teach German culture as a "divided culture."

2 How should we present this divided culture? We will certainly have to describe the country and teach some geography, if possible without boring the students. The geography of the GDR is particularly hazy and has to be treated carefully. This would be our first chapter:

(a) *A description of Germany, particularly the GDR.*

Our students are indifferent about the present problems of Germany, I said, but at least some of them have a strange preoccupation with the Third Reich. I am periodically asked by students if Hitler is still alive. People are fascinated by the Nazi phenomenon, and this fascination is kept alive by TV and reading material. It would certainly be helpful to demonstrate in which ways Germany today differs from Germany in 1945, 1935, or 1925. This would be the next chapter:

(b) *Germany today as compared to Germany before 1945; the Nazi problem.*

3 Some history of the postwar period is inevitable. The division of Germany was part of the Cold War in Europe, and each side still blames the other side for what happened. It would be instructive to contrast the two interpretations of certain events, such as the monetary reforms, the blockade of Berlin, the 17th of June 1953, or the Berlin Wall. Many institutions and other units were separated and now appear to be half and double at the same time. There are industrial firms, publishing houses, and professional societies in both parts of Germany that carry the same name—so does the CDU, the Luthern Church, the German Mark, and Berlin, the capital of the Reich. Not only the country as such was divided into two parts, but many smaller units with it—not to speak of personal ties. This did by no means happen all at once, but very gradually. In the process, each side claimed that it was the whole, or at least the "real" representative of Germany. It pretended to ignore the other half, while anxiously observing each of its moves.

The description of this long and painful process of separation, if possible from both points of view, would be another chapter:

(c) *Postwar history of Germany, seen as a process of separation of the two German societies.*

4 In 1945 the German society, at least temporarily, lost its structure. It became fragmented, and there was confusion about the desirable structure of a new society. Traditions, however, persisted, partly common to all Germans, partly related to a social class, partly regional. The two ideologies, Western democracy and Communism, tried to superimpose their aims and ideals on this confused mass of people and their traditions. After the Allied effort of reeducation, the Germans themselves took over. Both sides had an enormous output of propaganda. The two societies never felt safe and were afraid of each other. This was particularly true for East Germany, which was much smaller and which had the refugee problem and Berlin in its middle. The West Germans were not attracted by the East German system, but the government still felt the competition from the other side. The constitutional and governmental framework reflects both the experiences of the period before 1945 and the competition with the other Germany. Our next chapters:

(d) *The constitutional framework of the GDR and the FRG*

(e) *The effects of the ideological competition on the two Germanies.*

5. Constitutions, forms of government, official pronouncements, propaganda, will all stress the differences between the two German societies. But did the two ideologies really succeed in changing the life-style and ideals of the average German? What happened to the common German tradition? Can we still find it—maybe somewhat modified? If we want to know if there is still something that distinguishes Germans from all other Europeans, we will have to examine the life of the individual German, his habits, goals, ambitions, wishes, and ideals.

We may find, of course, that Germans living in the two countries differ at least as much as the Austrians and the Swiss (who also have a common official language). But my expectation is that we will find a typical German way of life, somewhat more traditional in the East than in the West. We will have to show this by examples, by some case studies. And this would be our next chapter:

(f) *Examples for the way of life of the individual German in both parts of Germany.*

6. Larger groups and cultural institutions reflect, of course, much more the aims and needs of the present society than traditions; but it would still be good to compare examples and see if anything is left which is more typical for the whole of Germany than for one part only. This can be done in a chapter dealing with:

(g) *Comparison of cultural institutions in East and West Germany.*

A new degree of complication is reached when we consider public expression: first, in the arts, such as literature, music, fine arts; secondly, in the mass media. The arts, literature in particular, reflect the ideological framework of the society. There are certain economic and political pressures, especially censorship; the writer himself has certain experiences and intentions, the audience has certain expectations. There was some common ground in the *Bewältigung der Vergangenheit*, the painful scrutiny of Germans after the Nazi period. But after a whole generation of life since 1945 writers focus on different topics. Is there still one German literature? Is there an all-German way of viewing theatre, of appreciating music, of entertainment; in other words: is there a taste which could be called "German"? Again, we could illustrate this by some examples in a chapter entitled:

(h) *Creative arts and cultural life as a reflection of society.*

Not all literature is intended to be a reflection of society or just entertainment. Some is basically propaganda—some entertainment is also propaganda. This becomes a crucial question when we try to analyze the function of the mass media. And it would be good to be fair in our evaluation—which, again, will have to be made on the basis of concrete and representative examples in a chapter on:

(i) *The function of the mass media in society.*

7. After outlining basic facts about Germany, we would thus get a collection of examples, of case studies which we would have to explain and comment on. Our comments would be designed to help our students understand the second contrast: the contrast between the two parts of Germany on the one hand and the U.S. on the other. Since quite a few of our students are interested in social studies, this contrast might be illuminating to them, and they might begin to see their own country with different eyes.

One point in particular is inevitable. If we describe the GDR, and if we contrast life in the two parts of Germany, the strengths and weaknesses of both life-styles become obvious, and we will have to take another look at our own system. We will have to admit that the picture is not black and white, and we will also find that Western Europe is not exactly like the U.S.

Let us also remind ourselves that there are other German-speaking countries, Austria and Switzerland, whose culture we should study more carefully than we have done so far.

8. In conclusion: We would have a reader with the following chapters —not necessarily in that order—:

(a) **A description of Germany, particularly the GDR**
(b) **Germany today as compared to Germany before 1945; the Nazi problem**
(c) **Postwar history of Germany, seen as a process of separation of the two German societies**
(d) **The constitutional framework of the GDR and the FRG**
(e) **The effects of the ideological competition on the two Germanies**
(f) **Examples for the way of life of the individual German in both parts of Germany**

(g) Comparison of cultural institutions in East and West Germany
(h) Creative arts and cultural life as a reflection of society
(i) The function of the mass media in society.

I am, of course, aware of the fact that if the two German societies drift apart more than now, there might be a time when we might have to present them as two different cultures. I am trying to maintain, however, that we are not that far yet.

I assume that all our examples would show in some way what happens to people and what happens to a culture when such a separation takes place. If we could make our students understand what this means in very concrete terms, it would be worth the effort. And after all, the U.S. is quite involved in Germany. Our students should at least understand why that happened, and what it did to the Germans.

● **Texas A & M University**

GDR LITERATURE—A LITERATURE OF CONFLICT AND DISSENT

Magret Eifler

GDR Literature can probably be comprehended best under the dual aspects of conflict and dissent. As early as in the beginning years of the state, an attempt was made in the GDR to introduce a socialist literature conforming to its own laws. In spite of this desire for autonomy, it proved first to be necessary to become disengaged from the literary and philosophical past. The phenomenon of bourgeois humanism was considered obsolete. The historical development of the individual *per se* was thought to be completed. No longer the perfection of individual human beings was to be the foremost consideration, but the development of the perfect society. Socialism intended to liberate the artist from his introverted and opposing position as an outsider into which the capitalist society had driven him. Thus the Brechtian technique of alienation was rejected and was to be replaced by anti-formalistic socialist realism. Critical realism and with it criticism of the government was rejected because this newly emerged socialist state felt that it had overcome the reasons that might give rise to such polemics. The transition to a socialist understanding was slow in coming; a real and genuine relationship with the Marxist-Leninist ideology and all its demands simply did not catch on. And even after 25 years, East Germany's literary documents still do not—or only rarely—convey what we would call an existential quest and a voluntary engagement. The transition that was to be made was too swift and too all-encompassing for many to adjust to, and it tended to make them feel totally deprived of personal creativity, compelling them to conform to a plan that seemed to make life appear to be a philosophical assembly line. Even if one were to agree with the goals of the socialist ideology, should the Party be permitted to bring about a new class of slaves, this time serving a communist utopia? The SED seems to have had a similar psychological insight, namely when it substituted the possibility of presenting intra-socialist conflicts for criticism of the society. Conflicts of this sort are to be of a non-antagonistic nature. That means that a person has to change wrong attitudes through deeper insight and understanding. Thus, any solution of conflicts always has to be positive, logical, progressive, and, especially, in agreement with socialist party concepts. In recent years, writers were given the additional incentive of becoming leaders and planners in the shaping of the new socialist society by showing the way for the application of Marxist-Leninist views, thus bringing about the gradual perfection of communism. Yet, even writers who accepted this challenge very often strayed from official cultural policy by solving problems too independently and too self-reliantly, with the result that their protagonists again, indirectly, became correctives of the system rather than being supported by it. A curious brand of jealously developed between the Socialist Unity Party and the literary self-helper, between a socialism that can only be attained through the guidance of the Party versus an already established socialist consciousness which sometimes supercedes the Party. Such independence is again viewed by the Party as a remnant of a discarded individualism. Self-determination, even to attain Marxist goals, is denounced as subversive and anarchistic. It became known as the *Third Way*, which is defined as the attempt to undermine through working for convergence. The only tangible results since 1965 have been a strengthening and deepening of ideological constraints as well as a change from aggressive to passive resistance.

Although censorship had always been very strict and was increased by the position of an editor (*Gesellschaftlicher Lektor*), who examines all works before publication for ideological content, criticism by cultural functionaries seems to have arrived at more differentiating judgments. A few years ago, a man like Wolf Biermann was silenced; Christa Wolf, on the other hand, was at least discussed, even if it was at an internal affair attended by a trusted few who were critical of her novel *Nachdenken über Christa T.* Criticism on this occasion was a minimal punishment in view of the many incriminating political statements which could have been found in this novel through close reading.

Poetry

Dissent in East German literature is most common in poetry. In the more penetrable forms of poetry as in ballads and songs the message is rather evident. This obviousness of statement has often been reproached on the East German side for its critical bias and for its abuse in anarchistic protest songs. In its more obscure manifestations, poetry is often very hard to decipher. Because of this, it frequently became a means of escape into ambiguous and esoteric language. Besides that, objections were raised against its philosophical approaches, which were not regarded as a contribution to socialism and did not establish a relationship to the here and now of a new political world. In addition, this type of poetry was rejected because it did not embrace the Party openly. Rather, it resorted to a cryptic code known only to very few, and because it did not portray a proletarian spirit and evaded any socialist engagement through skeptical resistance.

Wolf Biermann presents the most extreme example of the lyric of dissent. For this reason, he was excluded from the Party in 1965, and he may no longer perform either within or outside the GDR. His work is no longer published, nor is it mentioned in secondary sources. He was only heard of one more time in the West where his drama *Dra-Dra* appeared, in which he again expressed his rejection of the Party apparatus. The official powers accused him of wanting to destroy the unity of the people, of demoralizing the patriotism of the young and their readiness to defend their country. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that Biermann is a devout communist who said that he is happy that the GDR exists with all its faults. In 1953, he voluntarily chose this state and intends to remain faithful to it as an anti-authoritarian communist. He once characterized his position thus: "My comrades do not kill me, they merely kill my voice—they lock me out of public life but they do not lock me up; I enjoy—so to speak—the status of an officially recognized enemy of the state. . . ." And he said about the situation of this state: "In the GDR the first important step towards socialism has been taken. This is our basic advantage over West Germany and over any other capitalist nation, however social democratic its government may be."[1]

In his two lyrical anthologies, *Drahtharfe* and *Mit Marx- und Engelszungen*[2], he appears as a proletarian poet, a writer of songs about everyday life, as a communist troubadour, a renitent minstrel, a satirical commentator, an opposing guitarist and a protesting cabaretist. His quarrel with the Party he portrayed very convincingly in his ***Antrittsrede des Sängers* (*The Poet's Inaugural Address*)**.[3]

Biermann's heir in dissent is Reiner Kunze who was criticized accordingly at the sixth congress of the writers union in 1969 by Max Walter Schulz, a renowned cultural official. "If one reads his poems," Schulz stated, "it becomes very clear that Kunze's lyrical state lies between introversion and anti-communism."[4] And it is true that some of his lyrics can only be seen as a parody of the dialectic.

Even about *Saison für Lyrik*, a general collection of GDR poetry, it was said that it is hardly believable that these poems could have originated in a socialist country. A case in point is the following by Heinz Kahlau:

You asked me
where I have been
that I don't find my way home.
At home a long time
in the forests, among mountains
that is where I have been.

We have slaved and sweated,
have eaten and drunk
and we have sung
and you ask me
where I have been,
that I don't find my way home,
at home a long time.

The only accepted anthology of poetry has been *In diesem besseren Land* which appeared in 1966.

Drama

Although great efforts are still needed to redirect poetry in the GDR, the drama, on the other hand, was more manageable—although it, too, proved to be an obstinate genre. For too long it had been influenced by Brecht, who had concentrated his efforts mainly on economical and political contradictions within a pre-socialist society. One of his disciples, Peter Hacks, compounded this error in *Die Sorgen und die Macht* by having work brigades reach independent decisions and thus become the corrective of the system.

Since the drama is the most public and therefore the most effective of all genres, it can—at the same time—be most dangerous for the Party and the most vulnerable genre for the author. In spite of this, the SED, in most recent years, has received a few dramas to its liking. It is very proud, for instance, of Benito Wogatzki's *Zeit ist Glück*, Arnim Stolper's *Zeitgenossen* and Erik Neutsch's *Haut oder Hemd*. All are concerned with easing conflicts of the individual, or of society emerging from problems of an economic nature. In each one, representatives of diverse spheres of responsibility offer variations of possible solutions and advocate their acceptance. Differing viewpoints are shown as a basis for criticism and self-criticism, not as confrontations of incompatible conflicts. Each character must develop or prove a positive attitude and an engagement in an objective solution which does not profit self-interest but benefits the common good. Of main concern are not specific problems but, in a larger context, their effect on and their contribution to society as a whole. This requires of an individual the realization that the common good often demands the abandonment of one's own position in favor of a better concept. Frequently, this leads to strong personal conflicts within one's self and with others. Such struggles seeking to bring to an agreement the individual's endeavors with the demands of society are supposed to be reached logically and in a humane fashion.

In *Zeit ist Glück*, for example, a scientist and a technologist are confronted with each other. The scientist fails in his assigned task because of his theoretical detachment. He lacks involvement in the prognostical development of his firm's potential and is not concerned enough with raising the standard and competitive capabilities of his country. The female technologist had to point the way. Yet he was not demoted or expelled from his work for his failure but, rather, he was brought to the realization of the national aspirations and to voluntary cooperation in achieving them.

Novel

As was already done with Wogatzki's drama, literary pieces will surely be televised more and more in the future for the ideological enlightenment of the masses. Nevertheless, the writer will probably still be able to have a lasting influence through the novel as well. Its intention is relatively easily recognizable, just as in the drama, and thus easily censored. Also, literary theory is very active in creating and defining models and guidelines, especially for the novel which seems to adhere relatively closely to them. The industrial and agricultural settings—dominant up to now—correspond to the concept of the "Proletkult." In this they follow most closely the rules of official cultural policy.

The forerunner and leading influence for this type of novel is Anna Seghers with *Die Entscheidung* (1959) and its sequel *Das Vertrauen* (1968). The former could be considered an historical novel, because it covers a timespan from the thirties to the fifties and vast areas reaching from South America via the U.S. to West and East Germany. The latter centers more on the beginning years of the GDR and leaves off shortly after the uprising of June 1953. The many characters in both volumes are listed at the beginning as in a drama, and innumerable short chapters reflect the general human predicament rather than a single fate, thus conveying a people's strife rather than an individual's evolvement. This conception is very dynamic, offering, however, a confusing and tiring abundance of similar themes.

Both novels deal with the imperialistic reconstruction of West Germany, the reinstitution of fascist elements there, and confront this with the much more difficult socialistic innovation and development in East Germany. The resulting intra-socialistic conflicts in these books point to the various conversions to socialism, the long-lasting mistrust of one another, the gradual increase of confidence in the Party, and the final culmination in the uprising of the 17th of June, 1953—which clearly demanded a firm decision for or against the new society.

The programmatic and fundamental theme of decision, derived from the first of the two Seghers volumes, *Die Entscheidung*, was taken up by Christa Wolf, Brigitte Reimann and others, making them representatives of a so-called "literature of arrival." In these later novels, a love decision was often elevated into a national and socialist decision. The exemplary socialist worker, already a prototype in Seghers's work, now became the persuasive impetus for the young in their choice to work for the society over personal advantage. When the national theme became superfluous by the erection of the Wall in 1961, the conflict became predominantly intra-socialist. Erwin Strittmatter, in his novel *Ole Bienkopp*, was one of the first to convey problems of this sort. The protagonist here attempts to institute in his own surroundings the intentions of the Party in the field of agriculture, yet he fails tragically and ironically because he does not get support from the party functionaries of his village. East German critics objected to Ole Bienkopp's mistake, as they saw it, of accepting the Party's (temporarily) incorrect dogmatic view as the correct one, with the resulting shortsightedness tricking him into unacceptable self-reliance.[5]

In Erik Neutsch's *Spur der Steine* (1964), this type of conflict becomes more complex. Here it is the ideologically advanced Party secretary, Werner Horrath, who plays the role of an all too independent reformer. His unauthorized changes of the Plan constantly bring him into conflict with party discipline, which he shrugs off with his intellectual superiority, though somewhat cynically. His subordination and final restraint are brought about when he confesses to a past love relationship about which he had earlier lied to his party superiors. His decision is not reached for the Party's sake, but because his friend Balla, a converted brigadier, demanded it of him. Thus his testimony can be viewed as having taken on existential dimensions. The solution to Horrath's conflict lies in a deeper comprehension of an ideological and ethical responsibility that goes beyond party loyalty. East German criticism again rejected, here very superficially, this type of party member. Balla comes closer to fulfilling the type propagated by the official literary theory. His transformation from an eccentric worker for work's sake to a worker for the sake of socialist goals realizes skillfully the requirements of effectiveness in theme and presentation.

The appearance of Christa Wolf's *Nachdenken über Christa T.* (1968/9)[6] was to shake up the relative loyalty towards the Party which was heretofore characteristic for prose works. As a result, Heinz Adameck, a member of the Central Committee at the 10th plenum of the

SED in April 1969, questioned Christa Wolf and a few other authors about political esthetics and esthetic politics manifested within their works. He mentioned that it was obvious that something had to be wrong with their own and even their editor's ideologigal conception. At the same meeting, Ulbricht also criticized Wolf for her skepticism. But it was he who recommended discussion of the problems that had been raised. It might even have been upon his suggestion that the book was presented for criticism in a rather small edition of about 800 copies, which may have been a deterrent for other authors thinking of similar experiments. The title of the book, which could be translated as "Reflections on Christa T.," points to the form of this work. It is the life story of a woman who dies young (namely Christa T.), put together in a kind of literary collage through the use of diaries, literary sketches, letters, references by her husband, and finally of memories of the authoress who was her friend.

Christa T., the daughter of a village schoolmaster, becomes a provisional teacher in 1945 and later studies German literature. She marries a veterinary and has three children by him. Just as she begins to settle down with the intention to devote herself to writing, she dies in 1963 at the age of 35. The novel traces the development of a girl who, at 17, experiences the fall of the Third Reich, who has to flee her home and is then expected to take part in the building of a new society. This seemingly ordinary life is troubled with conflicts which arise from her involvement with the socialist concept of a new humanity. At first she sees the cause for her disquiet within herself, but finally recognizes it as resulting from obstacles which a society places in her way, a society which does not truly want change but only conformity.

As the authoress toys with recreating variations of Christa T.'s life, her formalistic techniques of presenting imaginary possibilities are reminiscent of Max Frisch's *Mein Name sei Gantenbein* and Günter Grass's *örtlich betäubt*. This allows room for fantasy, flexibility of viewpoints, pluralistic approaches to problems, and a critical consciousness. But it also means an expression of skepticism and doubt of life. This restlessness contradicts Anna Seghers's guideline of confidence and stability (which she stated so obviously by choosing *Das Vertrauen* as the title of her second volume). Thus, disconnectedness of form and thought can only be understood, in East German terms, as a misled activity, as an aberration from the functional concept of literature. The collapse of Rita Seidel in Wolf's earlier book represents the death of an obsolete past and, at the same time, a rebirth to a new socialistic future. Christa T.'s debility, however, is final. It symbolizes resignation, refusal, denial of a world in which she considers it impossible to live.

With the anti-social character of Pimi in *Das Vertrauen*, Anna Seghers seems to allude to Goethe's Mignon in *Wilhelm Meister*. Wolf also seems to have taken up characteristics of this type, though on a different level. Just as Goethe's enigmatic nature child, the somewhat older Christa T. is also incapable of adapting to the social norms of this new world. Because of the overemphasis on technology and collectivity, she feels threatened and deprived of her freedom of individual creativity. She rejects egalitarianism, since the artist has to conceive of himself as an outsider—in opposition, and as the critic. In this role he wants to serve the whole, not as an integrated part but rather as a counterforce. Actually, what Wolf envisions here is exactly what East German theory rejected as the position of the impotent bourgeois critic. Instead of accepting self-denial, Wolf seems to argue for self-realization which, however, stands no chance in her place and time. Christa T.'s death is thus to be understood as a dying-off process. Wolf herself believes—as does Biermann—to be too far ahead of her times and, like him, she has to experience that premature achievers are never welcome. Christa T.'s conflict of a stubborn individualism in a world that intends to live collectively is never resolved and does not even attempt a change of mind. Wolf's dissenting attitude reveals tremendous frustration, especially since, as a professional, she had earlier formulated convincingly socialist engagement and had even been a candidate for the Central Committee. In an interview dealing with her latest book she admitted that for once she wanted to write something that was unexemplary and anti-functional. Naturally, with this intention she opposed all rules and procedures of socialist art. In spite of this, her opposition never quarrels with the socialist ideal, only with its methods to achieve that ideal. Christa T.'s strife for the absolute, her dangerous desire for pure perfection of the new world, was considered by East German reviews[7] as a dubious literary affectation, and the basic mood of the book was seen as too pessimistic.

In East German literature it is difficult to draw the fine line between conflict and dissent, for dissent never represents an anti-Marxist position. It simply rejects the socialist concept of democratic centralism. Thus, it always appears as anti-authoritarian, attempting to work for a new world through the individual, or through a communal effort on the part of the people. Artistic dissent intends to abolish the vertical relationship of power as directed from above. It aspires to bring about a horizontal endeavor as a voluntary cooperation by all. Even in the officially accepted literature of conflict, the protagonist reflects this dilemma to a degree by frequently overstepping his functions from a lack of understanding of the correct relationship between himself and his Party. It is very difficult for him to differentiate between being a member of the party-vanguard and excessive self-reliance. The one clear difference that can be ascertained between a pace-setter and a dissenter is that the former will always base his actions on a strong socialist party allegiance, while the latter draws his strength from an inner vision.

● **Stanford University**

[1] Interview with W. Biermann. In: *Der Spiegel*, 10, 1971, p. 153 and 163.

[2] Songs are partially recorded on: Wolf Biermann, *Chausseestr. 131*, Wagenbachs Quartplatte 4, and on: *Wolf Biermann (Ost) zu Gast bei Wolfgang Neuss (West)*, Philips twen-serie 42.

[3] In: *Drahtharfe*.

[4] *Neue Deutsche Literatur*, 9, 1969, p. 46.

[5] "Entdeckung neuer Konfliktgrundlagen. Zu Erwin Strittmatter: Ole Bienkopp (1963)," in: Arno Hochmuth, ed., *Literatur im Blickpunkt*, Berlin, DDR, 1967, p. 179-192.

[6] For an excellent interpretation of this book, see: Heinrich Moor, "Produktive Sehnsucht: Struktur, Thematik und politische Relevanz von Christa Wolfs 'Nachdenken über Christa T.'," in: *Basis. Jahrbuch für deutsche Gegenwartsliteratur*, ed. by Reinhold Grimm and Jost Hermand, 1971, p. 193-233.

[7] Horst Haase, "Nachdenken über ein Buch," in: *Neue Deutsche Literatur*, 4, 1969, p. 174-185.
Heinz Sachs, in: *Neues Deutschland*, May 15, 1969.
Hermann Kahler, "Christa Wolfs Elegie," in: *Sinn und Form*, 21, 1969, p. 251-261.
Elisabeth Simons, "Das Andersmachen, von Grund auf," in: *Weimarer Beiträge*, Sonderheft, 1969, p. 183-204.

9

Discussions

DISCUSSION SESSION NO. 1

Following the Paper of Professor Lange

Discussants:

Victor Lange
German, Princeton University

Carl G. Anthon
History, American University

Royal J. Schmidt
History/Political Science, Elmhurst College

Ernest Bernhardt-Kabisch
English, Indiana University

Ingeborg H. Solbrig
Modern Languages, University of Tennessee

Guy Stern
German, University of Cincinnati

LANGE: I don't wish to prejudice the discussion, but let me say that what I have said addressed itself to a whole range of issues which, of course, may affect each of you in a different way. There are obviously those among us who are concerned with a German Studies program on a graduate level, and its job is primarily to supply the widest and the most intelligent form of information; and there are those colleagues who feel that whatever we do in American education must be directed as the job of educating. Therefore, I have stressed, I hope not unduly, the educational implications of the whole matter. I do not, of course, in any sense underrate the specific requirements that we might have to look into—requirements as to the content of a program in German Studies.

ANTHON: I would like to start right off with a practical question. Professor Lange, in offering perhaps a one-year course on contemporary German culture, what would you recommend as the best organization or approach? I myself have taught area courses, which was, I think, an experiment in amiable dilettantism, as you referred to—that is, inviting maybe a dozen visitors and making integrative speeches in between. This was unsatisfactory. What do you really recommend as an integrative approach?

Lange: Your question seems to be almost impossible to answer. You are suggesting that one wants to teach a one year course on German culture. Well, I think I can only go back. I cannot within a minute give you a total teaching program, but I would again build on perhaps what is familiar or quasi-familiar, not on what is unfamiliar. I would attempt at not—as I said before—simply showing and telling by displaying evidence, but I would rather direct the supplying of evidence towards a purpose. That purpose, I think, is not simply to make students aware of what is, because you can give them all sorts of tremendously exciting information, perhaps by distributing types of information among several students. But I cannot help thinking that the most effective course of this sort ought to make people aware that what they have been doing in such a course could not very well have been done in any other context. This would be my broad basis. If what they have been doing can be done in any other context, why then give information courses? The *Goethe-Institute* properly gives such information courses. My feeling is that, within the university, we must aim—each of us—at doing a job which, if well done, has a unique purpose and effect. Therefore, to have a course introducing the student to Germany ought, in my opinion, not simply be supplying what is, but ought to make him feel: "I have learned something about how to look at a foreign culture or indeed at my own." And this, I have often heard people say, is utopia: "It is foolish. You can't do this in one year." Well, perhaps there is some truth to it. Obviously, a year is very little. But I would feel, or have experienced, that students leave after a year's instruction with the feeling that they have learned how to do something. Fill in that something as "how to look at the foreign culture"—not only to learn how to jodel about the Germans, to be excited about how wonderful they are—which may be a very attractive thing to do. But I think that it leaves us wide open to all sorts of later disappointments, to all sorts of misunderstandings that we ought to avoid from the beginning. Forgive me for saying so much. Perhaps it is not enough.

Schmidt: Professor Lange, I agree wholeheartedly with you, and I think that it is unfortunate that not more people in the Social Sciences realize the importance of working with this sort of a program. But when we make a general statement to the effect that German culture or German cultures began about a hundred years ago, don't we neglect the very important historical contributions of great thinkers like Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt, and also the importance of the historical approach to the understanding of *contemporary* German culture? There is an awful lot of Herder in East and West German culture today, and the cultural nationalism that Herder believed in had little to do with the ultra-political nationalism of the Nazi period. I think, in fact, there is much in Herder that one could learn a great deal about for a German Studies program.

LANGE: Yes, I quite agree. The phrase "a hundred years ago" is not mine, though I wouldn't mind borrowing it. What I think one ought to recognize is that we don't want to say: "Don't mention anything before the 1870's." This is nonsense. This is not only nonsense, but it is suicidal, stupid. But I think that we must provide a reason for talking about Herder. And as I have said earlier, that reason is not, it seems to me, given by the fact that Herder *was*, nor even indeed by the fact that Herder was important—either in his own day or subsequently. But the reason is given by precisely the kind of thing that you say, namely that there is a great deal of Herder in, for instance, the thinking—cultural thinking—in the DDR. This must be understood in terms of Herder's position. In other words, I would call upon those bodies of knowledge instrumentally. I would suggest that we cannot quite do without mentioning a dozen or more of the great. But I think we ought not to say: "You cannot understand contemporary Germany without my giving you a few lectures about Goethe." This, I think, is nonsense. You will now accuse me of underrating Goethe, but I think that we must have a few pegs, or a few hooks, or a few good reasons for doing this. For instance, the whole view of the great break in German society from a feudal to a bourgeois society, etc., is of extraordinary importance, particularly to the contemporary East German thinking. We must learn to understand the importance which the East attaches to the totally non-Western view of the evolution of German intellectual history at the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century. (Forgive me for using these evasive terms "East" and "West"; my East German friends will not mind; this simply is shorthand.) We must understand this. I think it should be done in terms of insights or of issues that emerge from our look at the contemporary scene. You would misunderstand me if you thought that I said: "Let us talk only about post-Bismarckian Germany." Mr. Korlén (Sweden) and Monsieur Bertaux (France) have repeatedly said that, as far as they are concerned, they will teach only what a young Swede or Frenchman will need to know when he crosses the border into the contemporary Germanies—"need to know" in the sense of meeting the concrete contemporary situation. This is a splendid statement. It is open to many questions, many interpretations, many doubts. They have also said that probably German history before 1870 is irrelevant for the thinking of contempo rary Germans. Obviously, a statement like that is very easily torpedoed. The thinking, the mode of life of any contemporary, is conditioned by the past. The institutions within which he lives are conditioned by the past. Much of German institutional life can be properly understood only by an intense backward look. But, I think, what Korlén, Bertaux and others will argue, is that this backward look must be motivated by a first look at the contemporary situation.

Bernhardt Kabisch: Professor Lange, I would like to ask if you would care to speculate for a moment about some of the larger organizational implications of the same program that you envision here. In other words, do you foresee a time in which the kind of academic division of labor that we have now—study of English, study of English literature, study of German literature and language, study of history and sociology, and so on—will have to be reorganized, reshuffled? Instead of history, sociology, German, English, will we then have German Studies, English Studies, American Studies, and so on, so that the older kind of division will eventually dry up? Is that what you have in mind?

Lange: Again, the answer in all such pragmatic situations is a very difficult one. I see that in many institutions such new organizational patterns are emerging. And, therefore, I would say, it is quite feasible, especially in what you might call the less research-oriented institutions—and I regard those as at least as important as the research institutions—that wherever teaching matters enormously, that kind of German Studies focus might well be developed. But I do not overlook the fact that, after all, we are in some way scholars, and we are in a competitive relationship with other scholars. As yet we are not too far advanced in our competitive relationship with other German Studies scholars. We are still literary, historical, economic people first. If we are not that to a superb extent, we are not going to be collaborationists—we are not going to be effective in German Studies. So, I do see the real problem on a fairly demanding, shall we say, the graduate school level or on the level of major appointments which are likely to be made in reasonably conventional institutions, though they need not be made. You will recall, for instance, that at Cornell they were widely attacked for this. At Cornell, many years ago, after World War II, when four or five chairs became vacant, it was decided not simply to fill those with conventional literary scholars, but to establish a School of Languages, staffed on the top by linguists. You are probably aware of that. When that viable School of Languages was set up, it implicitly suggested to the literary people—and there were then no German Studies people—to join up with other literary scholars. That, to most of us, was a wonderful opportunity to be what you always wanted to be, namely for language teachers to teach language, for literature people to teach literature. But the German Studies program—as we should, I think, and will in the future envisage it—offers more complicated difficulties. They are least embarrassing where teaching is the most important job. They become most embarrassing where we have to hire out specialists and compete within the field of specialization.

Solbrig: I have a question concerning the small number of established interdisciplinary studies at American universities with which we seem to come into conflict because of the complexities you just suggested. There is, for example, a graduate interdisciplinary program at Stanford University. They have a program consisting of the specialized Ph.D. in German and also an interdisciplinary Ph.D. in the humanities. I wonder about these programs in the light of our trend away from an historical and esthetic focus toward a social sciences and interdisciplinary focus. Here I see a new complexity. I wonder how we could, or should, combine the two—what our relation could be to such programs?

Lange: I am not quite sure that I have got your point. What do you define as the existing interdisciplinary programs?

Solbrig: The existing interdisciplinary humanities programs in graduate schools are, as far as I know, historically and esthetically oriented.

Lange: Yes, you are really drawing the conclusion—a very good one—from what we said earlier today. I think this cannot be amiably resolved, as it were, by denying that there are differences in approach between the sort of social sciences and humanities procedures that you suggest—though my own experience has been that, among intelligent representatives of the two kinds of methodologies, not only a rapprochement but an identity of concern can be easily achieved. I think that it is a bogeyman, it is a false straw man if we always say: "This is all social science; we are after all humanists." I think that the distinction between the two is to some extent a spurious one, at least in so far as our pedagogical goals are concerned. But I recognize that most interdisciplinary ventures in which we German departments participate, such as comparative literature or whatever it may be, are in that sense esthetically and social science oriented. You need not tell me that there are many students—and we do listen to them nowadays—who feel that the literature departments are much too esthetic. They want far more social science elements in our teaching of literature. But that is the subject of another conference.

STERN: I completely agree that language study is not a premise for the study of cultural history. But I would like to question some of your inferences. I would like to start with your belief that language study and culture courses in translation are not integrative—meaning to say that, like Christianity, we have not really tried it yet; that, furthermore, the integrative approach of the two areas can lead to an exciting and newly shaped language curriculum, which either by self-choice or required courses, will indeed attract new students. Your figures on the decline of German language studies are, however, one year behind. For this year, the study of the latest statistics show German language studies are again on the increase. The second question: Is it true that the efforts to bring a language-culture track into our curriculum, in addition to the existing language-literature track, are already foredoomed or only of moderate interest, as you say? Are not the results still to be awaited? We have started perhaps far too late. But we do not know yet if we have attracted students or not. In some schools where this has been tried, some faint indications seem to show that we are making new friends. In fact, the very outlook of our faculty that culture and we ourselves are becoming more socially, more culturally atuned has lent greater eloquence to our involvement in those subjects and may give us a better chance in our cause. Finally, I would like to submit to you that whenever you urge us to institute a contrastive or comparative approach—an utterly solid and valid suggestion—do we not also need to examine, beyond the European or Western sameness, a certain difference in such authors as Peter Handke and Thomas Bernhardt which defines and identifies these very people as being of a different culture? Does not your contrastive approach have some of its most valid results when pitching a man like Rolf Brinkmann against Jack Kerouac?

LANGE: Let me respond to your first two questions. I have a feeling that to say: Let us switch from literature to culture as the content of our two or three-year language courses—I mean the exemplary material of such courses—is not wrong. There is nothing wrong with it at all. Indeed, I am inclined to think that you are right, namely that more people are going to learn a language if they know that they don't have to read Goethe, because they say: "I am not a literary fellow; I am interested in the Germans." Far be it from me that this is not true. Of course it is true. I would also, however, say that if you read Spengler instead of Herder, or if you read Marcuse instead of Schelling, that seems to me merely a switch in modernities. Or indeed, if you read a book by a contemporary prose writer—by Klaus Mehnert, let me say, or some such book, rather than historical literary texts—you are indeed offering something far more appealing to your students, and you will therefore possibly increase the number of those taking German. I hope so. I would, however, in effect note to this by voicing my feeling that, in the past, we have not really had the best of students in our literature courses. I wonder if you agree. The best literature people in our colleges and universities have not often—I must be very careful—not often turned out to be majors in German. I think this has been a situation which is full of questions. Why is this? Is this because we have been poor teachers? No, I refuse to say this. Is it because we have stuffed down their throats materials that they didn't want? No. Have we failed to relate their German readings to their reading of Roth's *Portnoy's Complaint* and of Faulkner's works, and God knows what—it doesn't matter? No, no. We have not done it; in part many of us have been fresh from Europe. We have never heard of Portnoy, or we shouldn't have. But that is another question. So, I would submit, let us not say: "Let's ditch literature and take culture." But I would rather say: Let us try to teach literature to intelligent, to superior students who will come to us if we do it well, perhaps first in courses in translation. My own experience is that many of them may well subsequently say: "There is something in all this." Perhaps you can't read the *Duino Elegies* without knowing something about German, though it is not that difficult to come to a point where students can cope with such texts. But this is one point. What was the third?

STERN: I was talking about the contrastive method in literature which, I think, you have already touched upon, and also about the integration of culture into the language courses within the first two years as a supplement, not a substitute. I was thinking of culture courses becoming supplementary and complimentary courses for what we are doing, but not surrogates.

LANGE: Ideally speaking, I would say: Let us have the language first and then literature and culture. This is a perfectly noble and, I think, sound proposal. My own feeling is that we really have to look carefully at both alternatives: first, at the quality, that is, the kind of literature teaching we provide; second, at the kind of use we make of cultural material. Neither should be of the touristic sort. Neither should simply be a demonstration of what is: "Look at the wonderful German literature before you." The showing can only be through a considered methodology which, I think, must relate the contemporary givens of our students to what we offer. This means for us that we have to read some American and English and French literature, which some will find they have no time to do, and others will find it's a waste of time because they read only the greatest—which is German. These are the problems which I would not brush aside; to me they involve a re-thinking of both literary and cultural offerings and their rationale.

DISCUSSION SESSION NO. 2

Following the Paper of Professor Herlitzius

Discussants:

Louis F. Helbig
German Studies, Indiana University

Nicholas Spulber
Economics, Indiana University

Erwin Herlitzius
Technische Universität Dresden (GDR)

Dorothea Bruschke
German, Washington University

Manfred Keune
German, Pennsylvania State University

HELBIG: Professor Herlitzius, I would like to thank you for your presentation and also for the summary of Professor Montag's paper. We all regret that he has been unable to attend. If I may start the discussion, let me say that nobody in this audience would probably insist on calling the people in the GDR "Red Prussians"—at least not in the sense in which you understand this word. When we say "Prussian" here in the U.S., we do not identify all that which is, or was, Prussian in the same way you do. That is where the difference comes in.

SPULBER: It seems to me very strange to ask an economic question from a professor of philosophy at the German Studies Conference on the Teaching of Postwar Germany, especially if literature is also a topic. I cannot resist asking these questions: Professor Herlitzius said that somebody had asked him to change his topic. I don't know who asked him, but anyway, maybe he should have rather presented the philosophical aspect. As far as economics is concerned, he started by saying that the goals for planning in East Germany are set by the Central Committee. Then he said that, at the Party congresses in East Berlin, they set the goals and principles which guide them: to do everything for the happiness of all men or mankind, and so on. He stated further, again on the topic of goals, that in a modern system there can be private property like in the American capitalistic system, or centralization might take place under the principle of nationalized property like in the GDR. As a matter of fact, he said that there are some similarities in the goals of the two systems. Let me comment on the question of goals. It depends who sets these goals, benevolent tyrants or tyrants who are not so benevolent, or the consumers. In the U.S. there are certain goals which are collective goals. They are set by the government. But it is not the government which determines what the consumer ought to buy or sell, or what industry should produce in the way of consumer goods. So there is a substantial difference between our countries as far as goals are concerned. Here the goals are set by the consumers, there they are set by the planners or policy makers, who think they know what the consumers want. That is the first difference. The second difference is this: You were saying that, concerning the goals and how they are set in the U.S., there would be some claims that there are certain universal management laws. I submit that this is not possible, neither in the case of capitalist management nor, for that matter, in the case of socialist management. The notion of universally applicable laws of management is a misconception. Let us suppose that the goals are set by the consumer or by the policy makers in the Central Committee. Once they are set, the problem is how to allocate the resources so as to fulfill these goals in an optimal fashion. This is a mathematical calculation, and operations research, systems analysis and all these things are tools for the purpose of allocating resources optimally once the goals are set. There is nothing capitalistic about them. In fact, they have been imported into East Germany an dinto the socialist countries. But in order not to call this bourgeois economics, it is now called "praxiology" (Ökonometrie) on the other side of the Iron Curtain. But this is the same thing. Finally, there is the last point concerning nationalization. You are saying that aggression would be typical for private ownership, and as an example you quote Prussian aggression based on private ownership, contrasting it with current anti-Prussianism based on nationalized property. But I know a state, and I am sure I don't need to tell you which one, which has nationalized its property for about 57 years and has occupied Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, half of Poland, controls Czechoslovakia, is expanding into the Middle East, India, and so on. Now, this is on the basis not of private property, but on the basis of nationalized property. Then, in conclusion, one thing: You were quoting a set of figures about economic growth. One would have to take these figures calmly and see what they are, but let's suppose they are true: growth in the GDR has been phenomenal. I am sure you would not deny that growth in Japan has been even faster. Should we all quickly adopt an imperial system with an emperor in every country, because that's the guarantee of having faster growth?

HERLITZIUS: That's a lot of questions. First, is it up to me to say why my topic has been changed?

HELBIG: There is a simple reason for the change of the topic. Professor Herlitzius originally suggested a topic dealing with "Creative Socialist Humanism." However, he had already made arrangements to have it printed in another publication. Therefore, the conference organizers asked him to suggest a different topic, which he did and which was happily accepted: "National Economic Planning in the GDR." This is the only reason for the change, and we apologize if we have unintentionally misled anyone.

HERLITZIUS: I first agree with you in underlining the differences between centralization and setting of goals in a capitalistic state and in a socialist state. That is precisely what I tried to explain. I never said that centralizing is similar on both sides, just on the contrary. There is a tendency in each society with a highly developed industry to bring about an accelerating concentration of the productive forces. That's what we call the most important objective law of society. That's what Marx described as "Vergesellschaftung der Produktivkräfte," i.e., the associating of the productive forces. This process became obvious in the 19th century, mainly depending on the development of the working class. The analysis of Marx is based hereupon. But there is no simplified comparison possible between a socialist system that has transferred this objective process of associating onto the most important means of production in creating socialist property and ownership, and a capitalist state which will not reject the respective private property. I just tried to show: Exactly here is the point that makes us oppose the concept of convergence. There is no possibility of convergence so far as private property on the one side determines what capitalist centralization means and what means *volkseigen* property and its centralization on our side. If we take, for example, consumer goods, the planning of new factories, measures in medical care or socialist education — the overcoming of profit thinking is evident. That means: decision making is not the same on the one side and on the other side, despite common formulas in a mathematically highly sophisticated operations research. Please, let us make a pure practical approach in understanding one another! In what way private property may develop in the framework of a capitalist state in the future, we should agree on this point. There shouldn't be any possibility to make private profit by producing weapons, by producing the means to undertake war. The destruction of property through acts of war hurts everybody. And each kind of military industrial complex hampers the national economy to satisfy the needs of the working people. We may disagree in the making of decisions for steelmills, for hospitals and consumer goods in your country and my country. That's a difference from the ground up. But let's agree on this point. In my country there is no person that can gain any profit from making weapons, from warfare-armament of any kind. And when I say that we are going the road to European security, that we want to secure the status quo in Europe, that we want to make our borders safe, to safeguard our peaceful work, it's the truth and I experienced this truth in my own life from the experience of the Second World War. We may have a lot of differences in ideology and in practicing our ways of life. But we should agree upon the necessity to go the way to a peaceful coexistence of states with different systems.

I must answer another part of your question. You postulate that there is a policy of "occupation" despite a socialist foundation on the part of the Soviet Union. I don't agree with you, you may take your own contradicting literature about the coercions practiced against the Soviet Union in World War II, and you will find that the history of this country means just the same: There was and is no interest in war, there is no ambition to conquer any other country. But you may take the history of the Second World War to explain why the changes of the borders in Europe have taken this form as it happened. We better discuss this question in regard to my country. I can tell you that our alliance with the USSR is in good progress. Please, remember what I said in my last six points: That we have a continent of socialism that wants peace and that wants safeguarding the borders and security in Europe. That is the main task for the next future.

Your question concerning the growth of our socialist economy: No doubt, if not unimportant, the aspect of quantity is only one aspect. We have to acknowledge what the working people in Japan after the Second World

War have accomplished. But another aspect is: Which results are increasing the average of living conditions and what satisfies the needs of the people?

BRUSCHKE: I apologize for also being an economist. I can't help being tintillated by your explanation of how the goals are set, and of how humanistically the decision-making is taking place. You said that all the workers contribute in the decision of what is to be produced and how things are to be produced. I did a cross-calculation: There are roughly 17 million inhabitants in the GDR, and there ought to be about 7 million people in the labor force. You do have full employment. At that point, to my surprise, you said that 400,000 workers actually do take part in the decision-making, which prompts me to ask this question: How do you delegate authority, who of the 7 million workers is allowed to have his vote counted and how much is he to decide? Does one worker's vote count as much in a plan decision as a manager's vote? And if it does, how do you manage to fulfill the plan? Or , let's ask the same question in a different manner: Do any conflicts arise with respect to interests between workers and managers, and if so, how are they resolved? If, for example, the outcome threatens to be in favor of the workers, which side has to give in? The question is, then, if only 400,000 workers take part in the decision-making, where are the other six-and-a-half million represented?

HERLITZIUS: You put your finger on a problem we have just had under discussion. At first I said that all workers are participating in decision-making or participate in all activities of the socialist state. You may say that this is too generalized, and your question is right in this respect. When I stated that nearly 400,000 workers and technicians take part in the activities of the permanent production council, this is just one level of participation. There are far more levels and possibilities: Consider the mass organizations, especially the Trade Unions, or consider the people's representative bodies. The inclusion of all workers and office employees in the solution of the economic and some other tasks really is our most important objective at present. But it is one thing to say in a constitution that the possibility for everybody to participate in decision-making exists, and it is another thing to educate and to train the workers in order to make them conscious of their possibilities and responsibilities. Please don't underestimate our claim that the party of the working class on all levels also realizes what we are striving for. If you want to know which value the votes of workers in regard to votes of managers have, then please turn to my remarks on democratic centralism. What about conflict situations? Well, there are conflict situations of a new type. Take the situation of changing production programs in connection with automatization. There are no rearrangements without thorough educational preparations. Women enjoying a job or undertaking any kind of training or study still have most of their family obligations. That means the emergence of a lot of problems in bettering the circumstances of the women's situation. The basis for repair and maintenance services is to be expanded, schools, kindergartens, creches and supply services are to be built along with dwellings. Traditional habits of family life are changing. Our problem is to relieve the work for housewives, to facilitate the way to education for everybody. And you may imagine how difficult it is to convince everybody to participate in any form of education, to deal with cultural progress. Such learning and teaching is even more than mere reception of information. One must emphasize what one teaches, and what one learns from it leads to the ends of the socialist society. There is nobody who doesn't participate in some way in the management of his enterprise, in culture and education, and, you could say, governmental affairs. In some respect even increasing difficulties are thus more readily controlled.

KEUNE: I would like to say that I am not an economist. If the discussion goes any further, then I won't know what I am anymore. But I think Professor Lange, in his concluding statements, pointed out that the problem after all is how to understand and how to overcome stereotypes. This seems to be the declared goal of the German Studies program. I don't know whether we, as Americans, are aware of the tremendous antagonism between East and West Germany, and whether we can overcome this in order to function in this kind of German Studies program. Perhaps we can function as a type of liaison agent between the two, although that is a political undertaking of extreme proportions. But the question is how to solve this problem, whether it is, as Professor Lange pointed out, a question of information, that is, a thorough knowledge of institutions. Secondly, as again Professor Lange pointed out, it is a question of articulating a self-critical judgment. Both are underlying purposes of the German Studies program. Now, the question is whether these goals can be realized. What we want to find out, after all, is what kind of a learning experience should be in the foreground for our young generation. You mentioned your young socialist generation and their goal, namely that they want peace in the world. This is very nice, I think we basically agree, *hüben und drüben,* on this particular point. But there remains the question of practical ends which could guarantee such an understanding and the dismantling of stereotypes. Therefore, I would like to ask you the following questions: First of all, do the two Germanies and the U.S. disagree on the issue of a common denominator, what the learning experience could be? In other words, is there a common denominator beyond ideological confines? We all know that both East and West have their ideologies. Can we overcome these ideologies and, in turn, these stereotypes? It seems to me that stereotypes are much less harmful than ideologies. Another point is, then, what kind of a criteria for a course of study do we need to overcome this? What, in your opinion, is this common denominator which could guarantee a better understanding and peaceful co-existence beyond ideological constraints?

Herlitzius: There are two questions. The first question is what we could do to overcome the problem of pure misunderstanding, i.e., especially to get rid of anachronistic stereotypes—for example, in what way such a stereotype as that of the "Red Prussians" should be overcome. A better understanding of our history could be helpful. I would like to recommend that you take the interpretations of the Potsdam Agreement given in schoolbooks of the GDR and the FRG into account. That means that the controversy in our learning processes, in our learning the lesson of history in the FRG and in the GDR, should be recognized, should be taken as fact. There is a totally different interpretation of our history and of the causes and reasons for two world wars. Thus far as I can agree with your pragmatic approach on "a common meeting ground," on a common denominator, I think of those agreements we have in common with the Potsdam Treaty, the democratic aims of the American people in World War II and with the Quadripartite Agreement on West-Berlin. You may ask any of my students about the "secret" in which World War I or II was born, and you will get an answer different from respective answers usually given by students in the FRG. Why? That leads us to the second question: how to get along with the contradictory ideologies? Any recommendation to this concern is ideology itself. We cannot escape it in any way. The Marxist answer is well known: That it depends on the interest of two different classes. I must say this, even if you don't like it. Is there any chance to overcome this problem in our situation? Yes and no. No, in so far as the systems of values concerning war and peace, concerning private profit or common interests, theoretically exclude one another. Yes, in so far as an ideological contradiction of this kind is not necessarily synonymous with anti-communistic militancy. Consequently, let me ask for any reason why the GDR is not recognized by international law. It is very difficult for us to understand why we should not be taken into the United Nations, why we should not be taken into the World Health Organization. Where are the interferences coming from against our participation in the Stockholm Environment Conference in June of 1972? It will be helpful to find an answer as to how those stereotypes could be overcome. The first thing is to define together, to discuss together those problems, and to have conferences like this one with equal rights for each side.

DISCUSSION SESSION NO. 3
Following the Paper of Professor Smith

Discussants:

Kai P. Schoenhals
History/German Studies, Kenyon College/Indiana University

Jean Edward Smith
Political Economy, University of Toronto (Canada)

H. Pierre Secher
Political Science, Kansas State University

SCHOENHALS: Professor Smith, I have almost a dichotomous feeling about your speech. I am very much in agreement with its first part in which you describe the rather shabby treatment which was dealt out to the GDR during the Cold War and the necessity of recognizing its existence after all these years. But I am very much puzzled by the second part of your speech, in which you seem to feel that the agreements, the various accords which have been worked out between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union and between the two German states, are very dangerous developments. Somewhat contrary to what you have said, I feel those agreements have fully diffused the Cold War atmosphere in Europe. I would like to point to just a few examples: For almost a decade the status of Berlin was very much in doubt. We know that for almost a decade the Soviet Union insisted that West Berlin should be transformed into a neutral city, an independent political unit. I think in this regard certainly the socialist camp and the Soviet Union have made a great concession. Consider the fact, for instance, that when West Berliners travel now in the West, they are being represented by the Federal Republic. There is no longer any talk about transforming West Berlin into an independent political unit. We know that when travelling from Helmstedt to Berlin, for instance, cars and trucks will no longer be searched completely. Only the necessary papers must be shown to the guards. So I think rather than the one-sided concessions which, in your view, have been made by the West, there have been compromises on both sides to diffuse a potentially dangerous situation in Europe. As I see it, the future of this agreement will not depend on any specific clauses that have not been thoroughly explained or explored, but it will depend on the overall *détente* which is taking place between the Soviet Union and the United States and, hopefully, will take place between the GDR and the FRG.

SMITH In answer to your question, Professor Schoenhals, let me say that, in spite of the apparent dichotomy between the first and the second part in my presentation, I think there is a link that connects the two together. It is a position which perhaps a North American might adopt, namely that the status quo in Europe, which has now been peaceful since 1945, depends upon the existence of the two German states rather than a united Germany, and this may be the history of more than just the years since 1945; furthermore, that anything which further encourages the stabilization of Europe in terms of the existence of the two Germanies should be supported rather than hampered. I think that we are probably on mutual ground in that respect. Where we diverge follows from an analysis of whether these Berlin Accords do in fact do that. The essence of my presentation is that they do not necessarily do so. It is true, as you suggest, that given the approval of the agreement and the various treaties incorporated within the corpus of *Ostpolitik*, this may very well be the case. However, when so much hinges on a parliamentary majority, this seems to be a rather serious and risky, even an adventurous political maneuver. While it is true also that these agreements, particularly concerning access movement in the city itself, have many desirable features (the elimination of the *Steinstücken* problem is one of them), they do have terribly difficult clauses—an important fact, considering that international agreements negotiated between powers have to rest on a firm textual basis which should not be subject to the unilateral reinterpretation of one party. In many respects, these treaties fail on that count, particularly Article 16, which specifies the reasons for the denial of access from the Federal Republic to West Berlin. Item D, we read, is "committing other offenses." That is an awfully vague expression, I would have thought, for an international lawyer. What I am suggesting really is that the agreements do have serious drafting defects and that, since so much faith was placed on *Ostpolitik*, too many expectations may be based on that rather shaky foundation. These agreements, then, when subjected to rigorous textual analysis, may therefore disappoint many hopes. So, I hope I have resolved the dichotomy between the first and the second half of my paper. I don't think it is as schizophrenic as it may seem. I think it simply hinges on the fact that a divided Germany and the status quo have insured peace in Europe since World War II. Anything that further encourages a solidification of that status quo is desirable.

SECHER—There is a point of confusion which still remains. You regard *Ostpolitik* as adventurous. I assume you believe that the direct recognition of the GDR would be the more preferable solution. Now, my question is a direct question, a short one. Do you really believe that Willy Brandt could have embarked on a policy of recognition of East Germany any more than any Democrat in the U.S. could have embarked on a policy of the recognition of China?

SMITH—No, sir. I am delighted by the manner in which you have formulated that, because just as it may be a Republican administration which might bite into that bitter apple, so might it have to be a CDU government that has to fight that bullet when it comes from the GDR. I think that this reveals another tactical problem as far as the relations between the two German states are concerned. Repeatedly during the last decade, the NATO allies of the FRG have pushed Bonn into the forefront of these negotiations which are very difficult for any government of the FRG to conduct. Rather than taking the lead from the FRG, even though this may exacerbate certain aspects of their bilateral relations with that country, the allies nevertheless should have taken the FRG off the hook, as it were. The U.S. probably cannot do that alone, Great Britain probably cannot do that, neither can France, because they are even more tied up with problems of the defense of Western Europe than most other states. That does not preclude smaller nations not so involved such as Denmark, Belgium, Norway and Canada from taking these actions. Mr. Trudeau, after the visit of Mr. Kossygin to Canada in October 1971, suggested off-hand, as he usually does with his shrug, that perhaps it was time for Canada to take that step. But I agree completely with you.

DISCUSSION SESSION NO. 4

Following the Paper of Professor Schaefer

Discussants:

Edmund P. Hecht
German, Kenyon College

Hans-Dieter Schaefer
Humboldt-Universität, Berlin (GDR)

Jürgen Kalkbrenner
German Embassy, Washington, D.C.

H. Pierre Secher
Political Science, Kansas State University

Hertha Krotkoff
German, Goucher College

Nicholas Balabkins
Economics, Lehigh University

Dorothea Bruschke
German, Washington University

Liselotte Gumpel
Humanities, University of Minnesota at Morris

HECHT: In your presentation, if I understand you correctly, you are using the terms of "education" and "training" interchangeably. If we assume for a moment that with "education" you mean *Bildung* and with "training" you mean *Ausbildung*, then where does *Bildung* fit into the socialist educational picture?

SCHAEFER: It is a problem for our American colleagues to understand the differences. If I am not mistaken, there is no sharp distinction between "Bildung" and "Erziehung" in the English language. Let me explain our position briefly. Each type of instruction in a particular subject has an aspect of "education," of forming and shaping the personality, of influencing morals and ideology to a certain extent. We can distinguish those processes theoretically by analyzing them, but not practically when implementing them. We proceed from the unity of "training" and "education."

Kalkbrenner: I do not like to demonstrate to our American friends here an example of *querelles d' allemands*. Therefore, I kept my mouth shut when Professor Herlitzius concluded his lecture on economic planning by the demand of international recognition of the GDR. I also kept silent when Professor Smith concluded his lecture on "Convergence and Divergence" by questioning the wisdom of Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and by demanding at the same time the international recognition of the GDR. But one remark in your lecture, Professor Schaefer, aroused my curiosity. You said that the basis of all studies, general and specialized studies, are the theories of Marx, Engels and Lenin. Now, by "studying" I understand developing a critical mind, a mind that adopts the faculty to question what is presented. What happens to a student who, after carefully studying the theories of Marx, Engels and Lenin, arrives at the conclusion that his masters were wrong?

Schaefer: He would discuss this problem with his teachers and with his fellow students. This is a matter of scientific discussions. We know and realize, of course, that students whom we admit to our universities are not perfect Marxist-Leninists.

Kalkbrenner: I was not thinking of somebody who arrives at the university, but who *at the end of his studies* arrives at the conclusion that his masters were wrong.

Schaefer: Again, this is a question which must be seen in the whole concept of scientific work. We are convinced that practice has proven the truth of Marxism-Leninism, not as a dogmatic scheme. Marxism-Leninism examines the objective basic laws underlying social and natural processes, in the same way in which natural sciences examine the objectively existing laws of a certain sphere of nature. You could ask me the same question in this way: What happens to a student who has some doubts about the laws of physics or mathematics? The study of Marxism-Leninism includes gaining serious and concrete knowledge about facts in relation to the economy, fundamental philosophical problems, the character and function of social institutions in their development, such as the state, etc. One can become a Marxist-Leninist only by study and conviction, by nothing else.

Secher: I was not terribly impressed by your assertion that there is no discrimination on the basis of race or creed. I was not really aware of any great racial or religious problems in East Germany. What I would like to ask you, however, and what really dismayed me, is the total acceptance of the integration of East German universities into what we call the industrial complex. This is precisely what we have been fighting against in this country and are trying to prevent from happening here. How is it that in East Germany and in the socialist countries this total integration of the universities, which has led to the removal of their critical function, has been accepted?

SCHAEFFER: This is a very interesting question. I think it would not be too useful to deal with these problems in a very abstract manner, saying, for instance, that every type of relation between universities and industry is a bad feature, or every type of non-involvement is a good one. What sort of industry, what sort of enterprises is the university connected with—that is the problem. Professor Herlitzius dealt with problems of national ownership of the means of production in the GDR. This is an important distinction which has to be made here.

KROTKOFF: You stated that the number of students in the next five-year plan will not be increased. Is this based on the assumption that the population will remain constant, or is there a *numerus clausus* which may stand in the way when people select their course of studies?

SCHAEFFER: There are several reasons for this. First, you must realize that we did not have a postwar baby boom in the GDR. We have had a sharp decrease in the number of 18- to 20-year-olds in recent years. For instance, the average age-group born between 1945 and 1948 is about 30% smaller than the average age-group born four years previous. This is a very complicated problem. As I have explained in my paper, nearly 40% of the eligible age-group gain admission to higher education, so that the age-group is almost exhausted. We are not able to raise this percentage and the number of students further during the next few years; otherwise we would encounter difficulties in our development, such as manpower problems, etc. Toward the end of the seventies the age-groups will grow, and then the situation will be different.

KROTKOFF: I think I was right in assuming that there is indeed a selective process, if not a *numerus clausus*, in the GDR. On which criteria is this selection based?

SCHAEFFER: We have a planning process in our society, and—this is correct—the number of students in relation to places for students is planned in advance and set for a certain period. We do so in order to avoid that our young people study a particular subject, graduate from a college or a university and then find out that there is no employment for them at all, not even an adequate job, simply because there may be no social or economic demand for cadres with their specific professional qualifications. Nobody would be happy if this happened to him, and so we plan the number of students according to our necessities and possibilities. And besides, as I said earlier, we don't have unlimited possibilities, and we cannot build up a new university each year. What about the type of selection? This is a topic for a lecture. In order to explain it, we must take a look at our educational system, especially the school system, which is a comprehensive one. As I said, nearly all children will graduate from the tenth grade in 1975. Recently about 85% of the pupils graduated from the tenth grade. There are several ways leading to the university. The first way is the so-called extended high school, which takes the student from secondary school via the 11th and 12th grades to the university. The second way leads from the so-called *Fachschule* (engineering college, or professional college). The graduates of the three-year course of study at the *Fachschule* work as engineers, educators, etc., which entitles them to apply for admission at an academic institution. Thirdly, there is a combination of vocational training and general education (school education). Within three years those pupils graduate with two diplomas: with a diploma as a skilled worker and with the *Abitur*, the examination diploma of the [illegible]th grade. And a fourth way provides for young people who are employed to receive a vocational education and then—in the evening, on the weekend, on special days during the week—they take extension courses at the so-called *Volkshochschule* (people's school or university). Graduating from these schools also entitles the student to apply for admission to the universities. So really all pupils graduating from the tenth grade have the choice to attend a university. That means that we are able to demand a high measure of performance from the pupils. As I said in my paper, we have succeeded in realizing a just percentage of workers' and peasants' children at the universities, whose number corresponds to the social structure of the population. At the same time we have the best pupils at the universities. The children of workers and peasants are being encouraged and supported so that they develop their abilities in the same way as children of doctors, artists or lawyers. I am sure you have heard about those special institutions founded after the war called Workers' and Peasants' Schools (ABF or *Arbeiter- und Bauern-Fakultäten*). If you read Hermann Kant's *Die Aula*, you will find a very impressive description of those institutions which prepared workers and peasants for the university — workers who possibly had 8 years or sometimes only 6 years of schooling. After having completed this three-year program of education, they began full-time studies at the university. This may serve as a brief explanation of some of the many measures in the GDR which secure the development of the abilities of all our students.

BALABKINS: A simple answer can be given to the question why in the socialist countries the number of students is being curtailed. As I see it, this has to do with the fact that, whereas privately owned means of production are not allowed there, studying at a university tends to provide the individual with knowledge which, in turn, can be seen as capital bringing in private returns. It seems to me that this is why the socialist countries encourage the education of the people. On the other hand, what does really happen when your people have acquired their human capital and wish to gain private returns?

SCHAEFER: We do not regard the knowledge which a person acquires as a kind of capital, and we do not promote the education of our people solely with economic advantages in mind. We are not afraid that too many people are being educated. This is not our problem. We don't have the problem of unemployed academic persons, and I think we shall not have it in the eighties when our baby boom children will reach college age. This is not our problem.

BRUSCHKE: That is the question I tried to have answered this morning, and I pose it again at this time. It concerns manpower planning. We do have the problem that sometimes we have square holes and round pegs. Right now we have, I think, a few more *Germanisten* coming out of our graduate schools. In our society individuals make the decision where to go and what to study. The only constraints are financial ones. In your system the decision appears to be the outcome of a selection process. Necessarily, it must take into account those people, also, who are to be selected. Supposing it takes five years for a theoretical physicist or a chemist to get his Ph.D. How can you estimate how many you will need, especially without yet knowing the demands of industry and of the university system? How do you avoid overemployment or underemployment of those professional persons? If you are consistently able to estimate accurately your needs on the demand side and on the supply side, then, I venture to say, you have squared the circle. If you are able to do that, then I am quite sure you can come over to us and teach us something. How do you do it? That's the question.

Schaeffer Thank you very much for your remarks. I don't think that we have squared the circle. Indeed, in our country we sometimes have the situation that there are, for instance, more teachers of German in a certain period and territory, due to personal implications, such as marriage, etc.—more than we would need in fact at a given location. But by our Constitution the right of employment in accordance with social requirements and personal qualifications is guaranteed. And principally we can say that till now we have succeeded in avoiding unemployment, on the contrary, we have a shortage of manpower. You remember my remarks concerning the number of students up to 1975. This is an example of how our system works on the basis of a comprehensive prediction of further social development. We can predict the number of persons we need in chemical engineering in 1975, because the enterprises where people will be employed are working already, are being constructed or are being planned. Of course, the development of science and technology sometimes includes surprises. We can predict pretty exactly the demand for teachers in 1975 or 1980, because most of the future pupils are born already. We have a ratio of 27 pupils per grade and 19 pupils per teacher in the GDR. So it is a matter of the right decision, of realizing the possibilities. We can say that we intend to lower these ratios in order to have 25 pupils per grade, or we decide to raise or to preserve the present ratios. Then it is a task for a computer to calculate the numbers of teachers we need and are able to train. We try to improve our work from one year to the next, and we combine several approaches in order to continuously increase the reliability of our predictions as a basis for planning.

Bruschke Let me follow up. Supposing you are building a plant; then you will also know the rate of output, provided the necessary input will be forthcoming at the expected rate. After the usual adjustments you are able to fulfill your plan close to 100%. At any rate, it seems that you come as close as, say 3% or 5%. This may mean that there may be underemployment or overemployment, relatively speaking, in a given situation. Unemployment in our system, however, shows up in the form that people get paid for the amount of work done. In other words, they are being laid off in certain situations. This is a cruel situation from the individual's point of view. The point I wish to make is that the socialist system probably underemploys people whenever there is a slack period, but you are guaranteeing the job instead of sending people home. This would be more honest. However, you cannot do this because of your principle of full employment. Supposing there is such a slack period—doesn't this mean that the underemployment, which goes with it, will show up somewhere else? In spite of your assurances that you have been on target in your economic planning, I would have more confidence in this way of social planning—population planning, if you wish—if you would not in fact be covering up the same or similar imbalances of the kind which we are having here. We may have a few *Germanisten* driving taxicabs for a year or two; in your country they would probably sit behind their doors, without having to change their titles, but how can they fulfill the Plan if they are underemployed?

(Professor Schaefer promises to come back to this question).

GUMPEL: Let us assume there is a gifted student in the GDR with a definite potential for becoming a good physicist. Let us assume further that he decides he would rather be a linguist, for example. Would your system put any pressure on him? Who decides what his best potential might be?

SCHAEFER: The task of counseling begins during his time at school, not at the point when he is admitted to the university. In the 11th grade the pupils are counseled as to what subjects are available, and then they file their application at the university. For instance, it may happen, of course, that in the GDR a dozen pupils apply for admission to the study of archaeology. We do not need 12 archaeologists per year; we probably need only four or five. The pupils will be informed of this situation very early. The best among them will then be admitted. The pupils are told which other subjects they can choose according to their performance and other interests, and this is the way it works. We think it is better for the pupils and for the students to make such decisions as early as possible. If they all would study archaeology, then they would not find a suitable position.

DISCUSSION SESSION NO. 3

Following the Paper of Professor Ludz

Discussants:

Helen Fritschi
German, Monmouth College

Peter Christian Ludz
Political Science, Columbia University/Universität Bielefeld (FRG)

Vaclav L. Benes
Political Science, Indiana University

Erwin Herlitzius
Technische Universität Dresden (GDR)

Hans-Dieter Schaefer
Humboldt-Universitat, Berlin (GDR)

Gordon L. Tracy
German, University of Western Ontario (Canada)

Jay Rosellini
German, Indiana University

Fritschi: Professor Ludz, would you please clarify what you meant by "lack of political authority in East Germany" since the end of WWII.

Ludz: By "lack of political authority" I mean the lack of legitimacy. On the one hand, the SED, i.e., the leading party in East Germany with nearly two million members today, is very strong. On the other hand, many observers in the West and quite a few people living in the GDR would agree on the fact that the SED still has difficulties in getting broad support from the population. Though there are other parties in East Germany, as you know, I think it is right to say that the political system in the GDR is dominated by one Party, because all political decisions in domestic and foreign affairs are taken, or at least are supervised, by the leading bodies of the SED. Participation by other social or political groups in political decision-making is very limited indeed.

Benes: I wonder if you would be able to explain what you have just mentioned, namely the fact that while from the socio-economic point of view the East German republic has been rather successful, why it is that, from the ideological point of view, they show so little originality as compared to other countries of Eastern Europe. This seems to be somewhat illogical. You say it is part of the problem of a search for values. But at the same time, especially since it seems to me that they have been able to be most successful perhaps in the entire area, doesn't this indicate that the time has come, or will be coming soon, when they will come up with a certain, perhaps typically German interpretation?

Ludz: I am grateful for this question since it raises an important point. We should recall that ideological discussions within East Germany have covered a wide range. Especially in the middle and late sixties; cybernetics, sociology, and other concepts of the Western social or natural sciences as well as various branches of Marxist revisionism have been reviewed critically and were assimilated, to some extent. However, a GDR-type ideological interpretation of Marxism-Leninism has not developed so far. I agree with you on the fact that chances for an ideological way of their own are improving, once economic and other basic-need problems are settled. However, we should always keep in mind that, in our age, developments in the ideological sphere are highly susceptible to influences from the "outside," so to speak. By building a Wall you may be able to blockade your territory against unwanted economic influences, etc; but you can hardly stop the flow of ideas running back and forth—especially not in a divided nation. Thus, processes in the GDR creating a specific blend of Marxism-Leninism are hampered by the mere existence of a second German state, i.e., the FRG.

Herlitzius: Mr. Chairman, I guess I was not accurately informed by your official bulletin and when I was told that Mr. Ludz would be speaking about the FRG, the West German *Bundesrepublik*. That was an important reason for me to retract from my earlier refusal to attend this conference. Now he is speaking about nothing but the GDR. Indeed, the largest part of his paper was dealing with the GDR. Wouldn't it be better in the future to inform the American people authentically from both sides? Mr. Ludz has a well-trained imagination, and he can imagine what would have happened if I had been dealing with the FRG in the same way in which he has been—and is—speaking about the GDR. I could likewise speak about the West German political system, I could speak about the military-industrial complex, I could speak about our Brown Book on established Nazis, I could speak about some other topics of the past twenty-five years. I wouldn't do that, and I think it is helpful to give actual information, not on the basis of stereotypes. As far as cybernetics are concerned, they were introduced by my teacher and friend, Georg Klaus. I was with him at the University of Jena when he introduced cybernetics as early as Norbert Wiener's writings (1948-49) were known. And he found his own approach. Since then we have been discussing this problem, but Mr. Ludz is making a revisionist out of him. What bad information! Klaus is just one scholar who takes the liberty of discussing problems in his horizon and in his way of generalizing problems. An article by Klaus on an interpretation of problems of mass communication was recently published in the leading theoretical organ of the SED, in the periodical *Einheit*. If you make Klaus a revisionist, why don't you do the same with the Central Committee? I suggest we make an agreement, at a conference like this one, not to give information about other countries, unless this information about our own respective states is requested as well as announced. As far as Mr. Ludz's position is concerned, I guess it is somewhat influenced by personal ambitions. His article about the counterrevolution of 1968 in the West German theoretical organ of the SPD, *Neue Gesellschaft*, included a special kind of "learning," namely how to do it better when preparing the next counterrevolution, let me say, against the GDR. I don't know whether this can be called an objective piece of information—how to infiltrate the Marxist-Leninist party, how to establish antagonistic contacts with the working class, how to diffuse centralized planning, and so on. He who chose this approach to the GDR in this manner continues nothing but the Cold War. I think we should agree that this is not a position which strives for a *détente* in Europe.

LUDZ: Let me answer your comment point by point. First of all, it was officially announced that I would speak about "Social Change in the FRG and the GDR." In the xeroxed Conference Program my lecture is listed on page 2. Secondly, the article in *Neue Gesellschaft* which you mentioned was dealing with Czechoslovakia and not with the GDR. In it I was not concerned with the "counterrevolution," but with philosophical concepts that had an impact on the Czechoslovakian events in the spring and summer of 1968. Thirdly, in the light of the lecture you gave earlier today and the style you seem to prefer in this discussion, it is rather preposterous to accuse me of using stereotypes. Finally, Georg Klaus, you mentioned his recent article in *Einheit* in order to prove that he is not a revisionist. Well, Klaus has been publishing his ideas in the GDR for more than twenty years now. One of his main concerns has been to prevent dialectical and even historical materialism from developing into an orthodox philosophical device. This overall intention can be filtered from both his discussions of the problems of formal logics, cybernetics and systems analysis as such and from the way in which he included several axioms and even concepts of cybernetics and other Western philosophical schools into dialectical materialism. This approach, as you should know, was criticized and called "revisionist" by some important members of the SED Politburo, especially in the sixties—and not only once.

SCHAEFFER: It was a scientific discussion.

LUDZ: You may give it that name, right.

HERLITZIUS: His newest book has just been published.

TRACY: Could I ask you to help an untaught political analyst or observer. I can sympathize with the view that the DDR is in some sense the more lively of the two German states and perhaps even the primary one, in the sense that it is the embodiment of the historical process, the historical process at work there, as it is not so remarkably at work in the West German republic. But on the other hand, I have the feeling that the social processes are less lively in East Germany than in West Germany. Would you comment on this for me?

LUDZ: Perhaps I may ask you first to explain briefly what you mean by "historical process." You know, you can see it basically from different points of view, either an historical or a sociological or a philosophical one. I had the feeling that you had in mind the idea of an underlying historical process in the sense of Marxism or Marxism-Leninism. Am I right?

TRACY: I am an unread and untaught philosopher of history as well. I wish to say simply that I have some sympathy for those Eastern philosophers and commentators who feel that the DDR is an embodiment of the historical process, growth or development, and, if you like, the embodiment of innovation, experimentation, and so on.

LUDZ: I am very interested in Marxism-Leninism, indeed. But I am a rather skeptical reader and not so much a believer. This makes it difficult for me to conceive of the historical process as a philosophical idea which is intrinsically tied to some conflicts, some movements within society. I know that Marxism-Leninism, not just in East Germany but also in many other parts of the world, claims that there is a historically necessary connection between the movement of ideas and that of the working class, the working people. However, I cannot see this necessity, because it cannot be proved in a scientifically sufficient way. Therefore, in answering your question, let me disregard the historical process and turn to developments on the societal level. Both German societies are industrialized, and they have to cope with a variety of conflicts—conflicts that may or may not stimulate innovative processes. The proper assessment about which of the two displays more innovative strength should be left to future generations. I really can't tell, since I reject all kinds of convergence or divergence theories. In my view, today's social scientists should rather describe and analyze the structures and processes in industrialized societies than engage in speculations and produce unfounded general concepts.

ROSELLINI: In your talk you mentioned that the SED exercised what you called "terror," especially during the fifties and early sixties, against certain classes of the society. I wish you could elucidate what specific form this terror took on, how it was manifested.

LUDZ: Let me give one example which may be known to all of you and which is perhaps one of the more prominent ones: the measures taken by the SED in the spring of 1960 to complete the nationalization or collectivization of agriculture. Immediately after it came to power, the SED had expropriated the bourgeois landowners and founded the so-called *Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaften* (LPGs), or agricultural cooperatives. However, many farmers were reluctant to enter these LPGs. Thus, in March/April 1960, the SED started a campaign and forced 25,000 farmers, who were not members of an LPG at that time, to join the cooperatives. The measures of force then used by the SED, of course, varied; they included heavy campaigning, individual persuasion, and economic pressures. After a period of about two months the SED was successful. From then on all farmers in the GDR have been associated with agricultural cooperatives. Similar policies were directed against the so-called bourgeois middle classes at various times.

SCHAEFER: A few questions concerning facts. Have you ever learned about the diffefence between national ownership and cooperative ownership and utilization? Secondly, do you know the number of peasants jailed by the state or by the Party? And a third question: Do you know the fact that before 1960 a large number of peasants joined the cooperatives freely?

Ludz: Of course, I know the difference between national ownership and cooperative ownership. As a matter of fact, I have written about the problems involved for quite a few years. Furthermore, I did not deny that before 1960 many peasants joined these cooperatives by free will.

Herlitzius: What about the question of terror?

Ludz: This I answered already. As for the number of peasants jailed in 1960, I am not associated with any security apparatus, and thus I don't know the figures. But I would like to emphasize that there are forms of terror other than imprisonment. You can exert force on people by using other instruments, other methods. We know it from many people who were so shocked by what was happening in 1960 that they fled the GDR. I suppose you are familiar with these facts, too: the FDJ troops and/or special agitation commandos approaching hesitant peasants day after day, asking them whether they wanted to enter an LPG, coming at night, using different techniques of blackmail and playing off one person against the other. It is just not so that people are either free or in jail. There are many possibilities of coercion in between.

Herlitzius: I would like to know what the comparison is between the ruinous Green Plan in West Germany and the socialist kind of industrialization of the productive forces in agriculture. And you know that nowadays all our farmers participate in the decision making processes.

Ludz: This is an interesting question. I think the main difference between our agricultural policies and yours is that we don't use force or pressure in order to make people participate in the modernization of agricultural life. That is quite a difference.

DISCUSSION SESSION NO. 6

General Discussion—First Day

Discussants:

Guy Stern
German, University of Cincinnati

Stanley R. Townsend
German, Pennsylvania State University

Victor Lange
German, Princeton University

Ingeborg H. Solbrig
Modern Languages, University of Tennessee

Peter Christian Ludz
Political Science, Columbia University/Universität Bielefeld (FRG)

Erwin Herlitzius
Technische Universität Dresden (GDR)

Gerhard H. Mundinger
College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado at Denver

Hans-Dieter Schaefer
Humboldt-Universität, Berlin (GDR)

Rainer Sell
German, University of Illinois

Carl G. Anthon
History, American University

Jürgen Kalkbrenner
German Embassy, Washington, D.C.

Manfred Wolfson
Government, Sacramento State College

STERN: It is the privilege of the rapporteur to look already ahead to the results of this conference. Therefore, as I was being enlightened by the speakers today, I already thought what pertinence those learned remarks, the controversy and the dialectics on both sides would have precisely for our concerns. Those concerns are practical ones, as Professor Lange pointed out in his keynote speech. At a time of crisis and reassessment we are thinking of our curricula in the universities, colleges and high schools.

But this is only one problem which we might discuss. I would like to steer our discussions somewhat in these closing minutes of this first day's journey into night, and I would suggest that questions of an eclectic and pragmatic nature be addressed to any one of the previous speakers. We are asking how we are to utilize what they have set before us, either methodologically or contentionally for those undergraduates or high school teachers, or even graduates or future teachers of culture courses. What is your advice?—we might ask. Specific questions, such as the one Professor Townsend directed to us earlier [*cf. the first paragraph of his following statement, Ed.*], might well serve as a starting point.

Townsend: I'd like to ask a general question pertaining to the nature of the conference and the future of German Studies. If I may, I would like to turn away a little from the strong political structure of the last two papers. I would like to ask you to consider the example of making movies in Europe today, which is an excellent example of modern European inter-cultural, international enterprise, often an American-European enterprise which is symptomatic, it seems to me, of present-day blurring of national cultural trends. And if this is characteristic in the age of the seventies, how can we then put emphasis on the so-called German culture? I think the answer to that question lies in the following consideration: The differences between people is real, indeed it is an extremely important determinant in our lives, both in our individual and social lives and in our national and international lives. And in so far as one community of persons considers itself different from another community—this is perhaps a very loose, perhaps cynic distinction in the concept of culture—we do have a basis for the definition of various cultures. And here we should move away from considering culture as simply a total accumulation of a people's intellectual material and artifacts in a given area, and seek philosophically a formulation of the nature of the specific culture and the various cultures for comparative purposes. We need the theory of culture or of national cultures not in terms of *Blut und Boden*, or of *Stamm und Landschaften*, but as an historical reality which does, after all, determine our lives and, I should point out, color our psychological, social, economic, political, philosophical, religious, and esthetic attitudes and evaluations. I therefore ask for a serious effort in this direction. I would like to direct this question to Professor Lange particularly, since it pertains to his presentations—a serious effort to define the cultural mystique, if you will, of modern society, German culture in particular, especially for comparison with our own.

Professor Ludz set forth very aptly and ably reasons for saying that there is a lack of national identity today in the West and, for various reasons, in the East. Nevertheless, this does not destroy the fact that there is an underlying tone to every culture which is different from that of another culture—for example, contrasting the French tradition with the general German tradition, or contrasting these two with the British tradition. This general tradition does determine how people receive new historical events, how they evaluate them, and how they react to them. I think it is necessary to define as closely as possible, both theoretically and specifically, other long-range bases.

LANGE: My answer will really not be commensurate with the efforts I am making in getting to the microphone. This has been a very interesting afternoon. It has, I confess, delighted and troubled me. Delighted, because it has brought to the fore a number of issues that, I think, both terminologically and philosophically we must squarely face. One of them is that in dealing with two Germanies, or indeed with two societies of radically different social philosophies, we cannot simply, in a spirit of comradeship and good sense, put a few comparable facts side by side and, when that is done, as gentlemen shake hands and say: "Well, you see, we agree in essence, though we may not agree in a marginal area." It seems to me that we cannot easily agree in that sense, where the basic philosophies conflict and are intended to conflict. I say this without meaning to be polemical. It seems to me that, if our friends from the DDR resent a number of things that were said by Professor Ludz, they do so in a spirit which I respect. But I think that they are not, if I may say this, quite justified in assuming that we are a number of experts, each of whom has the privilege of speaking of his shop, and anyone else who speaks of my shop is by implication either misrepresenting me or insulting me. I do not think that Professor Ludz intended to be either partial or insulting, if he has been—I can't check this—but if he has said a number of things that are not true, we can only be grateful for the corrections that were made by those who feel particularly concerned. Now, this is a bit of a confession. But I think it has to do with this central difficulty of talking without faith, without involvement, of two fundamentally different philosophical, social and political constellations. Two societies—two societies! Mr. Townsend asks what is it in the German corpus that entitles us to assume that we can interpret it. This is a great problem. But I would say that it is feasible not by resorting to a broad historical, organic concept of national growth. This is a concept that, I am sure, our friends from the DDR will properly reject, not as foolish but as unproductive.

We speak today of "cultures"—when I say 'we,' I mean the social anthropologists of which I am not one; I speak with great hesitation about these things—we speak of the two cultures, or indeed the American vs. the German, and you know that our friends from East Germany rather resent this notion of 'Germany.' There are two German societies. When they do this they assume that a society or a culture has not grown organically, but that it is the result of a resolution, the result of a determination of a given society to behave in a certain way. And the revolutionary DDR society insists upon this premise with a strength that we must find admirable. But that is also very disturbing to us. They want to make a society in terms that are partially logical and partly illogical, partly irrational and partly plausible. In so far as they are irrational, they may still be effective. A national policy is not based upon logic, but upon the desire to establish power. Therefore, a discussion of the social system cannot, I think, be made, ultimately or entirely, in terms of academic categories or in terms of comparison between various views of education as though one were almost as good as the other, saying: "We are happier with one, therefore we assume ours is the better." Much of what is said by a revolutionary society must be said in terms of power, that is to say, with a desire to establish the viability of its philosophy. To Mr. Townsend I would say: Unless we think of a culture in terms of definable institutions that have, as I said this morning, the dimensions of historicity, but that are nevertheless in a very specific and concrete sense contemporary today, that are in a very particular sense debatable as accretions of a contemporary will, we cannot, I think, arrive at any kind of a definition. 'German' in our context, it seems to me, can either mean that long historical process that has produced us who happen to speak German (I won't go into the problem whether you need a definition of 'German' for a definition of 'Germany'—the fact that Germans speak German is an interesting problem; it may sound absurd to deny that that is so). But I think that the institutions that we describe and perhaps judge, must be capable of being described and judged without reference to the fact that they are sustained by people who speak a language. It used to be different. Fifty years ago my statement would have been even more palpably absurd. Fifty years ago we would have said: "German is what speaks German, and German is what has been German for God knows how long." I think that our present discussion cannot operate in these terms, and I fear that we cannot successfully teach about German culture if we escape into these somewhat irrational, historical or linguistic categories. I myself would much prefer a discussion of the contemporary German culture in terms of willed and shared social institutions.

(Professor Ludz indicates that he joins Professor Lange in his statement.)

SOLBRIG: May I ask Professor Lange and Professor Ludz to help us in including now Switzerland and Austria into our discussions. We want to have them, too. This is the German culture area as a whole.

STERN: I think I will reverse the order now and ask Professor Ludz to speak first. Having taught culture courses myself, I always found that somehow I did not have time for either Austria or Switzerland.

LUDZ: I must confess that I have no answer to this question that would go beyond the remarks Professor Lange just made. According to my understanding, a general concept must be possible. And if it is wide enough to include the GDR and the FRG, why couldn't it additionally contain Switzerland and Austria? I am speaking here as a social scientist who has to admit that the problems scholars of German literature and language have to encounter in this respect may be different.

HERLITZIUS: I would like to know if it is possible to put a question and give an answer, too.

STERN: The dialectical process will have its day.

HERLITZIUS: Nobody has asked me, but sometimes we give answers without being asked.

STERN: It is a professional failing on both sides of the border.

HERLITZIUS: I am somewhat skeptical about this combination of all German-speaking countries, of all countries using the German language as the center of a German Studies program. I think it would be better to be careful in order to avoid wrong classes of abstractions. This kind of classification has been used in former times. Nobody would think it would happen again in the context you have mentioned. What would be the result? If you include all speakers of German in just one class or order, you wouldn't be able to reflect on the main feature of cultural interests: The increasing differences in regard to the divergent socialist and capitalist conditions of life. For one thing, you would also have to take into account the German speaking minorities in Rumania and, in a more general sense, some minorities in other countries.

STERN: We are quite aware of this. One of our concerns in this country are the ethnic groups within it.

HERLITZIUS: All right, that's exactly my question. If this will be done, then it must be done very carefully, so as not to mingle problems of a different kind. The future development of culture within those groups and states is mainly a problem of social development. Language always is derived from the main roots of the progress of the society. But I know that this word 'progress' is not in high esteem in this country.

MUNDINGER: Professor Schaefer, some of us here are interested in the exchange of students. At the present time there are something like one hundred thousand students from abroad studying in our country, and perhaps half that many American students are studying in various countries around the world. We see this as one way, a small way perhaps, of overcoming some of the misunderstandings, such as those we heard expressed on the floor here this afternoon. My question is this: In the light of the fact that so far any attempts that we have made to bring about an exchange of students between the U.S. and the DDR have met with negative responses, could you give us your opinion as to how soon this might be brought about?

SCHAEFER: I share your view that such an exchange would be a very good thing for both sides, and I am as hopeful as you are. But on the other hand I must say that the only people who can improve this situation are the American people. Why? It is not our side which is creating complications. For instance, I am here for a few weeks as a guest professor. What did I have to do to come here? I had to apply at the mission of the U.S. in West Berlin. My passport is not accepted by the Embassy, and so I was given a peculiar paper. I had to pass a questioning and to fill in a large form. I was asked: What's your political activity, are you an active member, what about your membership in youth organizations? I don't know any other country which asks me in such a form about political organizations and youth organizations. Many Americans come to our country, and they see that it is no problem to get the visa from our government. You get it immediately when you come as a tourist. The problem for us is the full recognition of the GDR by international law. What will happen, for instance, if I have an accident here, or if I am robbed of my papers? Where can I apply? I don't have any mission here.

STERN: Incidentally, it was a *West* German politician who was robbed in the U.S.

SELL: I would like to address my remarks to Professor Lange. In a sense, this is just a statement on what this day of lectures and discussions means to me. Contrary to the general trend, language is still of popular interest, maybe because the two German states obviously speak a different language, and I don't say that with a sarcastic tone. I think quite often it was obvious that speakers from both sides wanted to communicate and they couldn't. I think there is a supplementary relationship between cultural studies and the study of language, or language as related to institutions in East Germany and in West Germany. Maybe we need an East German dictionary and a West German dictionary. This was a little sarcastic.

LANGE: I think we *are* disputing this point, obviously, though you are stating it a bit sarcastically. Again, I feel that what we witnessed today points to what the Germans call an *Aporie*, an almost unresolvable problem. On the one hand, we want to develop the knowledge of German. That is not a national or a social proposition, but one that concerns all those who speak German—Germans, Austrians, Swiss, Siebenbürger Sachsen, perhaps even the Amish, if they can still be called German. On the other hand, we want to study institutions or comparable social phenomena which, you could say, either transcend language or pass below the language level in the sense of *unterwandern*. How can these two tasks be reconciled without an urbane blurring of the differences? If you have a year to give to the students, we must try to do the best we can, obviously. We must teach them a little language, a little culture and a little literature. If you have two, three or four years, the problem may seem less difficult, but actually it is bound to become even more complicated. The fact that many of us will prefer to teach literature, or in literary terms, will not help much. We are still rather inclined to accept a sort of nationalistic literary historiography. I am not using the word polemically or angrily, but the notion that has grown up in the 19th century of a German literature which gloriously moves towards the blessed state of whatever it was in 1870 or 1910—not much beyond that, this clearly we must remedy. This is no longer the pattern that we can use if we are to understand the conflicting social systems that operate within the common language.

ANTHON: I don't want to ride to death what has been said about stereotypes this morning and this afternoon, but we do recall that stereotypes were used at least in one paper, such as 'imperialist,' 'revanchist aggression,' and so on. This is not an individual case. It is repeated in the East

German press throughout. I am, however, much more concerned that these are not just semantic concepts, or perhaps not even 'quotas,' so to speak, imposed by policy or other authorities. This works up passions, feelings, especially on youths and children, because they are taught these concepts from early consciousness. As we are trying to come to some sort of *détente*, I am wondering if it is not time perhaps to loosen up, to liberalize these strings of stereotypes which come out almost predictably from almost any medium that one taps coming from the GDR. I just want to say that it was one of the most liberating experiences when, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the press—for a few months—did not use these stereotypes with regard to the Western world. It was a joyful experience. May I ask, is there a chance perhaps of loosening up this kind of vocabulary? Finally, an even more blatant question, perhaps: Is the GDR really and sincerely interested in a *détente*? I think the two go together.

Herlitzius: Thank you for this question. I would like to give you my paper and ask you to indicate wherever you find 'revanchist' or any of the other stereotypes that you mentioned. As far as German *imperialism* is concerned, let me point out to you that I used this word advisedly. 'Imperialism' was used at the Nuremberg trials to describe the German imperialists who had provoked WWII long before 1945. I find the same term in the literature of your country. Since 'imperialism' is a theoretical word, allow me to make one comment. 'Imperialism' means the continuation of capitalism through the concentration of capital, in the fusioning of industrial and financial capital, in expanding capital across one's own border by way of exporting capital. This is the way in which Lenin defined the term in 1918. Obviously, Lenin could not have thought of our conference; his definition was purely theoretical. When I used this word I did so in this sense. I am not aware that I have dealt with West Germany in this way in my paper. This I have avoided because I was supposed to report on my own country, leaving it to another scholar to explain what is going on in his country. What does this mean, the loosening of the stereotypes? I found many stereotypes here, I am sorry to say. That is why I opposed the stereotype of 'Prussia.' It is very important to me to explain what 'Prussia' really means in our history. In part this is my own history, because I was forced to participate in that war. Therefore, I am no Prussian; I am not following any Prussian pattern; and I think you will understand how shocked I was when I had to listen to the language of the Cold War earlier today. I, for one, tried not to use this language about terroristic activities. I agree with Professor Lange, who has just pointed out that, if two societies have developed differently, one should find out what the differences are, and one should talk about trying to avoid any misinterpretation of those differences. We are ready to admit that mistakes have been made. But if they have been misinterpreted, then they are not the kind of mistakes they appear to be. Naturally, we see our mistakes differently than you see them. Take the economic sphere. It would be better for our country if there would be less interference from outside, if we could get more help instead. One answer to your question lies in the way in which Mr. Honecker talked to Mr. Beitz from Krupp at the Leipzig Fair recently. I don't suppose they used any stereotypes. In this sense I am following Mr. Honecker's line: I am trying to communicate with you as one person with another. I wish to work for a peaceful coexistence, without ignoring that there is quite a difference in our ideologies.

Finally, let me come back to an earlier question which dealt with a student's attitude toward Marxism-Leninism in the GDR. Can one question Marxism-Leninism? The answer is that the study of the history of science and the interpretation of theories in the natural sciences make a confession to Marxism-Leninism quite unnecessary. We have a lot of literature from your country. When I use your systems analysis literature, I find it contains excellent information about the situation in your country. Naturally, I discuss those problems in operations research, management science, planning, and balancing with my students. Ultimately, there is no talking around: you must use computers, you must use them with a goal in mind which cannot be found in a capitalist country. Take medical care: it is free of charge in my country. Take the question of population control: a new abortion law has just been passed in the GDR, allowing women to have an abortion within the first three months. Those are the kind of themes which are presently being discussed in our seminars on Marxism-Leninism. We are discussing the very problem of our own lives; we never ask what would happen if someone refuses to confess to Marxism-Leninism. That question is never brought up. All that is necessary is to find answers to certain concrete questions about political economy, history, and philosophy.

KALKBRENNER: What happens if the student questions Marx and Engels?

HERLITZIUS: Let me say one sentence in answer to this question. Although the Christian world view does not happen to be my own philosophy, in the GDR anyone may enter the university and graduate a Christian.

WOLFSON: I am not a teacher of German; I am a political scientist and therefore interested in political discourse. Having seen two books on the exhibit table—one from the GDR, *Sprache der Politik* (East Berlin, 1971), by Georg Klaus; one from the FRG, *Sprache und Politik—Untersuchungen zu Wortwahl und Wortschatz des offiziellen Sprachgebrauchs in der DDR* (Munich, 1968), by Hans H. Reich—I would like to know, specifically in view of the discussion we have just had, if Professor Lange or someone else would be prepared to comment on this problem. It seems clear that the two German societies attach different meanings to their terminologies. My question is if, in your purview, it would be constructive or destructive to undertake such inquiries? To what extent is this envisaged in your cultural studies, specifically if you speak about interdisciplinary German Studies?

LANGE: I do believe the answer to this indeed should be that it ought to be part of our teaching. I think that at many universities and colleges it is already done. This is very important, not because the two societies use a totally different language, but because language is an instrument. Language is instrumental, not accidental, because it shapes not only ideas but also realizes and concretizes those ideas in practice. Therefore we must attempt the interpretation of the two languages, which are bound to be different to the extent that they refer to different resources and different intentions. They are not simply garbled versions of our sacred German. They are two different languages. They ought to be and they must be interpreted.

STERN: In closing, I think I would like to say to some of those who spoke today that they may now realize better, especially those from the two Germanies, what our problems are. You, Mr. Schaefer, said that you would wish each proponent of one or the other view could be asked to teach his particular specialty in the other country, his country's current scene and current history. Our problem is that, Monday morning, we will walk into that classroom to teach German culture, and we will be faced with the task of having to interpret both German self-images and each image as we see it.

DISCUSSION SESSION NO. 7

Following the Papers of Professors Herz and Renning

Discussants:

Nicholas Balabkins
Economics, Lehigh University

H. Dieter Renning
Economics, Stanislaus College

Dorothea Bruschke
German, Washington University

Wulf Koepke
German, Texas A&M University

Royal J. Schmidt
History/Political Science, Elmhurst College

John H. Herz
Political Science, City College, City University of New York

George Schwyzer
German, University of Cincinnati

BALABKINS: Dr. Renning, I notice two notable omissions in your presentation. One is that you dismiss the 1945-48 period with one sentence. I think the years between 1945-48 were of great importance. In those three years American policy, formally speaking, was guided by the JCS/1067 (Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive). Its main objective was to make sure that the Germans never again wage a war. And even though it was not implemented at the top, at the lower administrative ranks in the U.S. military government, there was always this feeling: You Germans started the war, now we will make sure that you remain peaceful in the future. These lower-echelon people practiced industrial disarmament. Yet at the same time the U.S. military government rebuilt the material infrastructure, they opened up canals, repaired the railroad system, fixed up government buildings. U.S. military government offices got very scared when, for example, in the fall of 1945 they discovered that the pilots and generals—who had received medals for bombing Germany—had destroyed the cities but not the industrial capacity. At the same time, the JCS/1067 ordered in paragraph 16: no repairs, no industrial production beyond the "disease and unrest" level. A lot of German plants and machinery were destroyed in those years through statutory neglect and lack of repairs. This policy amounted to accelerated capital destruction. It eventually led to a wholesale rejuvenation of the German industrial machinery. Thus the seeds of West Germany's economic miracle were sown in the 1945-48 period. As to the second point, I get the impression from your presentation that the Germans got away with murder again, as far as reparations are concerned. This is not true. Thus far Bonn has paid more than $10 billion for the Nazi-waged genocide in the form of intra-state reparations (Luxemburg Agreement of 1952).

RENNING: I generally agree with everything you say. In answer to the first part of your question, the emphasis of my paper was on that period of economic growth which people generally think of when they use the term "economic miracle." That was the emphasis and I had to limit the paper somewhere. I did not, therefore, include any details for the period before 1948. As far as intra-German reparations are concerned, I think one has to differentiate between these reparation payments that stay within the same country and those made to a foreign nation. Obviously, the economic effect will be quite different. If you take this into consideration, then East Germany carried a very heavy burden in comparison to West Germany. This has had a decisive effect on the ability of the East Germans to continue that economic expansion after the basic reconstruction had been finished, launching a period of growth on their own.

BRUSCHKE: I wonder if Mr. Re[illegible] could tell us a little bit more about the labor problem in East Germany and West Germany. It seems to me that the GDR brought about its economic growth with a steady or declining labor force, whereas the FRG has had a sizeable influx of labor from the East and, when that stopped, supplemented its labor force up to the tune of receiving over 2 million people from other countries in Europe.

RENNING: This has made a considerable difference in the development of the two economies. East Germany has had a net loss of population over many years, and West Germany has had a net influx, especially during the early postwar years when a very heavy influx of population in the form of refugees from the Eastern territories beyond the Oder-Neisse took place and, in addition, whatever migration occurred until 1961 between East Germany and West Germany. In the FRG this caused certain unemployment pr[illegible]ms for a number of years. During the early fifties, however, it turn[illegible]ut that West Germany had greatly benefited by this influx of people, [illegible]cause it now had a labor force that could be fed into the production process which, having gained a certain momentum, gave West Germany full employment before long. I might add that this was full employment in a much stricter sense than we use the term in our country. In addition to having an extremely low employment rate, the FRG had to import foreign labor for more than a decade now in order to satisfy domestic labor demands. East Germany, on the other hand, had a labor shortage for a very long time, which was partly due to the loss of people and stagnation in the size of its population and labor force. This has definitely held them back. It meant that all forms of construction, capital construction as well as capital goods production, etc., ran into this one bottleneck of not having enough labor to man the additional equipment that was installed. I fully agree with you that East Germany suffered in that respect, while West Germany benefited.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I am still impressed by the great discrepancies in prices and consumer goods between East Germany and West Germany. I am thinking of the very low density of cars still, for example. Can you point to any prospects for an improvement in this respect, so that the levels of consumption between East and West might approach each other some day?

RENNING: Most Western predictions on the basis of the performance of the East German economy indicate that the discrepancies in the levels of consumption between East Germany and West Germany will continue for the foreseeable future, as they have existed over the last few years. In other words, both countries will probably see a more or less steady increase in their level of consumption, but there will always remain a gap. As far as prices and price levels are concerned, these will continue to be different for consumer goods in the FRG and the GDR. This is partly due to the fact that you have different supply and demand relationships in the two separate economies, and in large part it is due to different price policies, especially in the GDR, with centrally controlled prices or state-administered prices, to use a more general term. In the GDR the fixing of prices is practiced in accordance with policy objectives that may have very little relationship to the existing relative scarcity of goods in the country.

KOEPKE: I found your statement concerning the trade between the two parts of Germany rather optimistic. Is not the total volume of East German trade rather small compared to the export and import figures for the FRG? What is your reason for optimism in this respect, particularly pointing to the future?

RENNING: In answer to the first question, let me say that trade with the GDR makes very little difference in the overall trade that the FRG conducts with the outside world. It amounts to roughly 2% of total West

German trade turnover. However, it makes a considerable difference as far as East Germany is concerned. For the GDR, trade turnover with the FRG alone amounts to roughly 10% of their total trade. Concerning your second question, my comment was really largely speculation based on the fact that trade between West and East Germany has not been seriously interrupted, not even when serious political problems between East and West, or between East and West Germany, occurred. In recent years this trade has been expanded quite rapidly, and depending on how things come out with Brandt's *Ostpolitik* and the ratification of the Eastern treaties, maybe there will be a sharp drop or increase in the foreseeable future. On the basis of past experience I rather doubt that either will happen.

SCHMIDT: I was particularly interested in hearing Professor Herz's plea for a broad historical base for German Studies, particularly for undergraduates. I think that is a very important aspect which needs to be stressed. Let me illustrate my point briefly. In 1955 I became interested in the Ruhr Question, the one when the French occupied the Ruhr in 1923. One of the things that amazed me was that there did not seem to be, at least not in English, a significant amount of research into this problem. As it turned out, the Ruhr Question was dealt with in very sharp national terms, in spite of the fact that there was an industry which actually crossed national boundaries and required a degree of cooperation which—and this is my point—came after WWII. It was very interesting to find that Konrad Adenauer, who was mayor of Cologne in 1923, played a leading part in trying to get together with the French industrialists and those from the Ruhr and the Rhineland in some sort of a working agreement. Historically, its seems to me that the Coal and Steel Community and the Common Market emerging after WWII did involve some sacrifices for the Germans. There was some indication that Germany perhaps had learned something from history, and one would hope that the cooperative spirit in the matter of the Ruhr industries may continue. I gave this illustration in order to show how important it is not to ignore history in the context of a German Studies program, even though we may go back no further than the twenties—incidentally, a period which is still not very well known. Do you care to comment on this, Professor Herz?

HERZ: I entirely agree. As I emphasized in my paper, I think that the historical background must not be neglected. I would like to add one sentence in regard to what was said by several speakers yesterday, who were more or less skeptical when I came to the study of history per se. Maybe that referred to literature more than to the social sciences, but still, though I am not a professional historian, I am quite convinced that what is relevant in history—to use this new-fangled term—has to be brought up if one wants to understand the contemporary scene. Your example on the difference between the political and economic treatment of the Ruhr Question after WWI and the way in which, quite generally, Western European economic systems have been cooperating and even integrating after WWII is very striking. I don't think you can really understand, or make the student understand what is going on in the multi-national European Community, etc., without pointing out the nationalist background of the story. You need not go back to 1871, although you should at least mention certain developments of that period, perhaps even some that happened fifty years earlier. Quite generally, I would say, the student must be aware of the main historical events and governmental systems, the two or three failures of liberal democratic movements in Germany in the early part of the 19th century, which account for so much of what happened in the 20th century and is still having an impact today.

SCHWYZER: Professor Herz, when Adenauer was the head of the West German government, German political scientists spoke of the "chancellor democracy." Would you say that under Brandt there still is a "chancellor democracy?"

HERZ: This is a hard question to answer, because so much depends on whether Brandt will be successful or not. If he is successful, the impact of his personality is liable to be very striking; if he fails, he will be forgotten. Therefore, I don't think that there is a "chancellor democracy" in West Germany today. By the way, I would also disagree with what somebody said yesterday, namely that after Adenauer it may turn out that Walter Ulbricht was the most forceful postwar German chancellor or, at least, leader of one part of Germany. It seems to me that Brandt may well turn out as such, if his *Ostpolitik* succeeds. I would like to add a comment on the subject of *Ostpolitik*. I believe that the most important aspect of Brandt's *Ostpolitik* was not mentioned yesterday, namely that for the first time the Germans, even German nationalists, seem to have come around to recognize that they have lost a war and that they have to pay for it. Until recently, after each defeat in war, they had insisted on those boundaries as they had existed before each war—the 1914 boundaries after the defeat of 1918 and, before Brandt, the 1937 boundaries after the defeat of 1945. Therefore, I think that Brandt's stand is a very courageous one indeed, as one can see from the tremendous and sometimes violent opposition which he has suffered. It is for this reason that he may emerge as a worthy successor to Adenauer—if he succeeds.

DISCUSSION SESSION NO. 8

Following the Papers of Professors Secher and Lawson

Discussants:

Walter S. Kohn
Political Science, Illinois State University

H. Pierre Secher
Political Science, Kansas State University

John H. Herz
Political Science, City College, City University of New York

Stanley R. Townsend
German, Pennsylvania State University

Marc Silberman
German, Indiana University

Robert F. Lawson
Educational Foundations, University of Calgary (Canada)

James G. Haas
Records & Admissions, Indiana University

Jürgen Kalkbrenner
German Embassy, Washington, D.C.

Wulf Koepke
German, Texas A&M University

Jürgen F. Herold
Modern Languages, Purdue University

Kai P. Schoenhals
History/German Studies, Kenyon College/Indiana University

Edmund P. Hecht
German, Kenyon College

Gordon L. Tracy
German, University of Western Ontario (Canada)

KOHN: Professor Secher, in view of the fact that the *Bundeswehr* is completely integrated into NATO, how much sense did it make in the mid fifties and how honest was it to speak of German reunification?

SECHER: I will give you my opinion on your question. I think any unification of the two Germanies which does not include the demilitarization of either side is impossible. And I believe that this has been known to policy makers for well over a decade.

Kohn: My second question is much broader. It is a reflection of my feelings of frustration during the last 24 hours. I have been using Professor Herz's book longer than I care to remember. My students usually found that there is too much material in that book. When I first arrived on the scene, the course description read something like this: the governments of Britain, France, Russia, Germany, Japan, Scandinavia, and other countries at the discretion of the instructor (two semester hours). I changed that, but even if one were to deal only with the first four countries, one could hardly do more than mention the terms *Bundeswehr* or *economic miracle*. I think Professor Renning was entirely right when he talked about differentiating between studying and teaching. This is the problem which we are facing. How can one cover so much material in a two- or three-hour semester course? I wonder if Professor Herz has any good suggestions on this.

Herz: I really don't know what to say in consolation. It is not the problem of a textbook author to solve the teacher's problem of how to cover everything he is asked to cover. I would evade the responsibility for having to solve that problem by referring you to the various deans, or deans within deans' offices, or whatever—administrative authorities in charge of assigning teachers to the job of covering this or that. Ideally, of course, I would think that only one country, at least for undergraduates, should be covered in one course, but that is a millenium.

Townsend: Professor Secher, would you care to give us briefly some comparative figures on the military establishment in the East in comparison to that in the West, including those for certain paramilitary organizations like the *Volkspolizei* and other bodies of the military establishment in the GDR. Finally, one detail: Are there any conscientious objectors in the GDR?

Secher: I cannot give you the exact figures on that. However, I will try to answer your questions in that sense. The *Bundeswehr* is a much larger military establishment, of course, than the East German one. That does not mean anything, however, because the East German military establishment is, of course, backed up, in terms of purely conventional arms, by the other members of the Warsaw Pact. So, just to compare the West German to the East German establishment does not tell you much, even if you include the *Kasernierte Volkspolizei* and all the others in that count. The answer to your last question is: No, not to my knowledge, unless our friends from the East want to correct that. The FRG, as far as I know, is the only country in the world that has a constitutional provision which recognizes conscientious objectors. Now, there are practices in other countries that permit it *sub rosa*, or they call it something else, that may be so. But only the Basic Law of the FRG has that as a provision. In my opinion, West Germany is far ahead of any other system in that respect, including our own, because it includes conscientious objection both on political and religious grounds.

Silberman: How do you explain, Professor Secher, that East Germany has not been forced to rely on old Nazi generals or officials?

Secher: I do cover this question in my paper, but I was cut short. The answer is that there was never really any viable alternative short of a social revolution in the case of the West German *Bundeswehr*. If Adenauer and others had introduced the kind of social revolution which some, call them progressive elements, even within this country want, or if the occupation powers had brought about the kind of social revolution which some of us supported in Germany after 1945, then you would have comparable armies in the two Germanies—as it is, you do not. The so-called National People's Army or NVA (*Nationale Volksarmee*) in the GDR obviously was not constituted from former *Wehrmacht* officers. The West German one was, and I don't think that there is any debate about that. However, the evidence that we have shows that those officers who were recruited after having been recommended by the screening board—a unique West German enterprise which worked very effectively—had records that were not blemished. If the contrary was true, then they were not admitted.

Silberman: Professor Lawson, you have said that, in the past few years, West Germany has changed its conservative model of education to a constructive one, making education a change agent, rather than a change object. What evidence do you have for this claim with respect to West German universities?

Lawson: I think Professor Secher would probably be better qualified to answer questions about the university reforms in both Germanies, because he has written on reforms in the FRG and other Western countries. Certainly, quite a number of changes are going on there. It seems still too early, though, especially in regard to the FRG, to predict what will happen as a result of the many reform efforts, at least since 1968.

Some writers assume that West German university reforms, especially the ones implemented in 1969 and 1970, will be successful. As they see it, this appears to be a more realistic expectation for the FRG than, for example, for France. But I don't know if one can anticipate that yet, especially since the West German reforms that were anticipated from the end of the fifties have only partially been achieved. Then, you see, a good deal of debate has been going on, and certain changes have taken place in one area and different changes in another area, but there is still a lot to be done. I simply don't know whether those reforms will make education a change agent. The other part of my response would be that—this is a kind of synthetic dichotomy—there is obviously change in the object-agent relationship in education as you change it as an object. As a consequence, there is some expectation that it will actually perform in a certain different way, that is in an agent form. However, as I was using those terms, I think one would have to remain quite doubtful whether there was a good deal of agreement and uniformity about what would move behavior and even consciousness in a clearly defined and agreed upon direction. I don't think that this is really likely to happen in West Germany.

HAAS: Professor Lawson, you talked about the emphasis in East German education on behavior modification and the contribution to the economy as part of the student's training. Supposing there are two persons, one in the GDR and one in the FRG with the same career objectives, and they went through similar amounts of training. At the end of the training, how would you equate their proficiency in their careers? Have they lost too much time with some of the behavior modification and their economic contributions to growth? If the students went through the two systems side by side, would they in the end come out with a similar amount of training in their career field?

LAWSON: This is a question on the difficult line between similarity and difference. I certainly would not want to say that the one student would come out with more proficiency than the other. I wouldn't want to, and I did not intend to suggest that there was any loss of efficiency in the GDR. If anything, there would be some gain in professional proficiency, because of the sort of narrowing focus from the general base of polytechnical education. The first stage the student is going through in that system would be his development from a general awareness of basic technical knowledge and skill, etc., through to a point where he would be extremely proficient in his chosen field. So I don't think it is a matter of losing anything. On the other hand, the West German educational system has long been noted for its results in terms of professional proficiency, and I don't think that that has been lost either. Into both systems there has been built a good deal of social and behavioral learning. However, there is a direct coincidence between the intended behavioral learning and technical or professional learning in the system in the GDR which is absent in the FRG. I think the two are somewhat separated, as they would be in the U.S. I would hesitate to talk about gain or loss. Perhaps one should reject the comparison of gain or loss entirely. Both the West German and the East German student are likely to succeed in the kind of professionalization that they are aiming for.

KALKBRENNER: I would like to add a comment on the composition of the officers corps in the West German army. We should distinguish here between proven war criminals, formerly active Nazis, and career officers. The first two categories were not reemployed by the new West German army. This important distinction is sometimes being overlooked.

KOEPKE: Professor Secher, you spoke of the danger that the military elite might again become a closed society, basing your observations on the traditional educational dividing line between classes in Germany, namely the *Abitur*. I wonder if your argument still holds in the light of the educational reforms which Professor Lawson talked about. Is not the present social mobility pattern in the FRG a valid counter argument?

SECHER: What I gave you was a statistical projection. Assuming that the educational reforms will be implemented, that still would not solve the problem within the *Bundeswehr*. There you have a group which is strongly persuaded that the *Abitur* is a welcome, a desirable prerequisite for officer training, rather than some particular vocational or occupational skill. This is part of the conflict which is raging at the present time. In answer to your question, I don't really think that educational reforms will do away with the problem. It seems more likely that the introduction of a volunteer army will totally change the complexion of the West German officer corps.

HEROLD: I have a difference of opinion with you on the *Bundeswehr* and its role. First of all, I'd like to say that I don't think that the screening committees for the officers did such an excellent job after all, because there were several cases where generals, who were supposed to be working in one of the NATO staffs, were rejected by the other NATO member countries on account of their backgrounds. Information that must have slipped through the fingers of the screening committees was available to others. The other point is that you make it sound as though the *Bundeswehr* is such a totally domestic affair now, both in terms of constitutional provisions and in terms of practice; but then, of course, there is quite a difference within the *Bundeswehr* between those that originally planned, for instance, *Innere Führung*, and those that have to practice it. Since those who have to practice it, at least the majority of them, do not believe in it, as was illustrated by a paper last year, describing how a number of captains tried to refuse working within the framework of *Innere Führung*. A further point is that this army was designed to be designed to be defensive, purely defensive, and yet it is equipped with predominantly offensive weapons. There is another difference there, but then you didn't talk about arms systems at all. However, I think this illustrated again a certain inconsistency which we can detect on all levels within the *Bundeswehr*, between an old system and new ideas which do not really get through. I don't know whether I should stop here. There would be a few more things which could be said about this topic. I really do have a question in reference to that new suggestion to pay the military not according to rank, as it has been done in every army in the world so far, but according to functions. Thus a sergeant who flies a jet, for instance, would get the same amount of money as a commissioned officer flying that same kind of jet. I would like you to comment first on what I said before. Secondly, I wish to ask what you think about the suggestion just mentioned, which would be a revolutionary one. What do you think would be the possibilities of implementing such a plan?

SECHER: Very briefly, the point of conflict in the *Bundeswehr* today is between authoritarian command and organizational decision-making. You can clothe that into the terminology of for and against *Innere Führung*, but I don't think anything is solved by it. Again, the main point that I was trying to make is that the problems of the *Bundeswehr* are not at all different from the problems that an army such as ours is experiencing as a result of an unsuccessful war. The *Bundeswehr* today is a good army if what you expect of a good army is that it has no particularly military ambitions and that its soldiers are good citizens. If you look at this from a non-pacifist point of view, which is what I am doing at this particular stage, the *Bundeswehr*, however, gets a negative rating in terms of combat-effectiveness, the same kind of negative rating which NATO gave it back in 1963, on which the *Spiegel* reported—the same kind of negative rating, for that matter, because of morale problems and others which our own army certainly might receive today in Vietnam, or would have today in Europe. The point that we have to recognize is, and I can only repeat it, that the age of mass armies is past. The age of mass armies was the result really of a kind of nationalism which saw it necessary for vast sections of the population, particularly the rural population, to obtain their sense of identity by serving in a national army. The notion of the army as *Schule der Nation* is passé—is passé in West Germany, is passé here. What you are reading in the papers about soldiers with long hair, hairnets and other problems of the *Innere Führung*, such as *Schlamperei und Dreck*, etc., to use the "Hauptmann 71" article in *Der Spiegel* (No. 15, 5 April, 1971) on the report of the Parliamentary Defense Commissioner, what you see in the reports about the U.S. Army in the FRG today, with our racial problems, etc., points to one conclusion: Highly industrialized nations are no longer capable of supporting mass-draft armies. This is the answer, in effect, to your question. As far as the screening board is concerned, it depends on how you interpret it. No war criminals, I agree, were passed by the screening board. The screening board was a very effective one, particularly through men of labor organizations, resistance groups, and others. Every effort was made, given the perimeters of the situation, which was that you had to create an army and keep out those who had criminal blemishes on their records. Some blemishes were there, but certainly not of that kind. In response to your question on the pay, let me say that this is the question of functionality and soldiering as a job vs. soldiering as a calling to serve the nation, which is again implicit in the pros and cons of the *Innere Führung* controversy. There is a commission at the present time which is studying this. It has, in effect, reported on it. I think it is the Ellwein Commission in West Germany. The *Bundeswehr* is planning to introduce that kind of pay scale; whether it will or not, is questionable.

SCHOENHALS: Professor Secher, you are offering the argument that the *Bundeswehr* could have avoided employing former generals and officers who had served during the Nazi period. On the other hand, we know that the *Nationale Volksarmee* in the GDR was originally built up by former *Wehrmacht* generals, such as Vinzenz Müller and Arno von Lenski. Those were generals who had already turned against fascism during the war in the Soviet Union as members of the National Committee Free Germany. Why wasn't it possible in West Germany to rely exclusively on generals and officers that had turned against Hitler during July 20th, 1944? Why was it necessary to bring in generals that were not clearly identified with the anti-fascist front?

SECHER: One answer is, of course, that some of those generals were dead. The other answer is a somewhat facetious one: I wish you would name me some generals that actually were clearly identified with the 20th of

July group. As a matter of fact, the answer to your question is that there were those who at least had sympathies or *liebäugelten* with the 20th of July. They certainly can be found among the officer corps, and they are certainly in the *Bundeswehr*. I am not really personally aware of any active 'anti-fascist' resistance at the general's rank during the Nazi era.

Hecht: I would like to address my question to Professor Lawson. Are you in a position to comment on the ultimate effectiveness of the socialist education system, not in the sense of preparing the young to contribute to society in a certain way, but in the sense of conditioning or determining individual attitudes? I would distinguish between the two.

Lawson: I don't think I am in the position to read minds, if that's what you are asking. I have not done an extensive attitude questionnaire in the GDR. Not that I would not have wanted to. Therefore I can only speculate. I think there is evidence through observation of a good deal of acceptance of and enthusiasm for the social system in the GDR as a result of the educational system there, although many responses appear to have a universal dimension. The intention to involve children more in the real life of the society is something that almost automatically engenders a certain amount of enthusiasm. That is something we have been trying to achieve for most of the century at least. In the GDR there has been a more determined movement toward that. Therefore, there is a good deal of cultural recreational interest and interest activity, as I have been trying to point out, which surrounds the actual curricular program. Also, there is a certain amount of response to political and social goals that are put through by this school system. In this respect one could talk about attitudinal effectiveness of the program. Probably your question referred to something that really came up yesterday with respect to the university, and that was the question of what happens when a student or child comes out with a different viewpoint than that which he is supposed to come out with. I find it difficult to ascertain how many people have such reservations in the back of their minds. Some people have written on this from their own personal experiences. Wolfgang Leonhard, for example, talked about his own experiences, the development of his own reservations and what was done about that. His account is a biographical one. The problem is that here we don't have very good information about this. In fact, I know of no source in this country which offers information about this question. Therefore, one can only speculate about it, but I think you can say at least this much, namely that if you put your efforts into a certain attitudinal construction or reconstruction, then you are bound to come up with a certain measure of success. This really is a comment on that question about the university student who, at the end of his studies, refuses to accept Marxism-Leninism. The analyst of political socialization would say that attitudinal change is effective when it coincides with the educational efforts of other institutions and, ultimately, with society as a whole. The old educational ideal that students are to reach beyond and outside their social environment for new truths refers only to a very select group of students.

TRACY: Professor Lawson, about the *Gesamtschule*, how comprehensive is it, what is the underlying educational philosophy, and how valid do you think is its philosophy in West Germany?

LAWSON: It is the key structural point of current reform debate and direction. It is significant that the *Gesamtschule* has now been publicized, at least in the Federal Government Report on Education, as *the* coming form. Up to this point there has been a good deal of experimenting. The *Gesamtschule* tries to combine some of those experimental approaches. For example, it will have more possibilities for interchange, and there will be greater basic similarities in courses at the beginning level of differentiated schools. This was the first time that a public document stressed the need for a *Gesamtschule*, emphasizing that it is to be implemented in order to make the West German educational system structurally comprehensive. There is no basic disagreement any more throughout the *Länder*, although there is some difference of opinion as to what form the *Gesamtschule* should take. In good German style certain terms have been coined, such as the attitude form, the integrative form, etc. Some of them are more truly comprehensive forms; others are somewhere between a tripartite and a comprehensive school structure. I don't really want to talk about the philosophy of the *Gesamtschule*, because it is very difficult to build up a philosophical case. Basically, it is a structural means of accomplishing certain kinds of social goals that seem to become more dominant in West Germany. If you look at the whole direction of reform over the past decade, at the implications in the *Strukturplan* that the *Gesamtschule* might be the way to do it, and into the government reports on the specifications of that form, then it seems that the new structure is likely to develop along those lines. But when all the old structures will catch up with that new building, is open to anyone's guess. The prognostication is that ten years or more will go by before one will be able to even consider that question.

DISCUSSION SESSION NO. 9

Following the Papers of Professors Weiss and Koepke

Discussants:

Manfred Keune
German, Pennsylvania State University

Wulf Koepke
German, Texas A&M University

Louis F. Helbig
German Studies, Indiana University

Jürgen F. Herold
Modern Languages, Purdue University

Manfred Wolfson
Government, Sacramento State College

Gerhard H. Weiss
German, University of Minnesota

Eberhard Reichmann
German, Indiana University

Paul A. Schons
German, College of St. Thomas

Richard J. Rundell
German, Kansas State Teachers College at Emporia

KEUNE: Professor Koepke, I would like to ask you again for your definition of the term 'culture,' because it seems different from the definition attempted yesterday at the beginning of the conference. Are you in effect following the traditional German definition of *Kultur*?

KOEPKE: No, I don't think so. My emphasis on the way of life of the individual person should already exclude that possibility. Furthermore, I do not see *Kultur* in opposition to *Zivilisation*, which is the traditional German distinction. It considered *Kultur* to be something different from and outside of politics. One feels reminded that German history in the 20th century has proven how disastrous this exclusion of politics was, and one observes how important politics have become in Germany in recent years. Politics now can be found at every level, in every sphere of life. I don't shy away from all these facts, and I don't think therefore that you can equate my conception of *Kultur* with the traditional German concept.

HELBIG: When Professor Koepke speaks of German culture being divided, then it seems to me that we really have no quarrel over this claim any more. What matters, however, is *what* has been cut in half. Using an anthropological metaphor, one could say in the sense of Uhland's famous poem: *Zur Rechten wie zur Linken sah man einen halben Deutschen zur Erde sinken*. If one stays within the image, then the two halves cannot live. Let me suggest a different comparison: pre-1945 German culture as an apple. I am referring to Erwin Strittmatter's apple in his novel *Ole Bienkopp* which, if cut in half, would show rather conspicuous red spots on one side and none on the other. Clearly, trees can grow from both halves, or cross-fertilization seems possible after the trees have grown. This may take a long time. It is important, however, that the two halves come from an apple, and not one, say, from a pear. The red spots on one of them, so Strittmatter says in his novel, that is the essential difference.

HEROLD: Explaining something through an image, I am afraid, doesn't prove anything. First of all, you would have to prove that those two halves do in fact come from the same apple. Without this proof, such a claim will remain a mere assumption—Professor Koepke made it without actually stating that he had done so and without showing it should be made in the first place.

KOEPKE: I am certainly prepared to grant you that this is an assumption which I did not prove to be factually true. What I did suggest, however, was that we should first explore the possibility that there still is one German culture, rather than beginning with the claim that there are different ones. The outcome of such an investigation seems quite open to me. It might bear out that the two halves are not two halves. Only if those two halves turn out to be entirely different, then we should say so. I am very sorry if I have not made myself clear enough. My definition of 'culture' is meant as a working term. I did so precisely because there is a considerable uncertainty as to what German culture is today. I don't think anything has been proven either way. As long as this is so, I would suggest we leave it at that.

WOLFSON: Another short remark about this apple. I would like to point out that sometimes, when American works of literature are being translated into German, we often find this notation: "*Übersetzung aus dem*

Amerikanischen." Isn't there a certain similarity between this and the language situation in Germany? I wonder whether there is some truth in the assertion that, in the realm of language, political changes are in fact contributing to the development of differences in one and the same language.

WEISS: I would completely agree with you, and I would suggest that one could establish very interesting cultural contrasts between the U.S. and England by just looking at the usage of vocabulary. I believe it was George Bernard Shaw who said that the two countries are very close, except that they are separated by the same language. There is some truth in that. I think that, within our American culture, one could observe very interesting differences in vocabulary usage and other cultural contrasts with minority groups. There are such possibilities in all kinds of in-culture languages, and linguists have already made rather interesting analyses of such phenomena. It is well known that there is a close relationship between language and culture everywhere.

KOEPKE: I would like to add that one of the basic tasks before us, which have emerged at this conference, seems to be trying to define certain basic terms used in the two German states. I am thinking, for example, of the term 'democracy.' What is 'democracy' seen from the GDR? It has a very specific meaning which we may not understand from our point of view and, what is worse, we may attach a totally different meaning to it. Naturally, this is part of the learning process in any context. This problem is in no way a special one as far as the German language is concerned. We would not gain much by simply proving that the German language is not the same in the East as compared to the West. The real problem is trying to understand the people with different ideologies rather than with a different language. Would there be a socialist English-speaking country, then we might have a similar problem.

HELBIG: We are all amply aware of the fact that there are differences between the two German cultures, or within the one German culture. The first of the two papers that we have heard just now discussed the question of teaching the postwar German cultures; the second one presented some preliminary thoughts on the advisability of including those two cultures in one cultural reader. Can this be done, or must we have two cultural readers, one focusing on the FRG and another focusing on the GDR? This will need some thought.

REICHMANN: Professor Weiss suggested a categorization into 1) facts and information, 2) cultural comparison, 3) vocabulary of culture. For the sake of clarity in our discussion let me make a general comment. We will have to differentiate clearly in regard to aims and instructional program forms. First, one of the principal concerns at this conference is the establishing of German Studies as a discipline. Second, looking at our business as teachers of German, we may have to consider a course in German culture, a 'one-course course'—forgive the tautological sound, I am referring to a course in the third or fourth year, 3 hrs. per week for the 15 weeks of a semester. Third, we may view German Studies as a principle permeating all our teaching. In other words, we would begin using 'German Studies' in the very first weeks when teaching the difference between "du" and "Sie", between "Herr Doktor" and "Mr.", etc. Fourth, when we address ourselves to packaging the information, packaging the cultural comparisons, packaging the vocabulary of culture, then we must address ourselves specifically to one of these aspects of German Studies. Are we addressing ourselves to the question of German Studies as an emerging discipline, to the question of teaching one course in German culture, or to German Studies as a principle permeating all our teaching? Professor Weiss, for which of these aspects would you address your categorization into three points?

WEISS: I would address that to the language teacher and, possibly, to the 'one-course course.' I do not want this to be applied to a graduate pursuit of studies which, I believe, would have to remain the prerogative of specialists who deal with the economies of the German-speaking areas, or with educational systems, etc. Certainly, the specialists would be able to contribute contrastive features, especially to a graduate program where German Studies as a discipline would need a heavy input from the specialists. The generalist, however, to whom I address myself here, is the language teacher and the supportive course teacher in the so-called culture course—whatever it may be.

SCHONS: If we would think in terms of a German Studies program, or perhaps extended studies in this area amounting to more than one course in civilization and culture—do you think, Professor Koepke, that studies of a foreign culture might aid students in better understanding their own culture? Is this approach possibly more valid than the old concept of studying a foreign language in order to better understand one's own language? Can we afford to discredit the latter?

Koepke: Judging from the current point of view, it seems much easier to justify attempts to understand a society rather than attempts to understand the language of that society. Both endeavors can be dismissed quite easily, of course, by arguing that language studies as well as contrastive culture studies would not be needed at all. Such arguments usually conclude with the statement that we can well afford to live in our country and ignore the rest of the world. This is a possible but not a very plausible solution. Studying a foreign culture in order to understand one's own culture is, in my opinion, not the only argument in favor of German Studies. I do think, however, that it is a valid one, and for some people it might even be convincing.

Rundell: A technical question pertaining to a bicultural or split-cultural course: How do you go about testing students in such a course, without reverting to what I consider rather old-fashioned methods like 'list ten German rivers' and that sort of thing?

Weiss: I have just survived grading final examinations, so I can perhaps answer that question. I have a device which works quite well. In my tests I have a character from one of the rich suburbs of Minneapolis, Mrs. Higginbothom is her name. She travels through Germany, she reports on certain things, she sees, and she misinterprets some of them, because she is using American cultural clues. The student is asked to correct Mrs. Higginbothom, her misinterpretations and misunderstandings by suggesting how she should have understood a particular issue more correctly by knowing more about German culture. By doing this I am able to test the student whether he sees anything strange going on. Some students find that Mrs. Higginbothom was absolutely correct. Those are students who may never have had a chance to leave their own ethnocentric territory. But a number of students are becoming quite perceptive. That is one way of doing it. I think tests using practical situations can be a very useful tool.

DISCUSSION SESSION NO. 10

Following the Paper of Professor Eifler

Discussants:

Marc Silberman
German, Indiana University

Margret Eifler
German Studies, Stanford University

Ingeborg H. Solbrig
German, University of Tennessee

Louis F. Helbig
German Studies, Indiana University

Hans-Dieter Schaefer
Humboldt-Universität, Berlin (GDR)

Edmund P. Hecht
German, Kenyon College

Rudolf F. Herrig
German, Westminster College

SILBERMAN: In the early part of your paper you seem to assume that there is some sort of censorship in East Germany. I wonder what evidence you have for this assertion. Perhaps this is rather a misunderstanding on your part or, because of our traditional bourgeois categories of considering criticism and not recognizing the new kind of dialogue that socialism is trying to establish between the artist and his society. It seems possible that, what we call censorship, in the bourgeois sense, is not really censorship. I have reason to believe that there is a new feeling or community spirit in the GDR which simply does not necessitate the outside figure of a censor as we know it, an institution which you seem to find so important. I wonder whether you really feel that there is a real censorship in the GDR? Officially, of course, there is none.

EIFLER: I believe I mentioned that in the East German publishing houses an additional editor called *Gesellschaftlicher Lektor* was instituted around 1969. He checks manuscripts before publication for ideological soundness. Don't you think that this is censorship?

Solbrig: I would like to ask you if you are familiar with political cabarets in the GDR, such as "Die Distel and "Die Pfeffermühle." In my opinion these are very important institutions in that the East Germans have thus tried to establish outlets of wit and criticism in the form of these *literarisch-satirische Kabaretts*. It has been reported that the actors in those cabarets are quite often standing with one leg in the penitentiary and with the other leg on the stage. East German cabarets usually have two programs, one a classical program which can be compared with that of the "Insulaner" in West Berlin or the "Kom(m)ödchen." Usually sketches are presented in the classical program with poems taken from Tucholsky and others, such as Karl Valentin and other personalities from the twenties in Germany. Then there is a second, contemporary program which runs parallel to the classical program. Its script is sometimes a teamwork written by the actors or a professional. From my own experience I can say that I was surprised at the amount and caliber of the criticism in those sketches. They even made fun of Walter Ulbricht, or they ridiculed the current Five Year Plan. Those cabarets, to my knowledge, have existed for over 17 years.

Helbig: This point of information is well taken. I must leave it to the audience whether we want to discuss the East German cabaret in addition to the three genres which Professor Eifler has dealt with. I would like to add to the discussion that, quite apart from the issue of censorship in literature in the GDR, there is quite a difference in the market situation in the two Germanies. What may be censorship in the GDR could be compared with the kind of constraints characteristic of a capitalist society. Therefore, I believe the term 'censorship' may not be the right one to be used here. One cannot really compare East and West German literature when it comes to tracing a book from the author to the point when it reaches the store.

Schaefer: Professor Eifler, I am a bit concerned that you are concentrating on what appears to be a very narrow concept of conflicts. That could lead you to the wrong conclusions, or not to any necessary conclusions. If you try to learn something about our society from our literature, then you must realize the whole range of conflicts. You should, I think, although it is your work and not mine, attempt a somewhat broader view. It may be quite interesting, of course, to study Wolf Biermann and Christa Wolf, but they are not representative of the whole literature of the GDR. In my view, they may not even be an important part of it, because there is, for example, Hermann Kant with his *Die Aula* and *Das Impressum*. The latter was just recently published and sold out within two days. I think these two problems must be faced: First, which authors do we deal with and, secondly, from which theoretical approach do we proceed?

EIFLER: I fully agree, but I think you also have to concede that you have two types of authors in your country. Some are controversial to you, and some you readily accept. I don't want to deal with only one of these types. Permit me to say this—it may have been somewhat strong what I said earlier—but you have definitely improved your literature in recent years. I am thinking of Anna Seghers' work vs. Erik Neutsch's *Spur der Steine*. No doubt, there is a definite improvement. Give it twenty more years in your country—then, I am sure, you will have fantastic material.

HECHT: I am wondering to what extent it is fair to see the censorship situation as something that will not change. It seems to me that censorship has not always undergone a uniform development in the GDR. There was, for example, a period before 1949 and then again the climax of what is called the *Tauwetter* prior to 1965, when a man like Biermann did sing in public and when he was received in public.

EIFLER: When talking about East German literature, one has to be aware of the different phases in cultural politics. One cannot talk about East German literature without taking into account those phases and the role of the Socialist Unity Party. As I see it, there have been seven phases up to now. During the period of the *Tauwetter*, there have actually been two: one after the events of June 17, 1953, which lasted until 1956, and a second one between 1961-65. That is where Wolf Biermann and Ernst Havemann enter the picture. Before that you had the well-known controversies surrounding Ernst Bloch, Wolfgang Harich, and Hans Mayer. This is cultural politics! Some of the details can be read in the documents dealing with the *Bitterfeld* movement. Those phases in cultural politics must not be confused with the Five Year Plans. The situation in cultural politics is much more complex than that. Quite often, as during the period of the *Tauwetter*, there have been times of concerted countermeasures in cultural politics. The *Tauwetter* between 1961-65 appears to have been caused by the construction of the Wall and by growing economic prosperity. Both eased tensions within the GDR, and more freedom was given to the people at that time.

HERRIG: I wonder if you are familiar with any literary experiments going on in the GDR which, of course, would either occur in secrecy or without official sanction? There appears to be at least one writer who is experimenting with concrete literature, somewhat in the vein of Franz

Mon and Eugen Gomringer. This author, Karl-Friedrich Klaus, who lives in Annaberg, is a Marxist who published most of his material in West Germany, Brazil or England. It seems that most of his work is graphic in nature, and he has also published commentaries. Are you aware of the broader range of experimentation going on in this kind of literature in the GDR?

EIFLER: Sorry, I am not, and I would rather not speculate on this. We may have to wait twenty years until we will hear about this kind of literature.

DISCUSSION SESSION NO. 11

General Discussion—Second Day

Discussants:

Louis F. Helbig
German Studies, Indiana University

Valters Nollendorfs
German, University of Wisconsin

Hertha Krotkoff
German, Goucher College

George M. O'Brien
German, University of Minnesota at Duluth

Margaret E. Ward
German, Wellesley College

Gunars Veveris
German, Thomas More College

Mrs. Walter S. Kohn
Political Science, Illinois State University

Albrecht Holschuh
German, Indiana University

Richard J. Rundell
German, Kansas State Teachers College at Emporia

Walter S. Kohn
Political Science, Illinois State University

John Hess
Comparative Literature, Indiana University

Helbig: During the next half-hour all participants at this conference are invited to voice their opinions, comments, suggestions, demands, ideas for a future German Studies Conference, and criticism.

Nollendorfs: First, I wish to thank Professor Helbig and the Institute of German Studies for having arranged this conference. Since you are asking for criticism, I would like to register a request that, at the next conference, we should perhaps return to those two introductory lectures which were given by yourself and Professor Lange. I feel somehow that these lectures were not followed up properly. They made so many suggestions and posed so many questions that one would wish to see them answered in some way or fashion. As I see it, there were probably three types of lectures—the two introductory lectures, then very informative lectures on various subjects, and at the end there were two very practical, maybe even too practical suggestions for specific courses and textbooks. What I would like to see is a future conference which should develop certain models, certain structural proposals for the presentation of German Studies to language learners, to undergraduates, and then to graduate students. I want to know how to develop specific methods, how to deal with the various disciplines that ought to come together. So far each discipline presented its own point of view, but we have really not tried to establish any kind of interdisciplinary cooperation or methodology. This is what a future conference should try to accomplish. It should move right into these matters.

Krotkoff: I also would like to see some more practical, pedagogical discussions, perhaps focusing on possibilities or problems of a horizontal orientation vs. a vertical orientation in our approach. In this respect the problem of how to train students to develop a perspective of their own should be discussed. By 'perspective' I mean both the perspective from the horizontal angle, that means the comparison of existing patterns, and from the vertical angle, that is by means of a comparison with the past which, for practical reasons, would have to be limited to a single discipline. A further point concerns the teaching of culture and civilization through works of literature. By this I mean basing a course primarily on works of literature and, as a second aspect—secondary in so far as the knowledge of the instructor may be of secondary quality with respect to the other disciplines—through the use of culture and civilization material. Such material would be mainly factual, and it could be expanded if necessary whenever one chooses to depart from an individual work of literature. To mention just one example, one could use Günter Grass's *Die*

Plebejer proben den Aufstand as a point of departure for a discussion based on that incident in the history of the two German states.

O'BRIEN: Professor Helbig, in your introductory remarks you clearly pointed out the need to distinguish between German problems as studied by scholars and citizens of the two Germanies and as they are looked at in this country. Also, in your ten guidelines, especially numbers 7 to 9, you reinforce this point. Professors Lange and Stern also eloquently enunciated the current practical problems which we face in class day in and day out. It seems to me that the mere tallying of our problems doesn't produce results. What I wish to suggest is that two aspects of our present dilemma really agitate the current crisis. Probably they were not recognized in our better days when, for example, NDEA grants were available. The two points are simply these: We are bound to develop German Studies that are distinctively American, and secondly, in setting up our programs we have overlooked the interests and needs of American students. I don't mean their ignorance from the point of view of their studies, but in relation to their interest in means. Unlike the British *Germanisten*, who have been able to adapt much more readily to the various mainstreams, I think we have seriously neglected and impoverished our field by not taking up those issues or not launching out on our own. In other words, we are in need of a distinctive approach to Germanic studies when conducted at American universities for American students. I think we could teach issues, personalities and works that really matter to our students—the Hesse cult is an example. We were not the ones to jump in; the students brought it to us, and then we joined in. Perhaps we could have been originators at that time. To use a bad stereotype, we have been good Germans. This is not surprising when we reflect for a moment. For Germanic studies in America are primarily in the hands of professors and scholars who were born in *Mitteleuropa*. Let me emphasize that I am not a disgruntled American chauvinist, but I am trying to give voice to an attitude felt and often discussed by other American *Germanisten*. I reviewed yesterday's proceedings in order to come up with a practical example. Only two who spoke on that day, excepting Dean Wilson, were American-born. You may think I am exaggerating, but I believe the two were Professors Smith and Townsend. Most of yesterday's sessions, including the observations from the floor, could have been conducted in Central Europe by Germans for Germans. Don't misunderstand, I certainly appreciated yesterday's proceedings. I learned a lot from them and I even found them entertaining, but the American framework was really not there. It was mentioned at the beginning, but it wasn't followed up.

I may be reiterating something Professor Townsend mentioned yesterday, namely that German Studies conducted in America should be a distinct undertaking. Even if they are second-rate, they should be distinct and we should pay more attention to the consumer's interest, that is the American student, especially the graduate student, be it in particular programs, such as the one you are developing, or in traditional Ph.D. or M.A. programs.

Ward: Someone mentioned just a moment ago that there were two speeches this afternoon that were too practical. I don't think that this is really possible, because all of us here, in one way or another, are facing practical problems. I do not know what hope there is for a second conference. If there is to be one, I would like to see it organized along the lines of workshops, where one could get together with people who face the same kinds of problems. Obviously, those problems are different in each case, especially if one is teaching at a small college or at a large university. I would not only be interested in the problems that I face in teaching at a four-year college, but also in the problems involved in setting up graduate programs at such places like Indiana University. Those tasks are so different, from the practical point of view, that I cannot help being a little disappointed with what has been offered here. During the current semester I am teaching a course on politics and literature, and I have some very practical problems—getting books from East Germany, for example. It would be useful if one would divide the audience into groups which would discuss specific issues and which could interact at a later stage.

Veveris: I have a great practical need for *Anschauungsmaterial*. I have exhausted all available avenues of getting support, such as the German consulates and the embassy, the Carl-Schurz-Association, Inter Nationes, etc. Especially if one is teaching a culture course in a small college, one encounters a great need for all kinds of audio-visual materials. Is there any chance that a pool could be created in the near future for all available resources?

Mrs. Kohn: Most of the speakers so far have been addressing themselves to the university level. I would like to see these issues discused on the other levels as well. If we would be training people on the university level in German Studies only, then what do we do with them? Therefore, I would like to see a panel which should deal with German Studies in the elementary and high schools, especially focusing on the teaching of culture and civilization through literature. As our financial resources dry up, those programs are bound to dry up, too. Therefore, what do we need the university programs for, if they are not to be used? As a second point, I would like to suggest that a future conference should also deal with contemporary literature for children in the German-speaking areas. At this moment we do not have a body of literature in translation for children, and I feel there is a need for this.

HOLSCHUH: Yesterday several speakers referred parenthetically to the fact that there are at least four major German-speaking areas. As you know, most of the conference was devoted to the distinction between East and West Germany. The title of this conference clearly states that the two are to be dealt with and that the other two areas, Austria and the larger portion of Switzerland, as well as all German-speaking minority groups in other countries, are to be set aside. I do not know whether a future conference could also deal with the distinctions involving those two. This might complicate our task considerably, since the number of distinctions would grow geometrically as one adds other countries or areas. I am not sure whether, in the present stage of developing German Studies programs, we should clearly state that we only intend to deal with East and West Germany, leaving aside the task of distinguishing Austria and Switzerland from the German areas, or whether we should not make a considerable effort at this time to find out more about material from these areas. Such materials are available; they just have been neglected. On the other hand, if one were to ask a West German as to what has happened in West German drama since 1945, he would come out with a great number of names, at least two-thirds of which would be either Austrian or Swiss—most likely the ones that are better known.

RUNDELL: I would like to advocate a panel, such as today's meeting, composed of graduate students or even undergraduate students from Indiana University, those who are actually taking courses in the Institute of German Studies. Let me conclude by saying that I tend to disagree with Professor O'Brien and his point about American-born vs. German-born speakers here. I came to hear German speakers. At any rate, I do not know of any American-born East Germans. As far as students are concerned, I think that student opinion is all too often presumed by us, and regularly falsely so. The viewpoint of the graduate student in German Studies, whether he is a German major or an economist, would be most illuminating to all of us.

Mr. Kohn: First, following up on the question that I raised this morning, I think we should concern ourselves a little bit more with the problem of where German Studies fit into the larger framework at the university, such as into West European or Comparative Government programs. As Professor Herz was saying, giving a one-semester course on one area would be a millenium—we know that, it is the ideal. Most of us are not in that kind of a position. Therefore, I would like to study this whole concept in greater detail. What are we to do in a comparative government course? Where does the German studies area fit in? Secondly, I would like to comment on Professor Holschuh's suggestion to extend the German-speaking areas even further. You may not have been aware of this, but the panel this afternoon was dealing with the problem that the division of the two most important German language areas was seen as something quite new. This division, of course, has existed for generations. There are people who maintain that, in fact, Kafka would really be a more Austrian writer, and that Stefan Zweig would be a more German writer. At any rate, it certainly seems more than useful to me if we would deal with the Swiss and Austrian areas as well, but not so much in terms of the language.

Hess: First, let me say there are American-born East Germans, many more than you might imagine. Secondly, I have two suggestions to make for a German Studies program, the first one being a course, for undergraduates as well as graduate students, focusing on films. There are a great number of interesting and quite well-made films coming out of both East and West Germany and, I am sure, we might even find that the Austrians and Swiss make movies, too. As to my second suggestion, I would like to offer a general but, to me, crucial observation on the future of German Studies in America. That the East and the West Germans argue and bicker surprises no one, since both sides seem to base their existence on the non-existence of the other. My concern is with the quality of the American response to the East German presence. I do hope that before we teach any aspect of East German culture, we come to an understanding of the basic tenets, goals and ideals of Marxism-Leninism as practiced in that country. Whether one ultimately rejects all or part of this body of thought or accepts it as one's own, that is a private matter. But to judge East German culture by our own standards alone is an exercise in absurdity and has little to do with education. What I am saying may have far-reaching ramifications for German Studies as a discipline. For the Federal Republic of Germany has much more in common with Austria and Switzerland than with the GDR. For us to tear off the two German states and neglect the other two might satisfy our desire for symmetry, but it says little about our understanding of world affairs—affairs in which we are all entwined whether we like it or not. While the concept of German Studies is a convenient organizational rubric, it dare not lead us to believe that the apparent 'Germanness' of these four countries somehow transcends the ideological conflict between the one and the three. As the debates here have shown, it is almost impossible to discuss any aspect of what Professor Helbig has called 'culture' without getting hung up on the differences between socialist ideology and capitalist idealism. It would certainly be more convenient to send our East German colleagues home and get down to the familiar task of organizing a new committee, program, institute, or department. But it is not so much the organization of German Studies that will decide its future, but its courage to look across the Wall and report accurately and humanely what it sees there. And this can only happen if we learn and teach our students what Marxism-Leninism is about and if we recognize that those people, like us, want to make the world a better place to live in. If we cannot argue and discuss with them on the basis of these two understandings, then all such discussion with them will be fruitless. Certainly, this kind of a conference is a step in the right direction, and the Institute of German Studies is to be commended for it.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Guy Stern, Rapporteur of the Conference

Ladies and Gentlemen, it cannot be the task of the *rapporteur*—who should not be a *raconteur*—to reiterate all conceivable details that we have witnessed on the occasion of this meeting. Instead, I propose to give you that which we—my colleague and graduate George Schwyzer and I—have tried to compile, namely the highlights of this first German Studies Conference: its main themes, patterns, critiques, criticisms, and suggestions. It is in this spirit that I would like to present these concluding remarks to you. If you sense any commissions or omissions, please attribute them to our haste rather than to our ill will. We have had no advance copies of any of the presentations, and so we did the best we could at short notice.

"Wann ist Deutschland? . . . Wo ist Deutschland?" —this quotation, appropriated by Ralf Dahrendorf and cited early in the proceedings by Professor Helbig, struck a keynote for our two-day and twofold search. We were in quest, both of the *substance*—what we should properly transmit to our students about the four geographical entities that comprise our cultural target area—and the best *approach*, the most viable *Methodology* for our task. In opening the Conference, most felicitously conceived and executed by Professor Helbig in cooperation with Professor Reichmann, Professor HELBIG distilled ten major methodological points from a brief history and rationale of the concept "area studies," as it is current in the United States and Canada. These ten points were subsequently distributed to the participants, obviating their detailed recall in this summary. Subsequent discussions, papers, and questions indicated the importance of three points: 1) the advice to proceed from an American vantage point, leaving the resolution of, though certainly not the confrontation with, internal German questions to the Germans themselves; 2) the advocacy of a sober, dispassionate, apolitical, descriptive method; and 3) a plea for the understanding of two or more political entities—still striving fully to be born—and for their subsequent quest for self-identification. None of these three cornerstones was completely shaken by the discussions that followed, although Professor Lange's demurrer that an unbiased reportage was next to impossible with such a volatile topic was readily admitted by Professor Helbig. He explained that such ingeniousness was more of an ideal to strive for and more of a corrective for certain biases, rather than an attained pedagogical reality.

Professor **LANGE** set further perimeters for the Conference in his keynote address. Taking the crisis in language studies as a point of departure, adducing possible flaws in the symbiosis of language, literature, and culture studies, and advocating courses in culture as well as in literature to be conducted in English (a position that was to go unchallenged throughout the Conference), he catalogued the new problems to arise from within—problems which a new generation of students attuned to the sociopolitical changes of their times and, indeed, themselves instruments of such changes, demand in trying to come to terms with the dynamism of the times, more often than they demand the traditional esthetic-linguistic preoccupation of the past. Later, in response to a question, Professor Lange readily admitted that these pursuits can be complementary rather than competitive, that language classes can accommodate themselves to include cultural learning meaningfully. He pleaded for a cosmopolitan attitude in culture studies to eschew the labelling of cultural manifestations as national characteristics when, in fact, they are part of the worldwide or, at least, our Western society.

Professor Lange also warned against the historical approach. The goals of German Studies should be a phenomenology of the present. The past would have to become pertinent only where it elucidates the present—present institutions, media, modes of expressivity of a cultural area. He likewise warned against the random assemblage of facts and against amateurism in culture teaching. Only the finding of a viable method for the interdisciplinary program would insure its survival. The goal of cultural learning should be the acquisition of a critical, even self-critical mind. Such a mind should lead via the understanding of a foreign culture to an appreciation and to a questioning of one's own culture.

The papers of Professors Helbig and Lange framed, as it turned out, the disquisitions and controversies that followed. By means of a clear exposition and evident erudition Professor **LUDZ** attempted to describe in his paper the social stresses and changes occuring in the two Germanies. In the case of the FRG, there is a breaking-apart of the temporary marriage of modernity and the prewar tradition, whereas the GDR is trying to recruit and persuade its people for its socio-economic goals. Within eight subheadings he showed analogous developments as well as divergencies in the two German states. For example, whereas the FRG guaranteed a wide range of political rights in its Basic Law, it stood mute on many social prerogatives, while the opposite appears to be the case in the GDR.

In challenging Professor Ludz's contention, both by questions after his speech and in anticipation of their own contributions, Professors Schaefer and Herlitzius demonstrated that facts are often in contention but, far more importantly, that the interpretations are in dispute. It became clear in the course of the meetings that the very concepts of objective depiction and self-expression may live in an uneasy alliance. Professor HERLITZIUS, an eloquent spokesman for his convictions, proved that cultural history as described by Professor Ludz and, in part, by Professor Smith, is not only explained by past events and trends, but almost as potently by the self-image of the present and by the aspirations of the future. All aspects of society, Professor Herlitzius contended, must be developed in a socialistic way. The socialist ideal is manifested in the GDR, in that the majority of the workers have the right to help make decisions. After his rebuttal of certain stereotypes held about the GDR, he projected the fulfillment of the ideals of a shortened work day, increased production through modernization, better supply of raw materials, and progress in labor, productivity and technology. In a later paper Professor Renning showed that the economies of *both* states would adhere to these ideals at the present time. Professor Herlitzius concluded by pointing out that—in spite of the common language, culture and tradition—only the GDR has been able to overcome the antagonistic class structure of the prewar period.

In a similar mood, Professor SCHAEFER addressed himself to education as a change agent in the GDR. He analyzed both the structure of the educational system in the GDR and its accomplishments, its promises and needs on which it is based, concluding that scientific and technological training must go in concert with the purpose of the socialistic order. The planned society must become a society of planners, hence education must not be geared to an elite but to the masses. If projections dictate a greater or lesser enrollment of students, as is the case now, these projections must be acted upon. Professor Schaefer's presentation elicited some of the most probing questions from the audience. Questions and answers left no doubt that the ideological differences are profound, unbridgeable and can induce acrimony in even an academic assemblage. The main questions, all of them leading to rebuttals and repliques, concerned themselves with the vitiation of differences between training and education (Professor Hecht), the fate of students unable to accept Marxist concepts at the end of their studies (Dr. Kalkbrenner), the criteria for limiting the number of students (Professor Krotkoff), the freedom of choosing an academic pursuit (Professor Gumpel), and labor problems in a planned society (Professor Bruschke).

The day's proceedings were rounded out by an address by Professor SMITH whose startling introduction brought home the fact that the position between the GDR and the FRG may not be as unique as it seems; he suggested that it may indeed be analogous to that of the U.S. and Canada. In using this approach, Professor Smith also provided a telling example of the comparative method advocated by the first two speakers (Lange and Helbig). The two conclusions which Professor Smith reached were: first, that until now the GDR has not received the kind of attention at the hand of Western historians which it deserves; secondly, that the Berlin Accords must be considered a somewhat precarious venture for the West because they appear to hold implications, both by their procedures and texts, that the FRG may be the disadvantaged partner in these treaties. This thesis was questioned the next day by Professor Herz who contended that conceding the results of a lost war was a gain in itself.

At the conclusion of the first day of the conference, a pattern had emerged in the papers and discussions. It became clear that only a thoroughly schooled teacher can circumnavigate the cliffs of culture teaching. On the one hand, he must have nearly the breadth of a *homo universalis*, on the other, the depth of a modern-day specialist. He can neither be aseptic in his attitude because he is himself determined by his convictions, nor partisan because he would infect his classes with irrelevant disputes. He must be an expert on the cultures of four geographical entities, yet constantly, as Professor O'Brien pointed out, be aware of his own identity and that of his students as being Americans and promulgators of American culture.

The papers of the second day, which were presented in panel fashion, one devoted to the social sciences, the other to German Studies, readily fitted into the larger categories set by the speakers. One of the papers, namely that by Professor HERZ, may in fact be read as an accidental replique to several presentations heard on the first day. He challenged the topical approach propounded by Professor Lange, arguing that an understanding of the Wilhelminian Empire, the Weimar Republic and the Hitler years was a prerequisite for an understanding of the present. He contradicted those who had seen the foreign policies of those German states primarily as a concerted effort with either their Eastern or Western allies; he said that all three German states have been independent agents of their own global destinies. Nevertheless he challenged Professor Helbig's working hypothesis of treating the GDR as a separate state. Finally, Professor Herz concurred with some of the previous speakers that literature may also be a socio-political emanation, and he cited Siegfried Lenz's *Deutschstunde* and Günter Grass's *Hundejahre* as evocative mirrors of an historical period.

The three other morning papers reaffirmed Professor Helbig's faith in a probing and descriptive method for German Studies. The first one, presented by Professor RENNING, addressed itself to the burgeoning economies of both Germanies and to aspects of German cultural learning which Professor Weiss later identified as being crucial. Professor Renning destroyed the myth surrounding the West German economic miracle. He attributed the economic recovery largely to the German predilection for hard work as well as to organizational and industrial skills inherited from prewar days, but even more so to circumstances beyond West or East German control.

The *Bundeswehr*—a topic of great interest, judging by the numerous questions—received equally close scrutiny by Professor SECHER. After describing briefly the fears which the re-creation of a German armed force had evoked in the early fifties, he then explained the uniqueness of its structure as an integral part of NATO and its current problems. Professor Secher pointed out that those problems would originate from the dual, contradictory roles of the *Bundeswehr*, namely of being both an army of citizen soldiers who, on account of their skills, can be used interchangeably as soldiers or expert workers, and as an army of highly trained professionals. Finally, in response to a question, Professor Secher subsumed the solution to all problems of the *Bundeswehr* by observing that all mass armies have become obsolete in highly industrialized states.

In his contrastive analysis of West and East German education, Professor LAWSON likewise tried a descriptive method. He suggested that both German educational systems contribute toward economic growth whereby, in the GDR, this contribution is evolving together with a new social order in the spirit of the socialistic ideology. Describing education in the GDR as an instrument for social change, he cited the example of the Soviet Union where education is also used to permeate all phases of social activity. In the FRG, he continued, the conservative model prevails. The change pattern conforms to the existing institutions, which means that it takes time until changes with the purpose of integrating modern social developments are taking effect. But despite these handicaps, there is an increasing awareness that pupils must become attuned to their social, political and economic environment. Finally, Professor Lawson showed that a number of important changes will take place in the FRG in the near future, especially through the concept of the *Gesamtschule*, educational reforms in some of the *Länder* through the standing conference of education ministers, and through contacts with trends for change in other European countries.

In the afternoon pedagogy had its day. In his paper Professor WEISS scrutinized what he termed a relativistic approach to the teaching of culture on the multidisciplinary level. The first step, he expounded, was to gather factual information and then to attempt a cultural comparison. Examples of the latter, such as humor and national clichés, were given with respect to the German and American culture areas. Above all, Professor Weiss saw language as an important aspect in the multiplicity of elements constituting culture.

Professor KOEPKE began by deploring the ignorance and the false concepts American students have about divided Germany and he offered means of remedying this fact. We should make use of all questions posed by our students, especially including those about the feelings of the citizens of both Germanies about the existing division. Professor Koepke explored the possibility of teaching German culture as one culture, but as a divided one, and he suggested that one should begin with the causes for the division, the Hitler years and the gradual process of separation of a geographic and demographic whole. One should continue with the growth of rivalry and hostility between the two halves of Germany, the emergence of different institutions, if not life styles, in all their phases as well as the views Germans living in the FRG and the GDR have of themselves and their fellow Germans across the dividing line. Professor Koepke proposed to package the complex body of knowledge on postwar Germany in nine broad topics (chapters). Professor Reichmann suggested that the overall approach to German Studies—that is, the course concept and the departmental or institutional concept—must be determined before we can define the exact packaging.

The words of Professor EIFLER are too recent in our ears that they would need exact restatement. I would like to take them as a valid point of departure for some more basic questions. Professor Eifler examined an official policy for literature in the GDR which defines independence as an outdated remnant of individualism. There seems to be resentment against works in which the writer, not the Party, is offering correctives for social ills. From this some larger questions arose in her examination.

Can a writer—in the GDR or elsewhere—follow a voice other than his own, even if he can sing in chorus with the Party's voice on other occasions, and not, at the same time, betray his own heart or his effectiveness? Can the conclusion be postulated from the start and, if so, by whom? Is Christa Wolf's defiance of norms and the quest for her own self-realization as well as the experimental form of her latest novel itself not a symptom for all works created in a controlled society? Finally, how ought we to teach the literature coming from the GDR?

In conclusion, let me offer my personal observations. I was startled by the fact that two aspects of German-American cultural relations were not mentioned at this meeting. As I had occasion to point out elsewhere, in these days of ethnic self-identification it is disconcerting that the remarkable role of German ethnic groups in the U.S. and in Canada continues to be ignored. Also, we tend to forget that cultural exchange ought to be a two-way road, that the German-speaking countries give and gain in their cross-cultural relations with the U.S. and Canada. The constant international peregrinations of Germans such as Mossbauer or of an Austrian such as Loewenthal, one of the pioneers in laser surgery, or simply the exchange of students about which one of the questioners asked, constitute a potential cultural bond that ought to be investigated and described in our classes. In fact, this very symposium can be defined in this way, namely as a two-way exchange. It is to be hoped that our participants from abroad not only shared with us the intellectual bounty but also received, here and elsewhere, an impetus or even an impact from the cultural life of this continent. In pointing out these omissions I do not wish to criticize but rather to suggest topics for future conferences of this sort. For it is plain that this brilliantly conceived symposium must be repeated. It may even be a preview of the lifestyle of the age of Marshall McLuhan—conferences and teamwork on a global scale.

As a teacher of languages I feel that my services will therefore be needed for a long time to come, particularly as a teacher of German. Since it is spoken in both the member states of the Eastern and Western alliances, one of the few major languages to which this applies, it may well become a widely used *lingua franca* of international communication. While our conference showed the depth of an international ideological conflict, it also brought proof that a bridge built on dialogue will not remove but will someday span the chasm. The very atmosphere of the meeting induced hope, and here the audience in particular is to be complimented. Good will, patience and a quest for sharing information and learning was felt throughout the meeting. I should like to conclude as a teacher also of literature in a similar spirit, and I have chosen, not by accident, the words of a writer who fled Hitler Germany and then came to live in the GDR. It is a poem by Johannes R. Becher.

Rückschauend

Rückschauend
Auf einer Wegstrecke:
Trümmergebirge,
Gräber-Unendlichkeiten—

Zeugen
Zweier Weltkriege—

Rückschauend
Durchschaue ich das Heute
Und prüfe es darauf hin,
Welche Kräfte am Werke sind,
Wieder Unheil zu stiften,
Und welche Kräfte am Werke sind,
Den Frieden zu begründen,
Fest,
Ein für allemal.

Rückschauend
Das Heute durchschauend,
Wendet sich
Der Blick
Ins Künftige,
Den Menschen sichtend:
Frei,
Einfach,
Schön,
Dem Traum entstiegen
Der Jahrhunderte.

In a neutral and poetic dream we may find, beyond the rigor of systems, the communality of our human aspirations.

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